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Dissertation in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Ph.D.
THE THIRD WORLD . . .
. . .does not mean to organise a great crusade of hunger against
the whole of Europe. What it expects from those who for
centuries have keept it in slavery is that they will help it
to rehabilitate mankind, and make man victorious everywhere,
once and for all ... This huge task which consists of re¬
introducing mankind into the world, the whole of mankind, will
be carried out with the indispensible help of the European
peoples, who themselves must realise that in the past they have
often joined the ranks of our common masters where colonial
questions are concerned. To achieve this the European peoples
must first decide to wake up and shake themselves, use their
brains, and stop pi«y±rtg the stupid game of the Sleeping Beauty.
FRANZ FANON.
PREFACE.
Strategic thinking is an area which has usually been
leftto tiepoliticians, historians and the military. The development
of the theory of games, and the rapid growth of experiments result¬
ing from it in the last decade, has opened the possibility of the
serious study of the fundamental psychological processes common to all
application of strategic thinking. The theory of games provides a
coherent logical framework for the analysis of strategic situations.
But the experimental studies have shown that in such si taxations, hu¬
man beings do not act according to the 'rational' prescriptions of
the theory of games.
This dissertation is an attempt to demonstrate experimentally
some of the psychological variables influencing strategic thinking.
In a field study in Cyprus the same basic psychological measureing
instruments were applied to examine the possibility of using concepts
and measurements derived in the laboratory in the analysis of the
strategic considerations of an on-going conflict.
The studies were carried out in Oslo, Norway, and Cyprus,
in 1965, within the stimulating milieu of the International Peace
Research Institute, Oslo. To those who have experienced this stimu¬
lation (their number grows rapidly large), my debt in the following
pages will be obvious. The 'milieu' extends by now to friends in
Copenhagen, Lund and London who, like myself, have been exposed
to the whirlwind of creative ideas, theories and research of the Oslo
institute's Director, Professor Johan Galtung. Sometimes we have
been caught up in his ideas, sometimes we have spun off in another
direction. Always we have gained from the immersion, and I xjould
here like to express my gratitude.
The findings reported here have been published previously in
a series, of papers in the Journal of Peace Research and the Proc-
eedings of the International Peace Rs earch Associati on. as ac¬
knowledged in appropriate footnotes in the text. However, they
have been subjected to thorough revision and in some cases re-
analysis, as in the case of the factor analyses presented in Chap¬
ter 4 for the first time.
The findings are supplemented by a more complete attempt to
spell out the theoretical considerations guiding the study and a
review of much of the relevant literature. The final chapter ex¬
pands some of the implications of the rest of the dissertation into
an initial attempt at a possible theory of strategic thinking. This
was presented at an early stage at a seminar at the International
Peace Research Institute, Oslo, but has not otherwise been present¬
ed in piiblic. It is intended that this will form the basis of some
further studies. These will be carried out at the Institutes of
Psychology and Sociology, University of Bergen, with funds from the
Norwegian Council for Research in Science and the Humanities.
The present research would not have been possible without
the financial support of the Department of Education and Science,
London. I am also grateful for material support from the Inter¬
national Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and the Institute of Psych¬
ology, University of Oslo. The dissertation has been written while
at Professor Stein Rokkan's Institute of Sociology, University of
Bergen. My thanks for this opportunity ar-e due to Professor
Fredrik Barth, who as an anthropologist renowned for his use of
game theory, gave me important feedback on my own field research,
and then suggested I come to Bergen.
For advice and assistance in the experiment I would like to
thank Finn Tschudi and Hilmar Nordvik, of the Institute of Psychol-
ology, University of Oslo. The field study could not have been
carr.iedWou'u/^e help of the United Nations Association Internation¬
al Service and War on Want (London). Any value there is in my
attempt at analysing the Cyprus situation is due to the friendly
hospitality of the Cypriot people, who readily provided me with
information, and in particular to Daphnis Panagides, whose many
years of struggle on behalf of his people did not prevent him
taking time to introduce me to them and their problems.
-iii-
Finally, I should like to thank my supervisors in Edinburgh.
This difficult job was first taken on by Professor James Drever
and Dr. John Butcher, and later by Drs. John and Halla Beloff.
An absent pupil is the not the easaaet to teach, especially when
he does not write as often as he should. I hope that any con¬
fusion I may have given them as to what I was doing will be cleared
up with the presentation of this thesis. No responsibility for any
inadequacies can be p laced upon them, and I regret that I have not
made better use of their talents and experience.
M.L.
Bergen/faay, 1968.
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Let us imagine an actor, A,a living, system maintaining a dynamic
steady state in a complex' environment. Of the possible actions, many are
subject to physical, biological and other restrictions. We may say,
however, that A has a set of actions (a^, a^, ... a_^) available
to him. In decision theory (e.g. Edwards, 1954; Thrall, Coombs and
Davis, 1954), each of these actions would, at a given time t, result in a
certain outcome with utility. U, and -probability, p. Thus, at time t,
A may choose from the set of actions according to the decision matrix
((U . p ), (U . p ), ... (U . p )). The outcome of the choice
of action results in a feedback of information enabling A to check the
accuracy of the prediction determining the previous choice and hence
providing the basis for a succeeding choice of action. In this way
A is able to adapt to the realities of the external environment.
These concepts form the basis of contemporary cybernetics (wiener, 1949,
1950), information theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1949; Cherry, 1957), choice or
utility theory (e.g. Marschak, 1954) and decision theory (Edwards, op. cit.;
Thrall, Coombs & Davis, 0£. cit.) These theories have in general developed
as branches of formal applied mathematics, stimulated by new disciplines
such as communications engineering and operations research. Uhile they
have been developed outside the confines of academic psychology, they seem
to the present author to offer the possibility of a comprehensive framework
for analysis of a range of psychological problems. A more systematic attempt
to examine the implications of these theories for psychological theory is made
in The Logic of Human Delations: Aspects of the Theory of Games as a Dodel
of human behaviour (Lumsden, 1964). Only some of the major aspects will be
pointed out here since the present aim is empirical application rather than
theoretical development.
The model of A's behaviour suggested above already leaps into the
realm of psychology from that of pure decision theory since, as Stogdill
(1962) points out, "Decision theory and utility theory are based on simplify¬
ing assumptions that seriously limit the validity of any outcomes generated
by the theories. Only when expectation is defined as a learning or reinforce¬
ment theory does it appear capable of predicting response and accounting for
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the complexities of individual personality and group structure." (p.52.)
Statistical learning theory (e.g. Estes, 1954, 1959, I960; Bush & Hosteller,
1955) fits comfortably into the same class of theories. That they deal with
parts of a complex process is suggested by the way they are inter-related in
diagram 1.
The theory of games is added to the schema because it may be regarded
as dealing with a subclass of decision processes, those where the major
source of uncertainty in A's environment is due to other actors. Organisation
theory deals with that class of actor which is itself a set of actors,
organised according to certain formal and informal rules (roles). General
systems theory deals with the interaction of such systems of actors. In
concerning itself with systems of interacting systems, general systems
theory to some extent subsumes all of the the other theories; on the other
hand it points to changes in the state of the system resulting from the
total nature of that system rather than from aspects of the subprocesses
functioning within the system.
information theory has had a great influence on psychology which may
perhaps be summarised as follows. Information has a complex function:
1. Information is required to give the probablility functions, p;
since the actual probablilities are rarely known, these will usually
be estimates made by A on the basis of information available at time t.
(i.e. they are subjective -probabilities.) At time t + 1, the estimate
may be revised on the basis of additional information generated by the
outcome of the action at time t. This kind of information is knoxvn in
information theory as H, where the average amount of information
conveyed by one event in a series of events is defined as
n
Bn = pi l0fr2 Pi'
1=1
where p. is the probability (relative frequency) of the event, and the
unit is bits (binary digits) of information (Shannon & Weaver, 1949°,
Cherry, 1957).
2. Information is required about the utility of the available outcomes
of actions. 'That is, the information transmitted from the environment
may also carry significance, or meaning, which we shall denote S_. (See
Leont'ev & Krinchik, 1962; Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957.) This
enables A to put a value on the alternatives available as well as a
probability.
3. In a situation of uncertainty, information itself may have a value.
It may thus also have a cost. (That is, A may expend energy on certain
actions purely to obtain information.)
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I V
Information not only needs to be acquired, it needs to be processed,
another factor to be considered when assessing the cost of the information.
As Lanzetta and Kanareff put it in a paper entitled 'Information cost,
amount of payoff and level of aspiration as determinants of information-
seeking in decision-making'? "As the cost of available information increases
or as the difficulty of 'understanding' the information increases, the value
of acquiring further information would presumeably decrease while the value
of processing time would increase." (1966, p.472.) While generalised
anxiety seems to increase processing time, Leont'ev and Krincik's work
seems to suggest anxiety about a specific stimulus (e.g. a light signalling
an approaching electric shock unless avoidance action is taken) may decrease
processing time for information and decision-making about that stimulus.
Information is stored (memory) and organised by A, enabling him to
structure the environment, to form a cognitive framework as a basis for
action (Garner, 1962). The payoff matrix may be regarded as a simple
model of (part of) such a cognitive framework
The concept of the matrix (which can have any number of dimensions,
as well as any number of possibilities along each dimension) is used
extensively in the cognitive theories of writers as different as Jean
Piaget (see Flavell, 1963) and Arthur Koestler (1964). These theories
are not concerned with what goes on in each cell of the matrix but rather
with the logical (or psychological) operations which can be performed on a
matrix (for instance, combining two existing matrices to form a new one, the
basis of Koestler's 'act of creation'). The matrix is fundamental both
to computer programming and to modern concepts of methodology in the social
sciences (see Cattell, 1966; Galtung, 1967). Such theories point to the
richness and complexity of the matrix as a conceptual model. The 2x2
matrix which we shall use extensively later is the result of simplification
in the interests of experimental application not of theoretical paucity.
In brief, we are suggesting a model where A's set of actions form
one dimension, and the set of states of the environment form another
dimension. This may be modified to 'perceived' set of actions, and
'perceived' states of the world. On the basis of the information A
receives from the environment he assigns probabilities and utilities
to each cell of the resulting matrix, i.e. the outcome resulting from the
intersection of each possible action with each possible state of the world.
He then chooses in such a way as to maximise the exptected utility (Arrow,1963)<
This our point of departure; the distinct limitations we sha.il return to later.
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1.2. Strategic thinking.
Where the set of environmental states is contingent upon
the actions of another actor (an individual or group), then the matrix
as a cognitive model becomes a strategic, model. Another actor, B, is
a quite special source of uncertainty, since B is capable of acting
independently; the uncertainty he produces may not readily be reducible
by simple observation, since his behaviour is unlikely to be either random
or recursive. In some circumstances B's behaviour may be entirely
conditional on A's, but on other occasions B mfbe deliberately trying
to make his actions unpredictable to A.
In order to act B too needs to reduce the uncertainty in the environment
- and one way to do this may be to make A's actions predictable. This
will doubtless compromise A's feeling of freedom; the very presence of B
in the environment may limit A's possible actions. The same applies to
B. Thus we are faced with the primary existential dilemma of human
relations; if A admits B as a subject rather than as an object - as an
individual, independent, acting being, rather than as part of the passive
environment - then A is threatened with a limitation of his freedom as an
actor (Sartre, 1956; May, 1958). Much of the complexity and interest of
the human condition revolves around attempts to solve this dilemma (Barnes,
1959).
Let us analyse the situation a little further in terms of the matrix.
The first step in strategic thinking is to assess the range of actionsfrom
which B is likely to choose in the given situation at the given time. This
will in turn open a set of possible actions to A. A's set of actions and
B's set of actions thus form the dimensions of a matrix.
A's admittance of B as an actor in a given situation usually also defines
the possible outcomes of the interaction, which will (presumeably) include the
goals of A and B. These may be directly opposed, as where there is a single
indivisible goal-object which both desire to obtain - the situation referred
to by game theorists as zero-sum (Von Neumann & Morgernstern, 1944). In
a non-zero-sum game, the sum of A's gains and B's losses (and vice versa)
will not always equal zero (i.e. both may gain or both may lose).
The second step in strategic thinking, once B has been admitted to
the 'game', is for A to try to assess which action will be taken by B,
so that A can determine his own action accordingly. This is more difficult
than simple probability learning, since B may at any time change any strategy
that he may have adopted. B will change his strategy according to what he
thinks A will do. Thus A has to try to assess what B thinks A will do, and
hence what B himself will do, before A can decide what to do himself. This
is a recursive procedure and could go on to infinity, neither able to decide
what to do. While a computer can be programmed to carry out such recursive
procedures, up to the limits of its memory store, there is some evidence
that the human br'ain is limited to two or three recursive cycles (Miller,
196A).
However, B will probably show some regularities in his behaviour which
simplify A's task of predicting his behaviour. These regularities may
be expected to be related to the values of the outcomes available. Thus
A should preferably know not only the values of the outcomes to himself,
but also the values of the outcomes to B. This may seem simple but can be
difficult, since B may have a different-;'value system. A may thus also have
to assess the utilities that.B_i.s.placing on the outcomes by observing which
outcomes B seeks to a\oid, and which he seeks to attain. That is, B's
actions (in response at least partially to A's actions) carry not only
information, H, about the liklihood of his choosing one action rather than
another, but also information, S, about the significance of the outcomes he
experiences. In the theory of games (Von Neumann & Morgernstern, op.cit.;
Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Midgaard, 1965) a clear distinction is made between
games of perfect information, where the players know both the j values
of the outcomes to all the players and which choices are actually made, and
games with less than perfect information. Further, game theory makes
strong assumptions about the rationality of the players, and, though it is
unstated in the axioms, about their powers of logical computation. Thus,
though we shall from time to time make use of concepts drawn from formal
game theory, we shall in general base our analysis of A's strategic thinking
on our psychological model.
In A's strategic thinking there are at least three levels of sophistica¬
tion in assessing the information transmitted by the sequence of events and
in determining the subsequent actions
(1). Only the significance of the outcome to A is utilised by A, and he
fails entirely to take B into account.
(2). A takes note of the choices made by B with a view to establishing
any regularities in B's behaviour and acting accordingly. A uses information
H available from the relative frequencies of B's actions, but does not take
into account the significance of the outcomes to B.
(3). A utilises all the information available; if he observes that
B is losing by his choice of action, he begins to infer that B may change
his strategy (which is often what A wants B to do), or to infer that the
particular action is chosen because other options are not available (perhaps
for moral or political reasons outside the game), or because B very much desires
the resulting outcome if A changed his course of action.
The third stage is thus very much more complex than the first stage
where A only takes into account his personal gains and losses. For instance,
if he wins he might be expected to make the same choice again; if he loses
he might be expected to make another choice on the next occasion. Thus 'stay'
the same1 and 'change' form the only two strategies available, and the result
of the previous trial provides all the information needed to choose between
them. This is very simmlar to what Peter Cooper (1265,1966) calls 'effects
logic', while the other stages seem to exemplify what he calls 'processes
logic' and Pauses logic'.
There is a further stage in this analysis, however, While A may himself
be operating at one of the higher levels above, he may only credit B with the
ability to employ one of the lower levels. Thus A may think he can change B's
chosen course of action by 'punishing' him, assuming that B's thinking is
at level 1. This assumption may be unfounded, perhaps to A's subsequent loss
when B's behaviour ceases to resemble A's expectations. In experimental
games, and in real life, it is therefore not surprising to find long periods
of 'learning' before the interaction becomes at all stable.
1.3- The application of the theory of games to the study of strategic
thinking: the experimental record.
The theory of games, originatsd by von Neumann and Morgemstern (1944)>
is a sophisticated attempt to construct a complete axiomatic system 'prescribing'
the optimum choice in any theoretical strategic game. The theory of games
is not concerned with games of chance or games of physical skill. Since the
optimum choice istpbefound for all the players, knowledge of these choices
may be said to be the 'solution' of the game.
Like all axiomatic systems, certain assumptions are introduced. The
major assumptions of the theory of games are (i) that the players are able
to order the possible outcomes according to preference. These preferences
are assumed to be consistent and invariant during the game, (ii) The players
are assumed to have perfect rationality, acting only on the basis of maximising
expected utility, with no limitations on their powers of logical deduction,
and not subject to such considerations as those in the previous section.
Nevertheless, precisely because it puts into such sharp relief the-points
of divergence of logical and psychological elements in strategic thinking,
it is a worthwhile exercise the see to what extent game theoretic analyses
can be applied.' Given the clear logical structure provided by the theory
of games extensive research efforts have been made in the last few years
the clarify the-psychological components of strategic thinking as exemplified
in experimental games.
A game may have one move or many (e.g. chess). The sequence moves
may be depicted as a game tree. The edtebThaiaoh of" choid'e's at each move from
start to finish is known as a strategy. Thus in a one-move game, with, say,
two alternatives (e.g. 'heads' or 'tails') there are only two strategies.
If there were two moves and two alternatives each time, there would be four
strategies (e.g. heads-heads, heads-tails, tails-heads, or tails-tails).
The end result of each such strategy is a payoff to each player. The
strategies available to each player form the dimensions of a matrix, with
the payoffs entered in each cell. Thus the sequence of moves shown in the
game tree, the so-called extensive form of the game^may be reduced to a
single matrix, the normalised form of the game. In other words, for the
sake of simplicty, a sequence of moves can be depicted by a single strategy
choice in a payoff matrix.
A distinction is made between zero-sum and non-zero-sum (or non-constant
sum) games. Zero-sum games are those where what one player wins the other
must lose (i.e. the sum of A's gains and B's losses is zero). Zero-sum
games may have a saddle-point ~ an entry in the payoff matrix which is at
the same time the minimum payoff in the row and the maximum in the column.
Von Neumann and Morgernstern proposed that this was the solution to the game,
because the saddle-point is the outcome which minimises the maximum loss to
each player regardless of what the other player chooses. A pure 'saddle-
point strategy' is thus the most rational since it is not. possible to lose
more if the other player is also 'rational' and if he is not it is possible
to win more. In zero-sum games without a saddle-point von Neumann and
Morgernstern proposed a mixed strategy which minimised the maximum loss
in terms of a long-run expected payoff over . repeated trials of the game.
The ratio of the 'mix' can be strictly calculated from the payoff matrix.
The significance of the distinction between zero-sum and non-zero-sum
now becomes clear. Von Neumann and Morgernstern' s work showed that
theoretically in any situation where what one actor wins the other must
lose then the optimum pure strategy could be presribed where there is
a saddle-point or the optimum mixed strategy where is no saddle-point.
This applies just as much to many military or economic situations as to a
game of chess. The .reason why chess has not been reduced to triviality
is because there are too many strategies for anyone to be able to calculate
the optimum one. In situations where there are limited options and the
payoffs can be evaluated some success is claimed for practical applications.
Lieberman (i960) has shown that subjects, untrained in game theory, can learn
to approximate saddle-point strategy after-a number of trials.
The theory of non-zero-sum games is much more complex, since the
payoffs to one player are not necessarily the converse of those to the
other; it is as possible for both to win as it is for both to lose.
(Hence the reason for the expression 'non-constant-sum', since all the
payoffs, to both players may, for example be positive.) First a distinction
between co-oporative and non-co-operative gamest in co-operative games
communication is possible, leading to, for example, bargaining games.
Non-co-operative games are non-negotiable. In experimental situations
this means that the only form of communication between the players is the
information aboutthe outcome of the previous trials - a fact we shall make
use of in later chapters. In n-person games, von Neumann and Morgernstern
believed that coalitions would form, reducing the game to a two-person game.
Likewise, they believed that where bargaining was allowed a 'coalition'
\jould be formed by the players against 'nature' so that the game was no
longer one of pure strategy against a rational player. This is the
theory behind the experimental games we shall discuss later where communication
is not allowed; it is such an important variable that it quite alters the
strategic nature of the situation.
In analysing non-zero-sum games, v'on Neumann and Morgernstern proposed
the concept of a dominating strategy. A dominating strategy is one which
assures a better payoff, whatever the other player does. Where both players
have a dominating strategy, then the resulting outcome may be said to be
strongly stable, if not a solution to the game. This concept is elaborated
in section 3.3when it is applied to the Cyprus conflict. Doubt
about whether a dominating strategy pair is a solution to the game is provided
by the following example - the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Two suspects are arrested and placed in separate cells of a prison.
(The game is 'non-negotiable'.) They are suspected of a serious crime, but
the authorities have only sufficent evidence to corv ict them of a minor crime
Each is informed that if he confesses to the circumstances of the
crime (turns Queen's or State's evidence) he mil be released after a
minor sentence while the other suspect will receive the maximum punishment,,
If neither confess, they will both be convicted of the lesser crime; if both
confess, both will be convicted of the major crime, somewhat moderated because
of the confession. The dilemma is thus whether to confess or not, and the
payoffs might be as shown baLows
Suspect B?
not confess confess
1 year each. 10 years for A/
6 months for B.
6 months for A/ 8 yours each. .
10 years for B.
(from Brand, 1966).
In such a case it is clear that 6 months is better than 1 year, and
8 years is better than 10 years. That is, whatever choice B makes, A will
be better off choosing to confess. So will B. Thus both are dominated by
the 'confess' strategy. According to all the assumptions of rationality
in the theory of games both should therefore make the choice which results
in 8 years imprisonmentfor both of them. If neither confessed, the
'irrational' choice according to game theory, they would each recieve only
one year in jail. The Prisoner's Dilemmais also a game theorist's dilemma.
(A number of attempts to solve the dilemma for the games theorist have been
made, e.g. by Amnon Rapoport (1967).) Since communication is not allowed,
any attempt by one or both of the players in such a game to try to , t
achieve the ndre moderate sentence,'-!*or. each, of .'them.-.. . z..r<z:i: • involves
such psychological factors as co-operativeness and trust. and it is this
which brought the game to the attention of psychologists, particularly
after Luce and Raiffa's discussion of Games and Decisions > (1957).
Reviews of the literature on experimental games, which is by now considera¬
ble, have been made by Rapoport and Orwant (1962) and Gallo and McClintock
(1965). Since that time at least some forty or fifty papers have been published
on the subject. These may be divided into two broad categories: experiments
varying the nature of the game, and experiments varying the nature of the
players.
Experiments varying the game. In a Prisoner's Dilemma where we have two
players, A and B, each have two choices which we may call C (not confess,
or 'co-operate') and D (confess, or '.defect'). Where both choose C (the
CC outcome) the payoff may be called R, the reward for c-operation. Where




DC outcome may be called T, the temptation to defect; and the CD outcome
may be called 3, the 'sucker's' payoff (following terminology suggested
by Hapoport (1963)). A PD game is then one where T > R > P > S. A Chicken
game (the other most 'famous' game) is one where T > R > S >P. In this
case the punishment to both for defecting is the worst possible payoff. Thus,
since some people suggest that the logic of these games is the same as that of
the Cold War, the type of game it is depends on the evaluation of nuclear war,
relative to 'losing out' to Communism or Capitalism. If it is better to be
'Red than dead', then the 'game' is one of Chicken. If it is better to be
'dead than Red', then it is a Prisoner's Dilemma. (Later we shall compare
behaviour in both these games, and propose a means of measuring such crucial
differences in evaluation - something which does not seem to have been done
elsewhere.)
Most of the work has been done on PD games, using the two-person, two-
choice paradigm. ivo attempt seems to have been made to study the effect of
an increase in the number of alternatives available (see discussion of
information transmission in Chapter 2). The major remaining structural
variables are therefore the number of trials, the relative value of the
rewards (i.e. variations in the parameters T,R,R, and s), and the absolute
values of the rewards.
The number of trials is important because it may allow opportunities for
learning. While 'rational' considerations seemed to lead to the DD outcome,
Luce and Raiffa (l957)believe d that in practice subjects would learn to
become increasingly co-operative. On the other hand, the 'rational'
tendency to defect could be expected on the known last trial; however, if the
players reasoned like this, the result of the last trial then became a foregone
conclusion so that the previous trial became the effective last trial; however,. . .
The possibility of the 'end' effect operating is usually eliminated by not
allowing the subjects to know which is the last, trial. Doth Morehous (l966)
and Hapoport and Dale (l966) have evidence that there is less co-operation cn the
known last trial. The effect, in practice,does not seem to go further back
than that.
Most experiments find that tha chance of choosing C on the first trial
is somehwat less than 50%. Thereafter the amount of co-operation seems to
decline, contrary to Luce and Baiffa's expectation. In Rapoport's (e.g. 1963)
experiments subjects typically continued for 300 trials or more. In this
case it was found that there was later in the game a tendency to increase in
co-operation, especially amongst the men* McClintock (1963) Tound that 'inter-
nationalists', after an initial decline in proportion of C choices, became
more co-operative later, contrary to 'isolationists'- Thus, differences in
the players, which we shall discuss la.ter, do not seem to show up until after
some 20-50 trials, Rapoport's work suggests that it is not so much general
factors of 'co-operativeness' or 'competitiveness' which are at issue, but
rather propensities to respond with co-operation or defection following
co-operation or defection of the partner. These propensities, which can be
exactly calculated (e.g. by counting the number of tiraes in 100 trials A
chooses C following CC, CD, DC & DD outcomes), may be given psychologically
meaningful labels, such as 'trustworthiness' (c/CC), 'forgiveness' (c/CD),
'repentence' or 'responsiveness' (to co-operation) (c/DC) and 'trust' (c/DD).
It is these propensities which may vary according to the type of game and the
nature of the players. For the effect of these propensities to become obvious
a fairly high number of trials is required. Put in another way, "the amount
of achieved co-operation is a direct function of the number of trials" (Lave,
1965).
Given that the payoffs can represent such things as 'reward for co-opera¬
tion' and 'temptation to defect', an obvious result is that one can vary
these parameters to see if co-operation and defection vary accordingly. Rapoport's
evidence on the basis of an extensive series of experiments (Rapoport, 1963;
Rapoport <ic Chaianah, 1965) is that in general they do. However, as Rapoport (1966)
points out, there may be an interesting difference here between Prisoner's
Dilemma and Chicken games. In PD, increase in the punishment for joint
defection may be expected to increase co-operation (as it does). In a Chicken
game, the DD outcome is already the worst, so that increasing it may not
necessarily make the players more co-operative, though it may. On the other
hand, an increase in the punishment may tempt a player into thinking that
the partner will not dare to choose D, so he can do so with impunity, so that
an increase in the P parameter may decrease the co-operation. This is a
major reason why strategists have ceased to talk of 'massive retaliation'
(leading, in the nuclear context, to probably total obliteration for both
sides) and now talk of 'limited war'.
'The sensitivity of the level of co-operation to the parameters R,S,R & T,
has led to a number of attempts to find an index, relating these parameters
directly to the amount of co-operation (Rapoport, 1967a; Axelrod, 1967;
Steele & Tedeschi, 1967). The most recent of these, log (T-S)/(R-P),is
claimed by its authors, Steele and Tedeschi, to correlate (Pearson r) .641
with proportion of defecting choices in a wide range of experiments.
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Absolute differences in the payoffs may also be varied. If the logic
of the Pn is a general phenomenon, then its effects should apply whatever
the order of value of the payoffs. Evans (1964) found no significant
differences in behaviour where payoffs were in terms of imaginary money and
real points on a subject's examination score. This was the opposite to Gallo's
(1963) finding of differences in the Deutsch and Krauss trucking game when
money payoffs were real instead of imaginary. McClintock and McNeel (l966),
in what they refer to as the Maximising Difference (MD) game,found in general
similar results using Belgian students to most of the other experiments
using American students but found that where payoffs were higher (.5fr. per
point) co-operation was higher than where they were lower (.05 fr. per point),
however, this does not allow us to say anything about the PD game or other
samples. Radlow (Radlow, 1965; fladlow & Weidner, 1966) uses a technique
of having a payoff matrix in whole dollars, but of only paying out on one trial,
determined by a random procedure; the results seem to be essentially similar.
bixenstine and Blundell (1966) used manipulations of the payoff structure
to show that the payoff accruing' to the lone defector was mare siror^Ly motivating
than the fear of getting the small payoff of the lone co-operator in leading to
a D choice.
PD games inherently allow of no communication between the players, but
Radlow and Weidner (l966) compared the usual situation with one where the
players were able to choose from a set of commitment cards, which were shown to
the other player. The commitments were not enforcible in any way, but neverthe¬
less they resulted in a high and constant degree of co-operation. The standard
group's level of co-operation was low and showed the 1 U-shaped: effect previously
reported independently by Radlow (l965) and Rapoport and Chamnah (l965) <•
Radiow suggests that the U-shaped curve results from the fact that the lack of
communication means that the choices are the only way available for the
players to "explore one another's intent". We shall take up this point later.
Experiments varying the subjects. As Bixenstine and Blundell (l966) point
out, so much of the variation in experimental games is accounted for by
structural, stochastic and dynamic (strategic) factors, that there is
little left to be related to personality. In addition, as Rapoport (1963) has
shown, there is so* much of an interaction between the players that individual
influences are very difficult to determine. Nevertheless, when the games
are run for a sufficient number of trials and matched groups of subjects are
compared, differences emerge on a number of personality dimensions.
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Lutzker (i960) found that 'internationalists' were more co-operative
than 'isolationists', comparing the top and bottom quartiles of a sample
who had completed a scale of attitudes. This finding was confirmed by
McCLintock et. al. (l963), who showed that after a number of trials the
internationalists showed the U-shaped effect, whereas the isolationists did
not. Using the experimenter as a stooge partner playing strategies of
85'/°, 50/o and 15/° C, they found that the strategy of the ' other player'
seemed to have no significant effect on these results. (The strategy of the
other plciyer has also been varied by Bixenstine & Wilson (l963)> Serniat (1964),
Solomon (i960) and Harford & Solomon (1967). Most of these authors find that
the strategy of the other player does affect behaviour.)
Dolbear and Lave (1966) could find no significant relationship between
behaviour in a PL game and a measure of risk orientation. Nor, in a different
kind of game, could Pilisuk et al. (1965)•
Oskamp and Perlman (l965, 1966) have found that students in a small
college seem to be more co-operative than students at a large university.
In their second experiment they compared groups on a sociometric measure of
friendship and found that in one case the higher the friendship between a
pair the higher the co-opera.tion; in the other case the higher the friendship,
the lower the co-operation. In the latter case they suggested that the
emphasis on business and politics at the particular institution may help to
explain the results. Swingle (l966) (in another kind of game) found that
an unco-operative partner produced a reduction in S's level of co-operative
responding when the partner wqs either liked or unknown, but the initial
level of C was maintained when the partner was disliked. Ratings of the
partner on semantic differentials seemed to suggest that negative attitude
change night inhibit retaliatory behaviour.
Wrightsman (1966), on a two-trial game with female subjects, found that
persons who believe human nature to be altruistic, trustworthy and independent
(Philosophies of Human Nature Scale) behaved in the game situation in more
trusting ways. However, he found no other personality or attitude measure which
correlated. Real vs, imaginary payoffs seemed to have little influence. Marlowe
(1963) reported on the basis of an adjective check list that co-operative
subjects scored higher on need- abasement and deference, non-co-operative
subjects scored higher on need-aggression and autonomy.
Dencik and Wiberg (1966) find, using Swedish students, that socially
open people are more co-operative than socially riaid. Their Social Rigidity-
Index was made up of the T-scale (Adorno, et al.. 1950), the Dogmatism scale
(hokeach, I960) and the L-scale (himmelstrand, I960; Rubenowitz, 1963;
Dencik, 1965). They found, however, that there was r high correlation
between sex of respondent and score on their SRI, with females being more
socially rigid. While sex differences did not seem to be indicated in
early experiments, they showed up clearly in the work of McClintock et al. (l963),
Rapoport <5c Chamnah (1965). Sampson and Kardush (l965). reported that in a
sample of white children the older males were more collaborative, the older
females were less collaborative. Negro children were more collaborative at
all stages, and they did not show any sex differences. Indeed, post-session
questioning indicated that the Negroes not only collaborated but acted in a
manner to help their partner gain higher rewards for himself. The white
children in the hi gher socioeconomic class became less co-operative during the
game in the younger group, and more co-operative in the older group ( seven to
nine years and ten to eleven respectively).
All this seems to indicate that socialisation towards co-operative and
competitive.behaviour, as it differentially affects age-groups, sexes, classes,
races, friends, unknowns and enemies, is a major factor determining the
cognitive processes behind game-playing behaviour.
A two-person, two-choice game has four possible outcomes. Since the
preferences for these four outcomes held by the two players may be in any
order. That is, there are 41 preference orderings for each player (- 24).
24 x 24 results in 576 different possible 2x2 games, though only 78
of these are non-equivalent. Rapoport and Guyer (1966) have recently
made a taxonomy of these games, which we make use of in Chapter 3.3. In
a subsequent article, Rapoport (l967b) points out that of the twelve symmetric
games, eight are no-conflict games (i.e. where both players have a common
most preferred outcome). Of the remaining four, one is the Prisoner's
Dilemma and another is Chicken (that is, both of these games turn out to
be unique). One of the other two games requires that a player changing to
a co-operative strategy rewards both himself and the other player, but himself
more than the other player; in the other, the change to a co-operative strategy
by one player rewards both but the other player more than himself, Rapoport
suggests that these four games, bringing out the roles of 'martyr', 'exploiter',
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'hero' and 'leader' form four 'archetypes' deserving of further study.
A somewhat different attempt at classifying games xras made by
Wilson and Lixenstine (1962). Theypresented games which allowed absolute
control over personal gain (AP control), conditional control over personal
gain (CP control), absolute control over the other's gain (AO control)
and conditional control over the other's gain . (which follows from CP).
The pointed out that a knowledge of these forms of social control (AP,
CP, AO, for each player) plus the average gain and the average difference
in gain could describe the matrix completely.
A number of other kinds of experimental games have been employed, not
based to the same degree on game theoretic models, Shure, Meeker and
Hansford (1965) have studied the effectiveness of 'pacifist' strategies
in a situation involving manipulation of a mechanical device. Swingle (l967)
has studied 'win-loss differences' in a set-up using model trains and a
tunnel. This has some similarities to the Deutsch and Krauss (i960, 1962)
trucking game, which has been particularly used to study the effect of
threat upon interpersonal bargaining (Borah, 1963; Shomer, quoted in
Aelley, 1965).
Pilisuk and Rapoport have designed a multi-choice version of the
Prisoner's Dilemma which has been used in a series of disarmament studies
(Pilisuk & Hapoport, 1964; Pilisuk. et al. 1965; Pilisuk, 1966; Pilisuk,
et al., 1967).
Pylyshyn, Agnew and Illingworth (1966), following up other studies
of group vs. individual problem-solving (e.g. Faust, 1959), compared
individuals and pairs as participants in a PD game. They found that the
pairs tended to be both more co-operative, especially later in the game,
and to be more predictable (i.e. show less uncertainty) in their
behaviour.
Bixenstine, Levitt and Wilson (1966) found in a six-person form
of the Prisoner's Dilemma that there appeared to no difference in the
behaviour compared with a two-person game. On the other hand, a
condition allowing communication enabled 'contracts' to be formed
which resulted in high subsequent co-operation.
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In spite of the complexities, the experimental record seems
to show that human subjects do act in logical and consistent fashions
in the Prisoner's Dilemma and other such situations, but the logic is
not that of game theory„ It seems a long way from the games of perfect
information played by completely Machiavellian players described by the
formal Theory of Games to the strategic behaviour exhibited in situations
of considerably less than perfect information (about the level of strategic
thinking used by the other player, about his utilities, the external limit¬
ations to his freedom of action, etc.,) in which less than Machiavellian
human beings usually have to act. Since in many cases each player will
be less than completely rational (in the game theory sense), and will be
unlikely to credit the other player with a greater degree of rationality,
each will be faced with the additional problem of making some assessment
of what kind of person the other player is. A strategic choice is
much easier to make if the nature and capabilities of the other player
are known.
As Morton Deutsch (1961) has pointed out there are social situations
which do not allow 'rational' behaviour as long as the conditions for
mutual trust do not exist (using 'rational' here in the everyday sense,
implying co-operation in the PD game); but mutual trust is most likely
to appear where people are positively oriented to each other's welfare.
It is precisely this element which is lacking in the context of inter¬
national conflict. While Deutsch (i960) was able to increase the
co-operation of players in an experimental game by emphasising a co-opera¬
tive orientation in the preplay instructions, players on the international
scence are unlikely to be amenable to such treatment. 'Motivational
orientation' in international relations is likely to be the result of a
long history of prior interaction.
While the restriction to two choices most often used in experimental
situations is a gross oversimplification of most real-life situations, it
has a certain validity at some levels. For instance, at time t, one can
either 'act' or 'not act', (perhaps in the hope that at time t + 1, more
information will be available, or the problem will have 'solved itself').
In extreme situations the limitation of the range of choices has even more
justification. It is well known that emotional stress decreases the capacity
for processing information (e.g. Leontev & Krinchik, 1962° Osgood,
Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957). Smoker (1967) has recently demonstrated the
phenomenon in a study of response delays to diplomatic notes between
India and China at times of crisis. 'Psychologic' (Osgood, 1961) then
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limits the number of perceived alternatives by 'rounding-off' the
probablility-utility structure of the possible outcomes. This increases
the cognitive structure and reduces uncertainty to make the most efficient
use of the limited information-processing capacity. Vail (1954-), Edwards
(L954), an^ Van der Meer (1963) have all demonstrated a 'preference'in
probability estimates for the 'round numbers' (0.0, 0.5, 1.0, etc.) even
in relatively non-stressful experimental situations. Festinger's cognitive
dissonance resolution (1957) may be interpreted in terms of rounding off
the utilities.
In conditions of stress, behavioural alternatives may be limited to
'flight' and 'defence' (Ursin, 1965). Ursin has isolated two closely related
areas in the amygdaloid substrate of the cat which when stimulated 'trigger-
off' one or other of these two responses. Similar findings have since been
reported in pigeons by Steen (quoted in Dalland, 1967). If such specific
relations between brain structure are found in widely.'..diverse, species- such' *':
as a carnivore and a bird then similar relations may be present in higher
animals. The relevancehere is P.. at the flight and defence reactions were
found to be clear-cut and typical and the only two such reactions found.
The problem then becomes one of getting enough information to one of
the flight" or defence boxes' to trigger off only one kind of behaviour.
Man's peculiar aggressiveness (for some ethological discussions see, for
example, Carthy & Ebling, 196.4) may be encouraged by a number of mechanisms;
1. The complexity of the human brain compared to lower animals (a complexity
believed now neuropsychologists to apply equally to the lower centres of the
brain - see Dalland, 1967) has complicated and differentiated the 'triggering
mechanism' of reflex actions.
2. The social nature of man has added threats to his social existence to
threats to his personal existence as triggers to extreme behaviour. (The
same may be said of baboons, for example.)
3. Human society, particularly when oriented towards war, has developed
devices to prevent flight (e.g. the shooting of deserters), thus leaving
only one of the alternatives, 'defence'.
4. Face-saving mechanisms, often to used to avoid confrontations in the
animal world, suffer in human society because of the publicness of most
such confrontations.
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60 The development of military technology (and the concomitant forms
of social organisation), enabling an increasing, distance between the conflict¬
ing parties (whether geographical, social, cultural, economic or political)
tends to increase the abstraction of the threats involved and to decrease the
possibility of testing perceptions against reality. It may thus lead to
an increase in autistic over reality thinking (see McKellar, 1957), where
the abstracted enemy, conflict, threats to existence, etc., are able to
increasingly serve the personality needs of the individual and the needs of
society.
In a word, Man may be becoming a slave of his ideology, not of his
instincts.
Though the credibility is rather low, the Prisoner's Dilemma is
supposed to model an extreme situation; literally one of life and death.
Though flight is precluded, each prisoner may either try to defend himself
(by confessing), or sit back in the hope that the other prisoner will do
the same. Death is the penalty for losing. In the paradigm no social
or ideological factors are supposed to be operating. The Chicken game
also restricts behaviour to the basic elements of 'flight' or 'defence';
in this case 'defence' means maintaining one's course of action, 'flight'
means one's course of action (i.e.the opposite situation to
that of the Prisoner's Dilemma). In the formal theory, payoffs are
usually numbers; in experimental games payoffs are usually small sums
of money (small enough not to make the cumulative result of up to 300
trials not too disastrous for either student subjects or experimenter).
Three important questions may therefore be asked, both of gaming
experiments and of strategic thinking based on this approach; Do people
behave the same regardless of utility values or dimensions in any situation
having the logical structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma? Within the limits
of small numbers of dollars, cents, candy and examination points it seems
that they do; but there is no evidence on questions of ideology and instinct.
Secondly, what are the complex dynamics of strategic thinking, the logics
apparently employed by different subjects? Thirdly, assuming that people
are able to cbrelatively complex rationalistic calculations required by
strategic thinking in normal circumstances, can we assume that they make
the same calculations in conditions of extreme stress (for instance, in
a nuclear war)? Erich Fromm (1961) for one believes not.
It was hoped to begin answering the first of the above questions in
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the experiment described here. An attempt is also made to unravel
some of the dynamic factors in strategic thinking. The questions
require answers before we can make attarpts at generalising from gaming
experiments to real-life social and political behaviour.
At some point we shall have to phrase the questions What conditions
predispose which individuals or groups to flight or defence behaviour?
The study of ordinary people in normal conditions, or even -under extreme
stress, may not be relevant to the study of political and military
leaders at times of crisis? if their situation gets to the stage of
of basic threats to their biological survival they are unlikely to have
the political or military apparatus remaining with which to act.
Rapoport (1966) does not believe we should make such jumps from
the laboratory to the real world of strategy. (Though he is "equally
sceptical about the relevance of strategists' analyses to the rational
conduct of international relations". (p.9S.)) He believes that only
"where the attention is focussed on the structurally essential aspects
rather than allowed to roam in search of real life analogies" can "the
rich promise of these methods" be fulfilled.
What I have attempted to do here is to focuss on the structural
aspects of the psychology of the situation. It has already been shown
that not all students behave in the same way in the same game; there
are differences which seem to reflect personality, social and other
factors. It is clear also that the structure of the game does affect
game-playing behaviour. Though both the structure of the situation and
the role of the actor are largely determined by forces outside the actor
(the experimenter, society, etc.) in the last analysis it is the way the
actor himself evaluates the situation and decides his role that are the
important determinants of his behaviour. The way he structures the
situation will depend on the information he has available; the role he
plays will be determined by the significance of the situation as related
to his value system. The value system is a complex function of personal,
social and ideological values which together determine the utilities of the
outcomes of actions. .
In a psychological analysis, therefore, it is crucial to measure the
values that the players put on the possible outcomes.
While some recent experiments, as we noted, have examined asymmetries
in the payoffs to the players, strategic thinking has in general assumed
symmetric situations. The approach has thus tended also to consider the
players as equal and to assume that they thought in terms of the other
player being like themselves, ('He is like me, therefore if I choose x
he will choose x, therefore I must choose y, ,,, 'etc.) But no evidence
has been presented that subjectsdo regard the partner in the same light
as they regard themselves. The nature of B is not an irrelevant factor
when A is trying to predict his behaviour. Bronfenbrenner (1961), for
example, indicates the Soviets and Americans, far from having the same
image of themselves as they have of the other, have mirror-images of
each other. (To this extent the perceptions seem to be symmetrical.)
The perception that A has of B is an extremely important variable in
analysing his behaviour (e.g. Tagiuri & Petrullo, 1953). This perception
will also depend on the information available (H & S) and will be coded
into evaluative (good-bad) and cognitive (strong-weak, active-passive)
aspects (e.g. Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957), analogous to the probability-
utility components discussed earlier in relation to the perception of situa¬
tions ,
If B is 'good' it makes a great deal of difference whether he is also
'strong' cr 'weak','active' or 'passive'5 if B is 'strong', it matters
to A whether he is 'good' or 'bad'. In gaming experiments, such as PD,
the reasoning could well be; 'The best thing would of course be mutual
co-operation, where we both win; but since he is bad, he would surely choose
to defect, so I would only lose if I chose C. Therefore I am forced also
to choose D.'
This may also occur in 'real-life'; 'Of course we are prepared to
disarm, but since they are by all definitions bad, we should be foolish to
do so and are forced to keep up our level of armaments'. In terms of
psychological 'economics' this simple argument performs a major task. In
the face of dangerous ambiguities it reinforces the self-perception that
one is good, and it gives an apparently rational explanation of one's
response in an irrational situation; the great psychological investment
required to examine the basis of one's own position is therefore avoided.
We have emphasised the questions of information and communication,
the evaluations that the players have of the situation and of each other,
and how the behaviour of the players may depend on the social background.
In the next section we shall pdnt to some aspects of the real world which
enormously amplify the importance of the®factors in strategic thinking.
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1.4. Strategic thinking in a stratified system.
In studies of national society it has long been the custom to classify persons
or groups on the basis of their rank on a series of dimensions - age, income, sex,
education, occupation, etc. Such factors may then be found to relate to things
such ■ as educational opportunity (e.g. Lindbekk, 1967) or attitudes to foreign
affairs (Galtung, 1964, Halle, 1966). (Later, we relate sone of these factors
to behaviour in a Prisoner's Dilemma game (chapter 5).) Just as sociologists
have pointed to the stratified nature of national society, some' international
sociologists have in recent years emphasised the class structure of the world
community of nations.
Socioeconomic factors have not only a direct influenqs on the dynamics of
society but have in addition a psychological component - prestige. It is not
only developmental reasons that excludes the young and the old from much of our
social life in Western society, it is because age gives prestige and status. It may
be found that more . women say they would like to be men than men say they would
like to be women; we may then say that, operationally, being a man has a higher
prestige in the given society (for methods of construction of such indices see
Galtung, 1967). We then find that on the one hand the higher status people read
newspapers and participate in organisations more than low status people
(Galtung 1964 b); and on the other hand, that the mass media report the actions
and opinions of higher status people more than low status people (Galtung and Ruge
1965)o Galtung and Ruge analysing the presentation of the Congo, Cuba and
Cyprus crises in four Norwegian newspapers find evidence for the hypothesis that
a major factor in the transmission of foreign news is the fact that the further
away a nation in status, the higher the status of a person in that nations needs
1 * *
to be in order to have his actions and opinions reported. Ostgaard (1965) reports
a number of factors distorting the flow cf foreign news. There is, in other words
an almost complete lack of communication between the people of the tiers monde
and the people and decision-makers of the Western world, with whose interests
they may often be in conflict. Not only is the nature of the system a source of
intense conflict, but the information flow is such as to lead to inadequate and
distorted images on which to base strategic thinking.
1. The present writer has suggested, in a private memorandum (1965), that newspapers
sell because they resolve uncertainty; they also therefore have an interest in
creating new uncertainty and for it to remain important to the reader, the
sources of uncertainty must be relatively more powerful; hence the emphasis on
the richest Latin-American or the biggest earthquakes. For reduction of
uncertainty as a source of motivation see e.g. Berlyne (1963).
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A number of studies indicate the extent of this problem. In recent years
a massive attempt has been made to collect data on as many nations as possible
and use these as independent variables in the analysis of the domestic and foreign
behaviour of nations. In addition to the United Nations Statistical and
DemographicY earbooks, major sources are Ginsourg (1961; forty-seven indicators
of economic development and under-development), Banks and Textor (1963; fifty-
seven variables), and Hussett, et al. (1964; seventy-five indicators). The
primary result of these studies is to demonstrate the richness and complexity
of international society. But while the statistical approach opens up the
possibility of the systematic testing of hypotheses, the outcomes have so far
proved inconclusive. Once, in the study of national society, there was disagreement"
over the relation of intelligence to social class. Now there is argument amongst
students of international society over the relationship between domestic
violence and foreign conflict. Haas (1965) finds a relationship between such
indicators of domestic stress as high unemployment and high urban population
density and foreign conflict. Feierabend and Feierabend (1966) find only a
weak relationship between an index of frustration resulting from the system and
external aggression.
An attempt to bring order into this confusing wealth of data by the process
of factor analysis has been made by Hummel and his associates ( eg 1966). The
1955 data on 236 characteristics of 82 nations were analysed, giving a primary
factor structure of 14 dimensions (such as economic development, Catholic
culture, political democracy); a secondary structure of five factors (eg.
international rank disequilibrium (after Galtung, 1964a), and political
stability); and two tertiary factors. The latter are difficult to give a label to,
but Rummel (1967) suggeststha.t the first indicates that "nations high in political
stability tend tobelow in rank disequilibrium, i.e. domestic stability is correlated
with international rank equilibrium", and the second third order pattern "shows
that dense nations high in political democracy (first order dimensions) have a
tendency to be diverse linguistically and ethnically, to have a more equal land
distribution, and to be above subsistence levels", (p. 298).
This final factor illustrates the major problem in such studies: it is not
possible to determine a causal relationship, so that there is a danger in the
'factors' reducing to tautologies. This problem may be partially resolved
when trends in data over time can be analysed. Some.attempt to do this using a few
dimensions only (e.g.proportion of national budget spent on armaments, foreign
trade) has been made by Richardson (1939, 1960) and Smoker (1964, 1966).
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However, here we wish to point to a more concrete finding from Runnel's data. This
was that the first order economic, development factor was the largest in terms of
the number of characteristics it included, "Thus in plies that economic develoume-tJL X
is the single most important source ox variation in the internal structure and
foreign behaviour of nations" (Rummol, 1967, p. 198). The economic development
pattern included internal characteristics such as agriculture, arts and
culture, communication, demography, economic, educational, geographic, health,
political, science and technology, social, transportation and values,0 end external
characteristics such as collaboration, international communication, diplomacy,
membership of international organisations, population movements and trade. It did
not, significantly, include such characteristics as history, domestic conflict,
foreign conflict, colonialism, political geography or international politics.
Domestic and foreign conflict came out not only as distinct patterns in themselves
but proved to be unrelated to each other as well as to the non-conflict internal
and external characteristics of nations.
Galtung in his structural theory of aggression (1964.) has suggested that
nations may be assigned a series of top-dog and under-dog statuses - just as is done
with persons on his social position index (see Chapter 5). Since these factors
tend to correlate we may, with a considerable degree of justification, divide the
world into top-dogs (T) and under-dogs (U). Galtung's theory is that there is
a struggle to equilibrate statuses on all dimensions. Thus a nation that nay
be TTU (say, high in economic development, high in foreign conflict, low in
power) wishes to become high on all three dimensions (TTT): the struggle to
become a top-dog on power results in aggression. Rummel claims to have
found just such a factor in his data, which he regards as empirical confirmation of
Galtung's theory. However, inspection of the data presented in his summary
article (1967) fails to reveal such a group of nations. Indeed the only group
of nations (out of 82) classified as 'conflictful' are also 'economically-
developed powers'. They number two - the United States and the Soviet Union.
Haas (1965) also concludes in his survey of several studies that
the rich countries have more foreign conflict than most of the economically ■'under¬
developed nations of the world. This is confirmed by Feierabend and Foierabend's
(1966) more recent study using data from 194-8-55 where the effects of the "'over¬
riding demands of international relations in the case of the major powers" (p,36)
had such an influence on their results that they excluded Britain, France, China
the United States and the Soviet Union from the final analysis,
The date of the data used in these studies illustrates another problem; the
difficulty of generalising to contemporary events and political processes. Since
1955 the number of independent nations has increased enormously (as of October 1967
there are 122 members of the United Nations). The French, British, Dutch and
-24-
Spanish colonial empires have all but vanished, forcing these powers to carve out a
new relationship between themselves and the rest of the world. In addition, since
the Cuba Crisis of 1962, and the development of Chinese nuclear potential,, the
relationship between the two major powers also seems to have undergone a change.
The popular feeling seems have been growing in the West that the sources of conflict
in the world are not now between East and West, but between the new nations of the
South. Thus, in 1964/5 in Norway, France and Poland, 'world war' was going
out as an issue of public concern.and 'hunger, poverty and over-population' were
coming in (Halle, 1966).
The belief in the relationship between poverty and conflict is given some
support by Secretary of Defence McNamara in a speech in Montreal (quoted in Reay,
1967). McNamara shoxred that since 1958 there had been only one major upheaval
amongst the rich nations (using the World Bank classification). Amongst the 38
very poor nations there had been 64 violent domestic conflicts. The number of
outbreaks of violence was increasing each year, almost doubling in nxmiber between
1958 and 1966. Of 149 serious internal insurgencies since 1958, the Communists
had been involved in only 58, and in 7 of these they were themselves the regime
that was the target of the insurrection.
Thxis we have an image of the world, apparently valid on data up to 1955, and
probably essentially the same for a long time after that, which may be exemplified
as follows:
subsystem 1 subsystem 2
high status T T
low status U_. U„. ...U U„. U„. ...U
1' 2' n 1' 2' n
Galtung (1966) has suggested that in such a situation, contact between the
two blocs will be primarily between the two top-dogs, with some contact between
a T and the Us in the other bloc and very little contact between the Us of
each bloc. Data on 15 kinds of communication (eg. exchange of diplomatic notes,
trade agreements, cultural exchange] between the NATO and Warsaw Pact lands confirms
the hypotheses in almost every case at the governmental level, but seems to disconfiri
the hypotheses at the ncn-governmental level. The feudal nature of the links
within such blocs has been shoxm by Schwartzman (1966) and Galtung, Araujo and
Schwartznan (1966). Galtung (1966b) has also made a more complete theoretical
formulation of the situation. Schwartsoan and Araujo (1966) have also related
the socioeconomic level of the nations in the Latin-America system to their
prestige, as rated by students from the various lands. They showed that the image
of the stratification was more dependent on the generalised rank-role of the
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nations than on specific knowledge of economic level, size, etc. That is,
not only do such groups of nations have hierarchical relations on objective
indicators, but they are perceived to have such a status stratification by the
people living in them. At the conscious level there was an exclusive concern
amongst the sample of students with accessible elements such as industrialisation
and education and a refusal to admit that they were using ascribed characteristics
of rank. This contradiction between values and actual behaviour is interpreted as
being related to the transition of the international system from a feudal-like to
a class-like structure. It is precisely such ascribed characteristics that
affect the^el^ction and transmission of news from the 'poor' to the 'rich' nations.
Much of the conflict in the poor nations se&mgs due to , the
attempted overthrow of the feudal leaders by other would-be feudal leaders from
the same class (if not family) in hope of preventing the overthrow of their
class/family by more popular forces (see Fossum, 1967). Such conflicts become
of international concern (and of concern to Secretary of Defense KcNamara) when
they involve the financial, political or strategic interests of a great power.
Because of its economic, military and political involvement, particularly in
latin America and South-East Asia, and to a growing extent in Africa and the
Iliddle-East (Horowitz, 1967) the United States has shown that it is the only Power
capable of, and prepared to, intervene military or paramilitarily in any part
of the \TOrld
Of concern here are not the political aspects but the psychological aspects
of the resulting strategic situation. The changing nature of the international
system seems such as to bring into prominence strategic situations not between
great Powers, or blocs, which although hierarchical in structure have relatively
balanced relationships, relatively good communication, experience in the modes
of interaction and a mutual interest in maintaining the stability of the
system. In the 'new' world it is the feudal structure within the blocs which
is breaking down, resulting in a strategic situation where the communication
channels are one way (from T to U), where the relationship is one of traditional
dominance and submission, where one of the parties wishes to reconstruct the
system, so that there is neither mutual interest in the stability of the system,
nor experience in interacting in the new relationship, perhaps not even a clear
idea of what the new relationship should be. The greater the 'gap' between rich
and poor, the more assymetric this situation will become.
When we relate this situation to the model we have been proposing, the
following points become clear. First, the flow of information is predominantly
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from the top-dog to underdog. B'ecause of the structural filters
built into the news-communication system, the top-dog has extremely limited
information about the values and ectivities of the under-dog. Harrison Salisbury
(1967), the seasoned New York Times journalist, noted on his way to Hanoi:
"Who in America knew anything of Vietnamese Communism, of the nature
of its regime? We possessed a few secondhand accounts from the French
who had experienced the movement in its Indo-China phase; we had some
scholarly studies and a number of propagandistic and self-serving books
written either to justify American policy or to glorify Ho Chi Minh. But
our ignorance was abysmal. And on China the depth ox" misunderstanding
was, if anything, even greater." (p. 6, emphasis added.)
Later Salisbury says:
"And before I left North Vietnam I was convinced that the nature of the
(National Liberation) Front;- and specifically of its relationships to
Hanoi and its probable role in a postwar Vietnam, had been badly misunder¬
stood in the United States. .... I found to my amazement that my ignorance
of the Front's program and policy was shared by American officials with
basic responsibility for our Vietnam policy." (p. 14.2, emphasis added.)
Where countries, such as North Vietnam, have been essentially cut off from
the rest of the world, this is likely to add to the extent of the misunderstanding.
But is easier to get information about a large nation than it is to get it about
a small one (especially where the small one does not publish official statistics).
Secondly, it is extremely difficult to imagine a payoff matrix which can
adequately encompass the range og disparate values and available actions of the
parties in a conflict such as that in Vietnam. The failure of one much-heralded
American strategy after another ('pacification', bscalation',) seems to suggest
that the parties are acting according to totally different rules and totally
different sets of values.
Rummel (1967) pointed out the significance of economic development in
explaining other characteristics of nations. Reay (1967) notes that on some
estimates, while the per capita income in the U. S. may rise from ^3,000 to
± U,500 between now and the end of the century, in the poorest half of the
'developing' nations per capita income on present rates of growth will rise from
$120 to 170 by the year 2,000. There seems to be no possibility of changing
this difference significantly by any means acceptable to the rich nations.
Widespread famine is predicted for dates between 1975 and 1985 by the U. S.
Department of Agriculture (quote in Bonner, 1967), Bonner (1967), Paddock &
Paddock (1967-)., Dumont & Rosier (1966). The Paddock brothers suggestion is that X
the United States should give all-out economic aid to the limited number of
nations with a chance of survival and abandon the rest.
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Dumont (1967) has pointed out that whereas in 1936 the Third World was
exporting 36 million tons of wheat, and in 1966 it was • importing 11 million
tons, by 1980 there will be a deficit of 150 million tons. But he estimates
the cost of producing sufficient natural and artificial fertiliser to make
up this deficit to be approximately 6.5 billion (milliard) dollars - only one
quarter the amount the US is spending on the Vietnam war in fiscal year 1967.
The choice is one of politics, not cf charity.
In a recent study of the 'peace-thinking' of the Norwegian political and
foreign policy elite, Hveem (1967) shows frequent differences of opinion
between the stortingsmenn (members of parliament) and the men in the foreign
service. (E.g. the stortingsmenn identified more with the United Nations and
the Nordic group, the foreign service men more with the Atlantic Pact and the
European Economic Community. The stortingsmenn were predominantly old and
Labour Party, the foreign service young (under 4-5 years) and Conservative Party.)
In another study Hellevik. (1967) has shown that the social position of the
stortingsmenn in the Norwegian parliament has no relation to their position in
parliamentary committees except in the foreign policy committee. In this case
there was a strong relationship between utenrikskommiteen membership, having
a higher income, higher occupation, higher education, living in a metropolitan
area, etc., Foreign policy in other words jsconducted only by top-dogs of
nations.
At the same time Jacobsen (1967) has shown that the Scandinavian countries
between 1956 and 1963 were voting more and more with the rich 'Northern'
countries against the poor 'Southern' countries.
Given the growing plight of the tiers monde. there seems to be a lack
of information, awareness, political responsibility (given the dependence
of the rich countries on the raw materials and food produce of the poor
countries. - see e. g. The Oxford Economic Atlas of the World,1965) and
sense of urgency in the rich countries ( at least in the West). This situation
would seem to be of the utmost significance for a ny attempt to discuss
'strategic thinking'. No theory of strategic thinking can be adequate unless
it can cope with these discrepancies between idealised 'players'in a symmetrical
'game' and the realities of international politics.
In summary we are suggesting that strategic thinking may be quite
fallacious if it is based upon mistaken assumptions about the nature of the
opponent. Much current thinking has developed out of the 'cold' conflict of
big Powers; the opponent is defined accordingly. When the opponent is the
peasant of Vietnam, this strategic thinking may be irrelevant and disastrously
erroneous.(For an analysis of misperception in the Vietnam War, see White
1966). It is not adequate to look for a big Power (China) to fill the vacant
lot in an untenable cognitive structure of the situation.
From the strategic point of view it matters greatly whether T^'s
opponent is It, or . Not only is T^'s strategic thinking based on the
assumption that Tg is the opponent - the low rate of interaction between
and means that both have little evidence on which to base their
perceptions and predictions of each other. T^'s assessment of the effect
of his actions on therefore may be quite mistaken; the liniWfeedback,
far from acting negatively on the system to stabilise it, may act positively,
producing" ever-ineroaEing distortions " ,in perceptions, more and more
inappropriate actions. The situation may degenerate to the stage where
behaviour becomes almost random in the anxious hope that something may bring
about the desired effect.
In such situations it becomes of peculiar importance to find ways of
analysing the strategic situation as perceived by the actors. This means
taking into recount not only the purely military aspects traditionally regarded
as 'strategic', but such less tangible elements as the opponents' perceptions
of each other, the value systems according to which they judge the utilities
of the possible outcomes, the structure of the conflict situation in which
they find themselves, and the modes of strategic thinking which they bring
into it.
We cannot hope here to make a thorough study of these many aspects. What we
attempt to do is to demonstrate me+hoas for measuring values and perceptions
of the actors in an experimental situation in a 'developed' society, and
in a field situation in a less-developed society. Only with measurement comes
prediction and control, and it is essential, for the reasons stated above, that
more objective measures, applicable across widely diverse cultures, be brought
into the study of international behaviour.
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1.5. A note on politico-military devices in strategic thinking.
We have chosen here to regard, strategic thinking as a general phenomenon,
inherent in the nature of human relations. Political and military strategic
thinking are regarded as subclasses, albeit particularly important ones.
In passing we shall point to some of the methods which have been extensively
used in these areas.
1. Rigid kriegspiel. The original 'war games', much used by the Prussians,
had elaborate rules for the various aspects of the mock war - such things as
troop movements, casualtieSj fatigue, effects of weapon3,etc. They would
usually take place on a map, making clear the 'geography' of the 'battle
field', and could be scoredj the winner and loser being determined by the number
of points. The validity of such games depends on how closely the rules relate
to an -actual war. Training officers by such methods does not necessarily
enable them to adapt readily to situations not foreseen by the rules or to
enemies not acting according to the same set of rules. Free kriegspiel is a
version which utilises the judgment of experienced officers, rather than rules,
in evaluating the game.
2. Crisis games. Crisis games are a more recent development, though both the
Germans and the Japanese are known to have used them before World War II
(Davis, 1963). These games rely much more on the role-playing of two or more
actors, and attempts to simulate the geographical environment may take second
place. Again the validity is limited, since it is clear that the role assumed
by the 'enemy' actor may be false. This is illustrated by a recent suggestion
to overcome the problem, common to a number of contemporary conflicts, of
civilians on the battle fields groups of soldiers should be assigned the role
of civilians in military manoeuvres. Clearly, since part of the soldier's
training is to accustom him to being under fire, since these "civilians' remain
under military discipline, are not subject to rape (since they will all be men).
torture or other indignities, nor faced with the destruction of their families,
homes, and livilihoods, the similarity with real civilians caught up in
modern warfare is minimal. Since civilians are a major factor in 'people wars',
the crisis game as a means of planning counterinsurgency is decidedly limited.
It is even more so where the civilians (and the insurgents) belong to
radically different cultures and circumstances from the military elites of great
Powers.
3. Scenarios are attempts to take a given situation and imagine all the
possible developments. They may also be used as a background for war games and
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simulations. The scenario is perhaps best seen as a way of foreseeing possibilities:
it is another question to assign probabilities to these possibilities. Alternative
scenarios may be compared to see which seems most probable when discussed by
a panel of experts. (Thus the scenario of the recent film 'The War Game'
imagined a situation arising from the Vietnam war which led to a Russian limited
nuclear attack on the U. S. Airforce base at Manston in Kent. At a conference in
1965 (before 1 The War Game' was completed) a group of people with some degree of
political and strategic sophistication (the U. S. Ambassador to the Geneva
Disarmament Conference, the strategic advisor to 'The War Game', and others)could
not, after many hours, construct a 'scenario' of 'how we get Johnson out of
Vietnam' which was nearly as convincing as that with the consequences illustrated
in 'The War Game'. Military reviewers of the film were net always convinced by the
scenario; they have not yet suggested ways out of the Vietnhm conflict which
seem realistic.)
4. Simu3 atlon. Simulation may refer to the construction of logical or
mathematical models, of which computer simulation is a main subclass. The
attempt is made to define the relevant variables and incorporate mechanical and
stochastic processes. The approach is more concerned with processes rather than
the environment or the human agent. Such techniques are probably the only ones
with any degree of suitability for planning global strategies a decade or so ahead.
Linear programming, Monte Carlo and gaming techniques can be incorporated to
estimate the long-range 'cost-effectiveness' of weapons systems, etc. (see e.g.
Quade, 1964). However, as Bock and Berkowitz (1966) point out, it is not clear
that such methods have any relevance for broader problems than those of comparing
alternative weapons systems, choosing alternative site for military bases, etc.
A special type of simulation has been developed in recent years (Guetzkow,
et. al., 1963) designed to study certain facets of international political
processes, rather than purely military aspects. The technique employs subjects who
play the roles of a number of national decision-makers in a 'world' of some five
or eight 'nations'. The economic level, growth rate, etc. of these nations are given
along with the size and population. Actions between nations are open to choice
(e.g. they may make trade agreements, political alliances, wars, ) within
repeated limited time periods, which serve to condense real time. There are
restraints on these actions due to economic factors, "consumer, satisfaction, etc.,
which if excouded may result in the 'aspiring decision-maker' coming to power
by election or revolution. There are other elements built into the simulation
such as 'International Organization' meetings and a 'World Times'.
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The Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) is particularly useful for educational purposes,
but has also been used to study strategic doctrines (Crow, 1963), some aspects of
personality such as risk-taking, authoritarian nationalism andaggressive militarism
(Crow and Noel, 1965), and to 'repeat' the events leading up to the First World War
using subjects matched and unmatched (as far as possible) with the Great Power
leaders in 1914- (Hermann & Hermann, 1962). The world situation depicted may be
hypothetical or based on an actual situation, such as Vietnam (Macrae & Smoker,
1967). A current study using an abstract situation is being repeated in the U. S. A.
Japan, Maxico and Norway in order to study cross-cultural differences. The basic
model is at present being revised and extended to enable more precise study of
the nature of the international processes involved (Simulated International
Processes Project, Northwestern University).
The validity of the INS model as representing the real world is of course open
to doubt. In addition, as a research tool,the method is faced with the difficulty
that the considerable expense, number of subjects, data-processing facilities,
etc., required mean that insufficent- repetitions can be carried out to enable
clear patterns to emerge in the results. Nevertheless, since the technique has
undoubted value as an educational device for the increasing numbers of students
of political science, international relations, etc., as well as younger diplomats
and others, it may be that in the years to come there will be sufficent simulations
carried out to enable some systematic research exploitation. For a long time to
come simulation will remain tantalising since the fascinating richness makes it
impossible to grasp all the sources of variance.
It seems that experimental gaming is considerably more sophisticated
scientifically, as Inter-Nation Simulation is considerably more complex politically
and economically, than any of the traditional methods of military planning. The
problem of validity, however, seems almost as bad in the one case as in the other.
As Davis (1963) says, referring to the military use of gaming and simulation,
"We cannot ignore (the problem of validity) much longer".
The approach here is to try, by using the more rigorous experimental games,
to unravel the underlaying dynamic processes involved in strategic thinking. Where
we have used 'real-life' illustrations it is as examples of what might be jossible
at a later stage, when the validity of the resulting hypotheses is proven.
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2. AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY USING CONTROLLED
INFORMATION TRANSITU SSI ON. 1
2.1. Design of the experiment.
The type of gaming experiment featured in the literature has a
major advantage which has attracted little attention: it provides a reasonably
interesting situation in which there is an exact measure of the information trans¬
mitted between the players, an extremely valuable but unusual circumstance.
In the Introduction the need to reduce uncertainty in order to act was
emphasised. Special problems are involved where reduction of uncertainty
requires communication with another individual or group. One major factor
facilitating communication in a dyad is what Triandis (i960) calls
attribute similarity. It is precisely a lack in such attribute similarity
which we pointed to in the last chapter with reference to the international
system. Rommetveit (l955) argued that an acquaintance with the other person's
dimensions of categorisation is necessary to permit communication. Triandis
(i960) also concludes that communication is more effective when there are
shared norms.
Hammond and his associates (Hammond, 1966; Todd, Hammond & Wilkins, 1966)
have developed an experimental technique for studying the effects of induced
cognitive differences in communication. In the present experiment the structure
of the problem is clearly presented to both parties, but behavioural norms are
established during the course of the experiment.
1. This experiment was reported in Lumsden, M., 'Perception and Information
in Strategic Thinking', Journal of Peace Research. 1966, 257-277. The research
was performed while the author was Research Fellow at the International Peace
Research Institute, Oslo. Some of the results were presented at the Second
Nordic Peace Research Conference, Hillerod, Denmark, February, 1966. The
author wishes to thank Finn Ts.chudi and Hilmar Nordvik of the Psychological
Institute, University of Oslo, for their co-operation, and Herman Ruge of
the Norwegian Central Industrial Research Institute, for assistance in the
design and construction of apparatus.
-33-
Toda (l956) points out that communication theory, developed for
engineering purposes, is inadequate as a theory of actual human communication.
He summarised his arguments as follows:
"(a). Human communication is a kind of game, sometimes co-operative and
sometimes competitive.
(b). The receiver's rules of decoding are not usually given; they should
be developed by the receiver himself for each different information source.
(c). The teceiver may extract more than one information content from the
signal ("multiple information extraction").
(d). The receiver is usually not given objective probabilities but he
estimates them. Accordingly, the amount of information and the information
content should be defined with respect to subjective probabilities. Particu¬
lar attention should be given to the problem of information synthesis."
(Toda, 1956, p.212.)
Communication is fundamental to most aspects of human existence and as
such cannot be examined in detail here. (See, for example, Matson & Montagu,
1967.) The complexity of human communication may lead to problems of information
processing and storage (see fields & Abbott, 1963). Miller (1963) discusses
a number of studies of channel capacities in human information processing and
suggests a number of mechanisms of adjustment: ommission, error, queueing
approximation, multiple channels (and decentralisation) and escape. At
high rates of transmission of information preference seemed to be indicated for
filtering and ommission. Smoker's (1967) study suggests such factors operate
at the international level. Indeed, Miller gained an 'overall impression'that
channel capacity decreased from cells to organs, to individuals, to groups, to
social organisations. Marschak (1964) reports experiments which tend to con¬
firm that the basic postulates of decision theory are only actually obeyed when
stress is absent (e.g. when memory is not overloaded, ample time is available,
etc.) . and "above all, when, and only when, the structure of the problem is
very simple and is laid bare, by the use of syntax, tabular presentation, etc."
(Marschak, 1964, p.104).
'Laying bare' the structure of complex international problems may be
possible with game theory (see Chapter 3) but in the present experiment
such problems are avoided by the restriction to structurally simple situations
which are clearly presented to the subjects, in the form of the payoff matrix*
Only two bits of information are required for any individual trial, and
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although the trials were repeated after 10 second intervals, this should be
well within the capacity of the subjects. Obviously recursive reasoning of
the "If I . . . , then he , then I * . . "type would require more
time, but as pointed out in the last chapter, there seem to be limits to
only two or three such cycles and it is not time that is the major barrier.
The problem with which the subjects are- presented in a gaming experi-
such as the one described here is not that of over-coming information over¬
load but simply that of predicting on the basis of his behaviour the choices
of the other player. The information available comes firstly from the
payoff matrix. This is constant during the game and so provides no
additional information. Secondly, in the case of the Prisoner's Dilemma
it is not possible to predict behaviour from the matrix (as it would be
in a matrix where one outcome was the most preferred to both players -
the case in two of our games). The subjects are kept incommunicado during
the experimenti The pattern of responses over repeated trials of the game
therefore provides the sole information on which to base predictions of the
other player's choicesi
The resulting situation- learning t<3'predict another person's actions -
is one which, as Hammond (1966) points out, has received little research
attention. Many psychological experiments have been carried out in two-
choice situations, analogous to that here, both with human and animal sub¬
jects. Perhaps the T-maze (e.g. Hull & Spence, 1938) is the most well-
known example. However, the uncertainty has been due to the experimental
situation, or the experimenter, not to another organism. Rats, for example,
can learn on which aide of a maze there is food. The experimenter may
change the food from side to side on a random basis representing some predetanific
probability, and the rat's learning curve approaches an asymptote approxi¬
mating this probability (Bush & Mosteller, 1955). Human subjects can also
learn probabilities of a set of outcomes, even where there is no 'reward',
for one choice rather than another.
In the present experiment the subjects are faced with a two-choice
situation, with both negative and positive reward possibilities with less
than 1.0 probability. Thus many of the formal properties of learning
experiments are present. However, each of the two available choices may
result in either of two outcomes, because of the independent choice of the
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other player; the situation is strategic. For this reason, no clear
learning curve of the traditional type may be expected. The reason for
this is obvious; the responses are not a true measure of the 'learning'
of the individual, since as soon as the behaviour of one of the players
becomes predictable, the partner may exploit him. Each player may change
his behaviour at any time, obscuring any 'learning1curves. Nevertheless,
there are consistencies in the data, and Rapoport and Chamnah (1965) report
attempts to fit stochastic models to the resulting curves.
However, strategic thinking requires feedback of information, which is
not available until after the first trial. It makes sense to ask questions
about the first trial and then about the learning that the feedback from the
first trial results in on the second trial.
On the first trial, where there is no other information than the
structure of the payoff matrix, and where both available choices may result
in a win or a loss, we might predict;
H„ : The mean probability of each choice on the first trial will be .5.
I • \J
On the second trial we are faced with a number of alternatives. First
we may take q and use it as a null hypothesis, implying that the choices
continue to be random;
^2 0° The mean probability of each choice on the second trial will be .5.
It is well-known that rats in a two-chcice situation such as the T-maze
alternate from side to side (though lesions of the septum may cause them to
perseverate the first response (see Dalland, 1967)). The same might apply
here;
.J; The mean probability of each choice on the second trial will be .5
but this will represent not a random distribution but a change of
all C choices to D choices and vice versa; i.e. the probability
of C following C will be 0.0. and of C following D 1.0.
Since there are rewards and punishments we might expect, on the
basis of another large area of learning psychology, that a gain on the first
trial might reinforce that response so that it would be repeated on the second
trial. Conversely, a loss might result in a change of respcnse in the second
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trial.
EL, 2* Those Ss who gain on the first trial make the same choice on
the second trial.; those Ss who lose on the first trial change
their response on the second trial.
We have emphasised here the strategic nature of the situation and the
need to make predictions about the partner's choices. If a player's own
behaviour is random (EL, ^), changing according to a simple rule (Hg ^),
or changing according to 'effects' thinking rather than 'process' or 'causes'
thinking (Cooper, 1965,1966), then he will not be able to make the maximum
use of the information available. A much longer sequence of responses will
be required to establish regularities in the other's conditional'behaviour '
if the subject's own responses are changing. It will thus also be longer
before the player is able to establish some control over his gains and losses.
Since of the two bits of information transmitted on average . one is provided
by the subject himself, holding his one behaviour constant would enable him to
get the maximum information about the other's behaviour. On the other hand
the player cannot afford to do this for long, since his behaviour will then
become predictable to the partner and may be exploited. However, on the
second trial there is still hardly a basis for predictability of the player's
choices by the partner, and the player could safely keep to the same choice
in ordeb to maximise the information from the other player.
H„ % Whatever their choice on the first trial, and regardless of
• J
whether they made a gain or a loss. Ss make the same choice
on the second trial.
The probability of subjects repeating the same choice we should expect
to become less and less as changing their own responses is the only way of
exploring the behaviour of the partner, and of maximising the payoffs accruing.
In this experiment subjects played four games, two of which (Prisoner's
Dilemma and Chicken) were played for small money payoffs, and two were
played for imagined personal and political values, on the basis of stories
(Resistance and Cuba) intended to match the structure of PD and Chicken games,
but with payoffs on a different scale of values (soo Chapter 3). Measures of
Ss ■ perceptions of each other were taken at the end of each game (Chapter 4-)




In this experinent 30 psychology student subjects played 100




C. 5, 5 -10, 10
Player A




Ci 5> 5 -10, 10
Player A
D. 10,-30 -50,-50
(The first payoff in each cell is that to Player A, the second to B.)
It can be seen that the only difference between the two games is that
the 'punishment' for not co-operating (the DD outcome in the lower right
cell) is increased ten-fold in the Chicken game, making it worse than the
'sucker's' payoff (CD).
The subjects also played two other games, which we shall call Cuba
and Resistance. In the latter, the subjects were asked to imagine themselves
as political prisoners . in an occupied country, where each was an important
member of a rival resistance group. The intention was to model situations
found in such countries as France, Greece and to a lesser extent Norway
during the Second World War. (In Norway the conflict between Communist
and non-communist resistance groups seems to have been played down to the
extent that the younger generation is hardly aware of it, which may be a
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factor in our results.) The two prisoners were kept in separate cells
(and in separate rooms in the experiment) and offered release if they
would inform on the activities of the other group; a prison camp if
they both informed; death for the one who did not inform; and a regular
prison sentence if neither informed. The subjects were asked to rate
these various outcomes on an 11-point scale (see Chapter 3). The intention
was to use the original Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm but give it a political
slant.
Similarly, the Cuba game attempted to give a political slant to the
Chicken situation. In this case an analogy to the 1962 Cuba crisis was
presented where each player was asked to imagine that he was the key
decision-maker of a great Power, where both had made an ultimatum which was
due to expire. At zero-hour they could either keep to the ultimatum - to
launch a major military attack with a high probability of nuclear war - or
back down; because of domestic pressure the latter was a serious political risk
In each of the four games choices were indicated by pressing or not
pressing a switch, which lit a signal lamp on a panel in front of each
subject and the experimenter. An additional lamp, of a different colour,
was flashed by the experimenter to indicate when the subjects should make a
choice. While the choices were being made the current in the whole circuit
was cut, so that the outcomes were shown simultaneously to each player at
the expiry of the choice period by restoring the current in the circuit.
The subjects were placed in separate rooms without knowing who the other
player was. Thus procedure was adopted because a measure of their perceptions
of each other was also required, determined solely by the response pattern
(see Chapter 4-).
The subjects were matched for sex (except for one pair, due to uneven
numbers) and played all four games. Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma were
played first (in random order) followed by Cuba and Resistance (in random
order). The games were played for 100 trials each, except in many instances
of Cuba and Resistance where the games were terminated after the first 30-4-0
trials had resulted in CC outcomes. (The reason for this result, as we shall
see, is because subjects rated the CC outcome highest, so there was no motive
to defect.) For the first "two games payoffs were in small sums of money
(Norwegian ore, equivalent to approximately 1/100 sh. or 1/7 c.) which
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was paid out at the end of the expdrimental session. In cases where the
subjects made a nett loss, they were asked to contribute to a fund for a
class Christmas party.
In order to get the two subjects to the laboratory without them knowing
who the other one was appointments were made secretly and one of the pair
came 15 minutes before the other one. In this 15 minutes he completed the
questionnaire of social position and attitudes (Chapter 5). The other
subject filled out the questionnaire at the end of the experimental session.
Subjects first completed the ladder scales of the Cantril Self-Anchoring
Striving Scale, which was later used to rate the outcomes in the Cuba and
Resistance games. They also rated their perceptions of themselves on 16
scales of a Semantic Differential, which they repeated at the end of each
game, along with a rating of the other player. Thus they were familiarised
with the measuring instruments before the beginning of the gaming session.
The payoff matrix was explained to the subjects and was before them in
each game. In the case of the Cuba and Resistance games the ratings of the
four outcomes on the Cantril scale were transferred to a payoff matrix analo¬
gous to that in the first two games. (However, the ratings of the other
player were not known and had to be assumed by the players. They were of
course known to the experimenter.)
Further details of the experiment may be found in Appendix 1.
2.3° Results.
Figure 1 shows the proportion of C (co-operative) choices in each
block of ten trials for each game. Differences in the games are clearly
shown. There appear to be no clear signs of 'learning' to co-operate, but
this is not surprising given the complexity of the dynamics and the ana.ll
sample. There does seem to be a slight trend in the direction of more C
responses, though a drop towards the end suggests an .attempt by the subjects
to vary their choices, perhaps as a result of boredom.

































































TABLE 2.1. Response characteristics of 30 subjects on 100 trials on-
each of four non-zero-sum games.
Prisoner's Chicken Resistance
Dilemma.
1. Mean % C on trial 1:
Men 58 74 100
Women 36 36 100
Total 50 60 100
2. Mean % C over 100 trials:
Men 52.5 67.2 95.8
Women 41.6 58.9 100.0
Total 48.5 62.5 97.1
3. Conditional probability of C:
(i) After CC
Men 67 .65 .90
Women 53 .58 v32
Total 60 .61 .86
(ii) After CD
Men 41 .45 .96
Women 32 .47
Total 36 .46 .96
(iii) After DC
Men 50 .59 .76
Women 35 .57
Total 42 .58 .76
(iv) After DD
Men ... 39 .61 .76
Women 33 .63
Total .. .36 .62 .76
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(and hence changing the PD game to a Chicken game) had the effect of in¬
creasing the mean percentage of C responses from 48,5$ to 62.5$. The
Cuba and Resistance games were obviously played quite differently (see
Chapter 3).
Table 2.1 presents in addition to the mean % C on the first trial,
and over 100 trials the conditional probabilities of choosing C following
CC, CD, DC, and DD on the previous trial. The figures are presented separately
for men and women to enable comparison with other studies (e.g. Rapoport &
Chamnah, 1965; Dencik & Wiberg, 1966). No reliability can be placed on
these figures in the case of the Cuba and Resistance games, since there were
so few cases of CD, DC and DD outcomes. In the Chicken game the probability
of choosing C following DD increased considerably for both men and women, but
other 'tlto?incfeaood"{juid'Sta&BfcTr* for joint 'defection
while it had the effect of an overall increase, in co-opera tiorrss&e»s to operate
at a simple 'effects' level, rather than changing the logical structure of
the game as seen by the subjects.
Table 2.1 shows the results for each game regardless of the crdaar in
which they were presented. In order to test our hypotheses about the choices
on the first and second trials it is necessary to take the results on the
first two trials regardless of game. Ihia is done in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
TABLE 2.2. Results on the first and second trials of the first game (N"30).
No. of Ss who chose C on the first trial 15
No. of Ss who ch'ose C on the second trial ll
No. of Ss who changed their choice on the second trial 8
No. of Ss who won on the first trial 15
No. os Ss who lost on the first trial 15
TABLE 2.3. Choice on the second trial as a function of win or loss
on the first trial













We see from Table 2.2 that exactly one-half of the subjects chose
each of the available choices on the first trial, a besuit which supports
, namely that in a new and indeterminate situation, choices will be
random. The hypothesis cannot be applied to each of the games individually
in this experiment since all the subjects played all the games, so that
only on the very first trial of the first game was there a total lack of
experience of the situation and of the other player's choices.
Table 2.2 also shows that the choices were not evenly distributed on
the second trial since 8 of the 30 subjects had changed their choice - five
from C to D, and three from D to C. However, as Table 2.3 shows four of these
had won on the first trial and four had lost. The probability of only 4
out of 15 cases changing by chance is 0.59 - which hardly supports H~ ,
though it does not quite allow us to reject it at the 5 per cent level.
There is no evidence for the 'alternation' hypothesis, since only 8
of the 30 subjects changed, Similarly, since 4 out of 15 who won on the
first trial as well aS 4 out of 15 who lost changed their choice on the
second trial, there..is no support for the "reinforcement1 hypothesis (H^ g)*
The best support is for H0 „ since, as we saw under H0 , there is less£ k> j • u
than a 6 percent chance of 22 cases out of 30 choosing the same on two
successive trials.
2.4. Discussion.
In the Introduction the importance of the need for information
in strategic thinking was emphasised and we believe some indication of this
is given in the above result. The information-seeking component of experi¬
mental games has not been studied systematically, since it is usually assumed
that all the information is available in the matrix and that otherwise 'no
communication is allowed'. Some form of verbal communication turns the
game into a bargaining situation, since the. players can then come to an
agreement on how to distribute the payoffs, even though there is no means
of enforcing such an agreement. In Prisoner's Dilemma games manipulation
of their choices is the only means available to the players of exploring the
intentions of each other.
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In the research reported here it has been the policy as far as
possible to keep parallel field and experimental studies. Controlling
information in the field is obviously impossible, but the two areas
studied in the field were chosen because there did appear to be quantitative
and qualitative differences in the amount of communication between the parties
in these two places (Limassol and Nicosia, a provincial town and the capital
of Cyprus, respectively). In Limassol there had been relatively little
fighting between the Greek and Turkish communities, there were no physical
barriers between them, there were functioning administrative relationships,
and areas where the two communities were spatially interwoven. Because
of the small number of 'incidents' there was also little UN activity.
In Nicosia by contrast there was a physical barrier, manned by three
rows of armed men (Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, and the UN Force in
between), a political separation of the communities, considerable tension
and overt fighting, no official contacts - and considerable UN activity.
We were not of course in a position to determine how much each side
tried out various strategies and tactics purely to test the intentions of
the other side. However, it was believed that there would be relationships
between the amount and type of contact and the perceptions that the parties
developd of each other, just as in our experimental situation. These
aspects are explored in Chapter 3. The next chapter explains the use
of the Cantril Self-Ancoring Scale as a measure of utilities both in the
experimental and the field situation.
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3. PERCEPTION AND EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.
3.1. The Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving (SA) Scale
as a measure of utility.
In determining the perception that actor A has of a situation
there are four main variables: A's perception of the choices of action
available to himself; A's perception of the choices available to B; A's
evaluation of the utilities of the various outcomes to himself; and A's
evaluation of the various outcomes to B.
In what follows we have attempted to control the first two variables
by artifically structuring the strategic situation in such a way as to
allow each actor only two possible choices, which are known to both players.
In addition it is assumed in the experimental situation that the utility
of the outcomes is believed by the players to be symmetrical, i.et both
players could assume that the other made approximately the sames ratings
of the utilities. It thus remains to measure the values that the actors
attribute to the various outcomes,.
The literature on the problem of measuring utilities is extensive and
technically complex, particularly where a measure up the requirement of linear
transformation is required. (For a recent discussion and review see Becker &
McClintock, 1967.) Here a measure is used which is adequate to provide an
order of preference of the outcomes, which is sufficient for a considerable
amount of subsequent analysis. Fishburn (1964) points out that ordinal
information about utilities is all that is required in many situations.
The measure used here is that ladder rating, taken from the Self-
Anchoring Striving Scale designed and used in some fourteen widely dispersed
nations by Hadley Cantril and his associates (Cantril, 1963, 1965). As
Cantril explains it:
"... utilizing a non-verbal ladder device (- see Appendix 2), symbolic
of the ladder of life', (the subject) is asked where he thinks he stands
on the ladder today, with the top being the best life as he has defined
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it. the bottom the worst life as he has defined it. He is also
asked where he thinks he stood in the past and where he thinks he
will stand in the fiture. He is then asked similar questions about
the best and worst possible situations he can imagine for his country
so his aspirations and fears on the national level can be learned."
(Cantril, 1965, p.22, original emphasis.)
What is done here, in the first case in a laboratory experiment, and
in the second case in a field study, is to ask in addition for the subject's
ratings on the ladder scale of the various outcomes of the given strategic
sitation. The differences between the outcomes on the ladder give
measures of utility sufficient to establish a preference order for the
alternatives and even to assess the relative differences between them.
The fact that the Cantril technique enables one to discover what
the value systems of the respondents are, and thus to compare value
systems across nations and socio-economic groups, is taken up at the
end of the present chapter.
*j
3.2. The SA Scale in an experimental situation.
3.2.1. Proceduret
Before beginning the experiment described in the last chapter
the subjects made SA scale ladder ratings for themselves and their nation
(Norway). The main purpose of this procedure was to familiarise them with
the scale, which was subsequnntly used to measure their utilities for the
outcomes available in two of the four experimental games - those known as
Cuba and Resistance. Payoffs in the other two games, Prisoner's Dilemma
and Chicken, were in small sums of money, and considering the homogeneity
of the sample (they were all psychology students in the same class) it
was not expected that there would be any significant diferences in the
1. The results of this experiment were reported in Lumsden, M., 'Perception
and Information in Strategic Thinking', Journal of Peace Research. 1966,257-2'
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values of these small sums of money.
The stories attached to the Cuba and Resistance games were intended
to give the strategic situation the same structure as in the Chicken and
Prisner's Dilemma games respectively - the difference was that the pay¬
offs were large, political and imaginary. There were four possible
outcomes in each game (see Appendix 1), and the subjects were asked
to rate each of them on a ladder scale. The values of the resulting
utilities were then put in the form of a payoff matrix, giving the
subjects a visual picture of the game and making clear the similarity
of structure with the much simpler money-payoff games (the matrices of
which were also presented to the players).
This technique gives a check on whether the Cuba and Resistance
games were perceived as having the structure intended by the experimenter,
namely that of Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma.
3.2.2. Results.
Distributions on the ladder ratings for 'self' five years
before, at the time of the experiment, and five years after, are shown
in Figure 3.1. Equivalent results from the ratings cf the nations are
shown in Figure 3.2. While there are changes for the better in both
cases between past and future, there is much more consensus on the ratings
for the nation. In Chapter 5, these ratings are split according to the
social position of the respondents. In section 3.3.3 (Table 3.2) the
mean ratings are compared with those of the two samples of Greek Cypriots.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4- show the ladder ratings of each of the four
outcomes in the Resistance and Cuba games respectively. Table 3.1 gives
the mean ratings and compares them with the payoffs in the Prisoner's
Dilemma and Chicken games.
It is clear from Table 3.1 that while the DD outcomes had the correct
relative position with regard to the CD and DC outcomes to classify the
games as a PD and a Chicken game, in both cases the CC outcome was clearly
the most preferred, instead of being the second most preferred. Thus the
two games with imaginary political payoffs were not structurally the




































TABLE 3.1. Structure of the four experimental games, "
CC CD DC DD
1. Prisoner's Dilemma 5 -10 10 -5
2. Chicken 5 -10 10 -50
3. Resistance 7.64 1.86 4.04 5.46
4. Cuba 3.60 3.03 4.84 1.10
x Games 1 & 2 judged by real money payoffs; games 3 & 4 judged
by ladder ratings, taking the mean over the 29 subjects.
games we had hoped, so that we cannot compare behaviour in games with
real money versus imaginary political payoffs as hoped.
The subjects' behaviour was consistent with their evaluations - that
is they made co-operative choices almost 100 percent of the time (see
Figure 2.1).
3.2.3. Discussion.
We are left -with the conclusion that the ladder ratings give
an excellent check of whether the subjects' perceptions of the strategic
situation are the same as those imagined by the experimenter. This is
precisely the kind of check required in strategic situations; it is
partucularly important where the opponents represent widely diverse
cultures and circumstances. One of the najor advangages of the Cantril
technique is that it is designed for cross-cultural use.
The subjects' behaviour was consistent with the results given by the
test. But wedbnot. know if they would make the same ratings and act accord¬
ingly if they were really in the situations they were asked to imagine.
This remains the Achilles heel of the whole attempt to apply games theory
to international conflict.
The hardened games theorist may wonder at the fact that receiving
a prison sentence instead of being let free; and achieving an uneasy
compromise instead of a strategic victory, were given the higher ratings.
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It seems too much like irrational behaviour. It is clear that higher
values were operating than that of immediate personal gain. The social
and political context in which strategic thinking takes place is crucial
to the understanding of the actors' evaluation of the payoffs. In this
case, the Cuba and Resistance games could be interpreted as games within
games, where nuclear war and the occupying forces, respectively, were the
opponents in a superordinate games The error of the experimenter in failing
to predict the utilities of the subjects lies not so much in the basic con¬
ceptualisation, but in failing to apply it at more than one level. This
is an additional complication in the experimental design, and a further
argument for resisting the temptation to use real-life analogies at this
stage. (For a theoretical discussion of factors 'transcending' the game
see Midgaard, 1965.)
In experimental situations, the evidence (see Chapter 1) sugggests
that within the limits of the experimental design, the subjects do act
according to the payoff matrix, particularly when the matrix is presented
to them. The variations in behaviour in the Prisoner's Dilemma are be¬
cause it is a genuine dilemma, and the dilemma is approached in different ways.
We shall now attempt to make use of the ladder ratings as a measure of
the utilities of the major outcomes in a real conflict situation.
3.3. The SA Scale in a field study of Cyprus."^
3.3.1o Introduction.
While questions of strategic analysis have been much discussed in
recent years, the method rarely seems to have been applied to concrete ex¬
amples in current conflicts - at least in the publicly-available literature.
A number of reasons might be suggested for this; strategists have been
1. This section was discussed in outline at a seminar in the Department
of Politics, University of Lancaster, 17 January 1967, and presented as
a paper at the Second International Peace Research Association Conference,
TSllberg, Sweden, 17-19 June 1967, under the title 'Cyprus; A Case Study
in Strategic Analysis'. To be published in the Proceedings as publication
no. 1-7 from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.
preoccupied with East-West confllicts, seen as essentially symmetrical
between more or less equal power blocs; strategists have been more
concerned with Great Packer conflicts, rather than with TU (top-dog -
under-dog) or UU (under-dog - under-dog) conflicts; and of course,
professional strategists are usually in the employ of one of the interested
parties to a conflict, so that their analyses are not usually published,,
The apparent degree of success of 'under-dog' strategists such as
Mao Tse-Tung, General Giap and 'Che' Guevara is presumeably attracting the
attention of Western strategists, in an effort to devise counter-strategies.
It could be a major research topic to make a formal comparison of the
contrasts in strategic thinking involved; an initial look at some of the
material suggests that not only differences in cognitive style (the
kind of language used to describe the strategies), but also differences
in cognitive mode are inportant factors (a distinction we shall return
to in Chapters 5 and 6),
There are major methodological problems associated with applying
game theoretic and other models to real conflicts. Any real conflict
tends to be much more complex than any model (particularly any formal
model), having many factors 'transcending' the game. Secondly, the
problem of measuring the variables in the model has not usually been
solved. In this s'ectionthe Cyprus conflict is chosen because it is
not too complex, and for the purposes of illustration can be examined
as a two-person, two-choice game. Taking the resu ts from an empirical
attempt to measure the utilities that Cypriots have of the simplified
matrix (Union with Greece, Partition, peace between Greeks and Turks,
and war between Greeks s.nd Turks) we then discuss, in hypothetical
vein, alternative matrices.
3.3.2. The model.
For the sake of discussion here, the model taken is the simplest
strategic model possible; it assumes the minimum number of actors (two),
each with the mimimum number of choices (two). This results in four
possible outcomes. Each of these is assumed to have a measurable value
to the participants, so that thoy can be ordered according to a linear
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preference function. The poss5„ble outcomes will be referred to as
1, 2, 3, and 4, where 1 <2 <3 <4, <_ meaning 'is preferred less than'.
Only an ordinal scale is assumed in the discussion.
The two prime actors in the system are the Greek Cpriots and the
Turkish Cypriots. While Greece and Turkey, the Great Powers, the United
Nations and NATO all have a role to play in the conflict, this discussion
will be limited to the prime actors, since ultimately no solution is
possible if they choose to go on fighting. I shall frequently use the
terms Turks' and 'Greeks' therefore to refer to the Greeks and Turks of
Cyprus only, not those in the mainland countries.
Each of the main actors has stated a clear but extreme position
which is unacceptable to the other side While the degree of commitment
to these extreme positions is unclear (see later), each side fears that
the other is so committed. Becasue of the relative balance of power
(the Turkish Cypriots having the threat of almost instant Turkish backing
on their side because of geographical proximity to the Turkish mainland -
visible from the nothern coast of Cyprus) these fears mean that any
misinterpretation of the moves or motives of the opponent rapidly in¬
duces a danger of war. Any move by the Turks is seen by the Greeks as
an attempt by a minority of Turkish 'terrorists' to overthrow the Govern¬
ment and/or set up a separate statej any move by the Greeks is inter¬
preted by the Turks as a threat to their existence. The existential
nature of the conflict is an important element. When the Turks talk
of their possible annihilation by the Greeks they use historical and
recent examples of actual killings and even massacres to show the danger.
But I believe the danger of actual killing is grossly overstated: the
real threat they feel is to their existence as a definable, self-determin-
1
xng community. They do not went their social values, religion and cul¬
ture to be trampled underfoot by the more numerous, entrepreneurial Greeks.
They are particularly sensitive to this threat since the Turks were for
more than three hundred years colonial masters of the Greeks, and later
1. This judgement is based on extensive personal interviews with Turkish
Cypriot leaders in Cyprus, August 1965. (See Lumsden, 1965,1966a.)
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enjoyed a special relationship to the British, who were happy to divide
the communities in order to rule. Partition (Taksim). where the
Turks unite part of the Island with Turkey if the Greeks unite with
Greece, or Federation, where the Island 3s divided into two self-
governing units with a minimum of federal links at' the top, are put
forward as solutions where the Turks can be their own masters at least
in part of the Island.
The Greeks on the other |iand, after nearly four hundred years of
alien rule of varying degrees of oppressivenes (under the Turks they
had the choice of giving up Christianity and becoming Moslems, having
their heads cut off, or paying blood money to the Turkish emperor -
a tax which continued to be extracted by the British from 1879 to 1914-
and paid to the Emperor as rent for the strategic use of the Island)
are determined to show that they are now in charge of their own destiny.
They want to prove (to themselves as much as to anybody else) that they
are neither controlled by the former colonial powers or their NATO allies,
nor prevented from taking hold of the reins of government in both hands
bu the Turkish minority.
Two possibilities serve these functions. One is Enosis. the union
of the Island with Greece. This was the aim of the insurgency movement
against the British, frustrated by the London and Zurich agreements which
brought and end oo the fighting in 1959. It is still the aim of a large
section of the nationalist movement, headed by General George Grivas, who
apparently enjoys the backing of successive Greek Governments.
The other possibility is an independent, unified nation with a Greek
majority government, and certain personal, religious and cultural rights for
the Turks. This perhaps .has a greater appeal for the politicians in power
since it enables them to continue to play a role on the world stage, as
well as remaining politically in advance of the regime in Athens. (It
is even more doubtful that Makarios would like to merge his religious
role in the Greek religious hierarchy, since within the Orthodox Church,
the Cyprus Church enjoys 'autocephalous' status, second only to Istanbul
(Constantinople).) (A fuller account of the background of the conflict
may be found in Lumsden, 1966b.)
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Thus both sides have an extreme choice (Enosis for the Greeks,
Taksim for the Turks) which is quite unacceptable to the other side,
and some less defined alternatives. If there is a peaceful solution
it probably lies amongst these alternatives° as yet it has either
not been discovered, or remains unacceptable to one party or the other.
The real situation will be discussed again later, but for the initial
discussion it will be assumed that each side is faced with essentially
two choices; the extreme political choices of Union with Greece (the
Greeks) and Partition (the Turks)5 or something less than these ideals,
but which represents a possibility of peace between the two communities.
Peace depends on the co-operation of thw two communities, and can be
prevented by one of the communities if it insists on its particular
•hard line'. Thus, if the Turks give up the idea of Partition or
Federation for the sake of peace, the Greeks might more easily achieve
Enosis. If the Greeks give up Enosis, and the Greek forces go home,
the Turks might find it easier to split the Island in two (as to some
extent they already have a.ttcmpted by moving some of their own popula¬
tion into Turkish-controlled areas).
For the sake of discussion, therefore, we shall allow each side two
choices only - co-operation and competition (or integration and conflict),
We shall suggest four possible outcomes as in the matrix below;
MATRIX 3.1" The Cyprus conflict as a 2 x 2
Choices open to Turks,









Each of these outcomes may be regardedac having a certain utility,
which may be positive or negative, and may be different for each player.
Thus peace might seem to most variable alternative to outsiders, bum it
may not be to the Cypriote, or at least to the leaders who make the policy
decisions. Thus the Greeks believe that the Turkish leaderhip has a higher
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value for Partition than for peace., while the Turks believe that the
Greeks have a higher value for Union., with Greece than for peace 'with
the Turks. Hence each, following the logic of the Prisoner's Dilemma,
chooses conflict rather than co-operation, believing that the other will
choose the competitive policy. This prevents the opponent attaining
his objective (if necessary by fighting an 'honourable and glorious'
battle), and if the other does after all back down, ghe competitor wil]
(he thinks) attain his objective. The aiguments are thus circular, dead¬
locked by suspicion and lack of trust.
Thus the question may be put; Is the Cyprus conflict, as viewed
by the participants, a Prisoner's Dilemma, where peace is prevented by
lack of trust and communication? Is it a Chicken game - which is
structurally similar, except that, unlike a Prisoner's Dilemma, Partitiom
would be valued as a better alternative than war by the Greeks, and Enosis
better than war by the Turks? Or is it some other kind of non-constant
sum game?
3.3.3. The data.
The possibility of studying a real, on-going conflict is one
which is both exciting and frightening - exciting because of the feeling
that the key to the -understanding of conflict behaviour may lie at the
scene of the conflict; frightening because of the insurmountable-look¬
ing practical and methodological difficulties - and because there is some
danger involved.
Though the conflict in Cyprus is seen essentially as a two-party
conflict (greatly complicated because of intervention by various other
Powers) a third party, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
has been injected, though on somewhat different terms. The aim of
this third party is to stop fighting between the other two, and, hope¬
fully, to induce some co-operative behaviour between them.
The purpose of the present study was to gather hypotheses for further
work; to gain first-hand experience of the problems of two-party conflict
and third party intervention; to assess the feasibility of field research
of conflict; and to try out two measuring instruments of relevant variables.
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- the perception that each side has of the others (see Chapter 4-)?
and the subjective utilities of the various possible outcomes. While
communication between the parties is a very important variable it is
very difficult to measure. However, an attempt was made to compare
samples in Nicosia, where there is a rigid division of the Greek and
Turkish communities, but much contact with the UN force, and Linassol,
where there is no such rigid separation, but little UN presence.
It was not possible for the author single-handed in a short time
to attempt a sophisticated sampling procedure. He therefore arranged
to take samples which nay be described as likely to be 'fairly representa¬
tive' of the population as a whole, but which were comparable amongst
themselves: these were four classes of senior secondary school pupils,
aged 17 years, selected from the middle range of ability. There were
two Turkish and two Greek Cypriots classes, one each in Nicosia and
Limassol. The school system is such that the schools contain pupils from
all levels of the society, from both town and the surrounding villages.
On the other hand, because of the troubled circumstances, the Turkish
schools had experienced more disruption and not all the pupils has been
able to return to the schools from the areas where the Turks were isolated.
The classes had some girls as well as boys.
It is a matter for debate (or better, empirical investigation) how
representative 17-year old high school students are of the general popu¬
lation. However, in Cyprus, there is little sigh of a "teenage cult"
separating young from old as it sometimes seems to do in Western Europe
and North America, further, as has been argued elsewhere (Lumsden, 1996a),
the young people have, at least on occasion, been directly involved in the
conflict. At the time when the present troubles started in Cyprus a high
number of educated but anemployed young people (a serious problem in
many other countries at a similar level of development; see the U.N.
Report on the World Social Situation, 1963). 33 percent of the male
population in 1960 was under 15 years (U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1963);
about 70 percent of the relevant age-groups were receiving secondary
education (Greek Education in Cyprus, Education Office, Nicosia). Only
about one-half the people leaving the secondary schools were able to find
employment in Cyprus, and the 1962 Immigration Act in the United Kingdom
reduced drastically the number who were able to emigrate (previously 12-13,00(
-55-
per annum, out of a population of some 600,000), thus worsening the
job situation in Cyprus. It is reasonable to expect a considerable
amount of frustration amongst young people as a result of this situation,
which may have been a factor in the uneasy period ■ precipitating the
communal hostilities. (Now most of the younger age-groups are conscripted
into their respective forces.)
Thus, though the samples were extremely limited, we are arguing
that they may have some intrinsic value; and also that they may not be
so unrepresentative of the general opinions held in the country.
Permission was obtained from the Cyprus education aifchorities to
administer the tests - the ladder ratings of the Cantril Self Anchoring
Striving Scale, and a set of Semantic Differentials. The ladder ratings
were used to give the utilities of the outcomes of the conflict required
to construct a payoff matrix.
Permission was also obtained from the Turkish Cypriot authorities,
but regrettably the tests were never carried out. Data is therefore
only available for the Greeks, However, even this is of great interest,
since, as far as the author is aware, this is the only attempt to measure
the utilities of the participants in an ongoing conflict by direct means
in the field (though less formalised studies have been made in race con¬
flicts) .
A 10-rung ladder was drawn on the blackbqrqfd and the subjects were
asked to imagine that the top represented the best possible life situation
for them they could imagine, and the ground level (0) represented the
worst to which they could sink. They were were then asked which step they
thought they were on then, where they expected to be in five years'time,
and where the expected to be in five years'time in the event of Enosis,
Taksim and peace between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. By taking the
difference between the position now and each of the possible futures, we
get a measure of the expectations of change, i.e. the net expected gains
or losses, which is a measure of utility.
The distributions from the two equivalent samples of 17-year old
Creek Cypriot high school students, one sample from Nicosia, the capital
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of the Republic, the other from Limaseol, one of the main provincial
towns, are presjfr^ted in Figure 3.5. The mean ratings are shown in
Table 3.2. For comparison the data from the Norwegian student sample
are added where appropriate. It will be noted that whereas the Norwegians
have very low expectations of change, the Cypriots have very high expecta¬
tions - second only to the Dominican Republic in Cantril's (1965) sample
of fourteen nations.
TABLE 3.2. Ladder ratings: Two samples of Greek Cypriot high school



















































(CC) — — 7.4-6
(CD) — — 1.86
(DC) — — 4-.84-
(DD) — — 1.10
The Cypriot students were not asked to rate 'war between Greek
and Turkish Cypriote' because I had ethical doubts, and more doubts
about the validity. However, the Norwegian students showed no difficulty in
making ratings of the equally serious, though imaginary, outcomes of the
Cuba and Resistance games, so perhaps I could have been bold enough to
ask for the ratings of war in Cyprus. This would have given all the
values for the payoff matrix we shall discuss. As it is we onljr have
three of the values and for only one of the sides. Even this may form
the basis of an anlysis. First, however, we shall point to some im¬
portant differences between the two samples from which we have data
(Table 3.3).
TABLE 3.3. Ladder ratings; Scores expressed as expectations
of change for two groupssof Greek Cypriotsf"
Condition










1. No condition specified 2.87
2«. Peace between Greeks
and Turkish Cypricts 2.92
3. Taksim (Partition) -2.02











Spearman Rank-difference Correlation Coefficient, 0.80 <
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We see from Table 3.3 that while Enosis is the most highly rated
alternative in Limassol, peace is the more highly rated in Nicosia.
These results are put in the form of a payoff matrix for each group in
Matrices 3.2 and 3.3.
MATRIX 5.2. Llr.asso.I Greeks" MATRIX 3.3. Nicosia Greeks
Peace Taksim Peace Taksim
2.92 (2) -2.02 (1) 3.27 (3) -1.89 (1)
Enosis Par Enosis War
3.52 (3) — (?) 2.88 (2) - (?)
3i The figures in brackets represent the preference orders of the
three outcomes for which we have data, where 1 <2 <3.
The difference in the rating for peace is not only in the absolute
rating but in the order of preference. This especially interesting
since the school which the Nicosia students were attending was in the
old walled city, where much of the fighting has taken place, and where
the separation of the two communities is the most extreme. On the other
hand the school has a long tradition of Greek nationalism, dating back to
the last century. Since this is an important finding, Table 3.4-. breaks
the figures down further to show how many in each group actually did rate
peace higher than Enosis, and vice versa.
TABLE 3.4-. Ratings of peace compared- with Enosis
by number of respondents in each group.
Peace y Enosis Peace = Enosis Enosis > Peace N
1. Limassol 4 10 20 34-
2. Nicosia 16 4 23 43
TOTAL 20 14 43 77
x Chi-square = 9.13. (Lor p <.01, chi-square>9.21.)
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Table 3.4- shows that although a majority in each preferred Enosis,
a considerable proportion in Nicosia rated peace higher (only 4- rated
it the same as Enosis), whereas in Limassol only 4- rated peace as higher
(though 10 rated it the same as Enosis). (Chi-sauare 9.13 enables us to
reject the null hypothesis that this difference is due to chance at beyond
the .02 level of probability,) However, it is clear that the higher mean
rating for peace in Nicosia is due to higher relative ratings by a minority.
Whatever the validity of these figures as repesenting the general
population, they do reflect serious political differences in the Greek
community. On the one hand are the followers of Grivas, to whom Enosis
is a mystical, relgious-like end ('Union with Mother Greece'), and the
way to achieve it is "We must have faithI" (the words of Grivas himself
in the author's presence to a one-time political advisor). General George
Grivas left the Island asfer leading the insurgency against the British
and lived in retirement in Athens until June 1964-, some six months after*
the outbreak of hostilities, when he returned secretly and again took an
important role. Subsequently he assumed control of the (conscripted)
Cyprus National Guard, and some 10-15,000 troops from Greece, which puts
him in a powerful position. He is a fanatical anti-communist; as a
resistance leader in Greece in World War II he was regarded (so I am
informed by an ex-member of British intelligence, now a professor of
politics) as collaborating with the Germans against the communist resist¬
ance. He has had for many jrears considerable personal and political
differences with President Makarios. (This is fairly well-known, but I
have personal confirmation from a long-time associate of the two.) My
impression in 1965 was that Grivas was slowly losing politically in Cyprus,
but that he retained the support of the Greek Government.
Enosis represents about 100 years of often bitter struggle, and it
is emotionally difficult to give it up. Nevertheless, there are those
with strong political objections to the regime in Greece, to its NATO
membership, and those who would lose economically by the loss of
Commonwealth trade preferences, etc., who are prepared to consider
other formulae for a solution to the conflict, such as 'self-determination',
without Union with Greece. This could give the Greeks the feeling that
'We could always have Enosis when we want it, but just now there are many
problems to overcome ..." Greek Cypriot politicians cannot yet come
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out against Enosis. But this is precisely what makes the Turks feel
that whatever guarentees they have the will be faced with Enosis sooner
or later. While the considerable left-wing of the Greek community seems
prepared to live alongside the Turks,the Turks do not seem to want to
live alongside a left-wing; they seem literally to have killed most of
the Turkish left-wing opposition leaders. Both Grivas anf the Turkish
leadership reject Makarios because he has found it politic to have
dealings with the Greek Cypriot left.
Our results indicate this split in the Greek community. The
outcome to which most can agree is Enosis - but it is this which brings
them in conflict with the Turkish community, and thus with Turkey, present¬
ing them with the threat of war. (This threat is justifiably taken serious¬
ly. Most of the military activity is related to a potential Turkish in¬
vasion. There is a large civil defence organisation, and schools and
public buildings are protected with sand-bags, backing paper on glass
to prevent shattering,etc.)
3.3.4-. The preference orders of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
(i) The Greeks. We have already noted differences in the preference
orders of quite a number of our sample of Greek Cypriots. Since we do not
know their evaluations of cell 4- - war - we can reasonably suggest that
war may either be rated as the worst of all outcomes, or that it may be
rated better • than Partition. To some Greeks war may seem a way of solving
the problem one way or other, once and for all time, which, because of their
numbers,might be more satisfactory to the Greeks. Such reasoning has the
appeal of simplicity, ending of uncertainty, etc., but involves a great
deal of optimism to play down the potential role of the Turkish mainland
forces in the event of open war. Matrices 4- ts 7 show the possible prefer¬
ence orders of the Greek Cypriots since it is unlikely that war will be
rated higher than Enosis or peace.
We may examine these matrices from the point of view of games of
strategy, leaving out the Turkish preferences for the moment for the sake
of clarity. It will be noted first that, for the Greeks alone, Matrix 6
has the chaxactBristies of a Chicken game, where A^ may result in either
the best or the worst payoff, whereas Matrix 7 is a Prisoner's Dilemma,
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MATRIX A MATRIX 5
b2 B1 B2
A 2 A.j A 1
A^ 3 1 A2 3 2
MRIX 6 MATRIX 7
B1 B2 B1 B
A1 3 2 A1 3 1
A2 A 1 A2 A 2
where may result in the west payoff but not in the worst. Matrices
5 and A turn out to be structurally equivalent to 6 and 7 respectively.
In A, is a dominating strategy, in 7, A^ dominates.
(ii) The Turks. As explained there is no data available on the
Turkish preference structure. This in itself may be significant. It
may be that the Turks feel much more that the conflict is one of life or
death for them, and as such the options cannot be rated on a simple scale:
the choice is 'to be' or 'not to be'. It may also be that the political
leaders, through whois the test had to pass, did not feel that the test
was in their interest, since they have adopted the position that peace is
impossible between the two communities, so that Partition (or Federation)
is the only solution. They seem, in other words to be dominated by their
strategy B2« This time we shall argue backwards to the preference structure
If war is preferred to either Enosis or peace, for reasons of honour,
pride, faith or fatalism, then the possible matrices are as follows (8,9):
MATRIX 8 MATRIX 9
B1 B2 B1 B;
A1 2 A A1 1 A
A2 1 3 A2 2 3
If Enosis and peace are preferred to war, the matrices are as shown
in 10 to 13:
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MATRIX 10 MATRIX 11 MATRIX 12 MATRIX 13
B1 B2 B1 B2 B1 B2 B1 B2
A1 2 4 A1 3 4 A1 1 4 A1 3 4
A2 3 1 A2 2 1 A2 3 2 A2 1 2
In each of these matrices we are combining Federation and Partition
(Taksim) under one heading (E^) - they both involve separation of the
two communities. We are also assuming that Enosis and 'peace', dominated
by a majority of Greeks,are not perceived as so very different from each
other, so that both will either better or worse than war. We could of
course imagine other matrices where, for example, Enosis was seen as
the worst outcome and a compromise solution as the best. Alternatively,
there might be some Turks who could imagine a Greek government that would
allow the Cyprus Turks andbetter position that they would have in an
independant Cyprus under a Greek Cypriot majority rule. However, since
it was in an independent state that the present conflict arose, and there
being no sign of Enosis appearing a better alternative for the Turks, we
shall continue the analysis on the basis on the assumptions we have made
and with the matrices above.
3.3.5. The Cyprus 'game'.
Given that each player in a 2 x 2 game has a preference order
for each of the four possible outcomes, there are 576 different games.
Of these 78 are non-equivalent. This complexity, resulting from the
simplest of strategic situations, is a major reason for simplifying the
structure to that of a 2 x 2 game. What we have done here is to eliminate
as many as p3 ssible of those which seem unlike.ly in the real situation.
We are left with twenty-four games.
In a paper of Anatol Rapoport and Melvin Guyer (1966), to which the
following analysis is much indebted, a taxonomy of the 78 possible non-
equivalent games is created. We shall now apply this taxonomy to our
remaining 24 games.
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The first criterion for the classification is that of dominance.
One strategy is said to dominate another if and only if in using it
a player does no worse, and in general, better, regardless of the strat¬
egy chosen by the other player. This gives three classes of game -
Class I where both players have a dominating strategy; Class II where
one player has a dominating strategy; and Class III where neither
player has a dominating strategy.
Savage (1954) refers to the dominating principle as the 'sure-
thing' principle. Ellsbeig (1961) reviews a number of shortcomings and
cites many examples that he and others find 'unreasonable' (Becker &
McClintock, 1967). Luce and Suppes (1965) point out that the dominance
or 'sure-thing' principle leads to the Prisoner's Dilemma and is in¬
consistent with the Pareto optimal criterion for social conflicts (see
below). Guyer and Rapoport's taxonomy puts these principles into clear
relationship with each other, and in doing so seems to resolve much of the
difficulty. They are however not so much concerned to use the terms
prescriptively but descriptively.
The next concept, also taken from formal games theory, is that of
an equilibrium outcome, which is one from which neither player can de¬
part (i.e. change to the other strategy), while the other player keeps
to the same choice,without diminishing his own payoff. All the games in
Classes I and II have exactly one equilibrium outcome, where equilibrium
by pure strategies (not to mixtures of strategies to a certain optimum
over time, which may give another kind, of equilibrium), but games in
Class III have either two equilibria or none.
Finally there are various kinds of equilibria, depending on the
degree and nature of stability. Briefly this results in the following
categories of game.
Category 1. No-conflict games are those where these is an absolutely
stable equilibrium, the maximum payoff to both players being in the same
cell of the matrix. None of the twenty-four matrices we obtain by
combining those we derived for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots falls in
this category.
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Category 2, Games with a single, strongly-stable Pareto-equilibrium.
A Pareto equilibrium is one with the property that there is no other
outcome in the game in which neither player gets a smaller payoff.
Combining Matrix 7 (the Greek payoffs) with 8 and 9 (Turkish) we get
two such games (Matrices 14 and 15).
MATRIX 14 MATRIX 15
B1 B2 B1 B2
A1 3, 2 1,4 A1 3,1 1,4
^2Ap 4, 1 2,3* A 4,2 2,3*
The first entry in cell refers to player A (the Greeks), the
second to plaeer B (the Turks). 'x' indicates the equilibrium
outcome.
In both cases of a strongly-stable equilibrium outcome, this
outcome is war.
Category 3. Games with a strongly stable deficient equilibrium are
those where the equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal. Combining Matrices
7 and 13 we get one such game (Matrix 16). Indeed there is only one
one such game in the theoretical total of 78°. it is the Prisoner's
Dilemma. In the present case it is where Enosis is most preferred
by the Greeks and least preferred by the Turks, and Taksim is most
preferred by the Turks but least preferred by the Greeks. A Pareto-
optimal outcome in this context is such that there is no other outcome
in which both players get a more preferred payoff, The irony of the
Prisoner's Dilemma is that there is an outcome in which both players
get a larger payoff, but it is not the equilibrium outcome. The






Category A. Games with a -single stable equilibrium are those where
neither player "has the inclination to or else is unable to either
force or induce the other to shift". Here we find two such games,
where both players have a dominating strategy (Matrices 17 and 18),
and two in Class II, where only one player has a dominating strategy.
(Matrices 19 and 20),
MATRIX 17 MATRIX 18 MATRIX 19 MATRIX 20
5: r2 B1 B2 B1 B2 B1 B2
u 2 2 C 3'2 2>^' 3'1 2>^
A2 3,1 1,3 2,2 1,3 4,1 1,3 4,2 1,3
In each of these four cases it is Taksim which is the equilibrium,
which means that if war is the worst preference for the Greeks, while
Taksim and war are the highest preferences for the Turks, then the
Greeks cannot get the Turks to depart from the extreme strategy B^,
even when A., the moderate strategy, is their own dominating strategy.
Category 5. Games with a. single threat-vulnerable equilibrium.
Here a distinction is made between inducing and forcing a shift in
the other's strategy. As Rapoport and Guyer use the terms, 'one
induces the other player to shift strategy if the other player sees
that it is to his advantage to shift rather to suffer the consequences
of the other's shifting. One forces the other player to shift strategy
if, as a consequence of one's own shift, it becomes advantageous for
the other to shift also' (original emphasis). Equilibrium outcomes
in which one of the players Is in a position to induce but not to
force a change of strategy are called threat-vulnerable equilibria.
However, the threats are only good if they are not carried out. Games
where one of the players is able both to force and to induce a change
of strategy by the other player are called unstable equilibria. Games
where one of the players is able to force but not to induce a change
by the other player are known as force-vulnerable equilibria. Here
we find a single threat-vulnerable game in Class I (Matrix 21), but








MATRIX 22 MATRIX 23 MATRIX 24 MATRIX 25
3,2 1,4 3,3 1,4 3,1 1,4 3,3 2,4
, 4,3 2,1 4,2 2,1 4,3 2,2 4,1 1,2
In Matrix 21, where both have a dominating strategy, the Greeks
may be able to induce the Turks to accept peace by threatening Enosis.
In Matrices 22 to 25, the Greeks may be able to induce the Turks to
accept Enosis by threatening war.
Category 6. Games with a single force-vulnerable equilibrium are only
found in Class II, and we find four (Matrices 26 to 29).
MATRIX 26 MATRIX 27 MATRIX 28 MATRIX 29
B1 B2 B1 B2 B1 B2 B1 B2
A^ 4,3 1,4 4,2 1,4 4,1 1,4 4,1 2,4
A2 3,1 2,2 3,1 2,3 3,2 2,3 3,3 1,2
All games of this category have the characteristic that by changing
his strategy one of the players can force the other to change. However,
this initiates a cycle. In Matrix 26, for example, A^B^ is a Pareto-
optimal outcome, but it is not an equilibrium, so that, Rapoport and
Guyer point out, it somewhat resembles the Prisoner's Dilemma. The
difference is that only one and not both the players is motivated to
defect from it. In this case it means that while peace is a Pareto-
optimal solution, the Turks are motivated to push for Partition, since
they still prefer war to Enosis if the Greeks should also change their
strategy. In Matrices 27 and 28 the 'natural outcome' (the one which
results where one player has a dominant strategy and the other chooses
assuming he will play this strategy) is war. The Turks are not motivated
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to move from this strategy since they are better off than under either
of the alternatives if they change their strategy. On the other hand,
if they do change, this may encourage the Greeks to go for peace,
their maximum utility in these three games, which might then enable the
Turks to change again and achieve Taksim instead of the natural outcome
war. In Matrix 29, Is dominating for the Greeks, though A^E, is
Pareto-optimal. (Since this outcome is E'nosis, this is an unrealistic
situation in practice.)
Category 7. Games with a single unstable equilibrium are all in Class
and we find two (Matrices 30 and 31)
MATRIX 30 MATRIX 31
B1 B2 B1 B2
A.j 4-,2 2,4 A^ 4,3 2,4
A2 3,3 1,1 A2 3,2 1,1
In these two games both threat and force are available to one
player - the Greeks (row player). A, is dominant for them, so that
on the assumption that they choose it, the Turks might choose B2, which
makes A^B2 the natural outcome. However, since the Greeks want to avoi
this (Taksim) they can threaten, or actually choose, A . Either way the
Turks would then do better to choose and avoid war. Matrix 30, wher
the Turks prefer Enosis to peace seems unlikely, though not impossible
the Greek Government might be regarded as more restrained, and/or polit:
cally acceptable than the Cyprus Government. In any case these are eye:
games and do not give hope of a stable solution.
Category 8. Games with two Pareto-equilibria. one of them being_the
natural outcome. We now move to Class III, where neither player has







In this game is the natural outcome and is Pareto-optimal in
that there is no other outcome where both players are better off. On the
other hand, there is an outcome where A can be better off and where B
will also do well, which is also Pareto-optimal - namely A^B^. A cannot
threaten because B will not voluntarily shift to A.|B j he can only
force him to change by choosing A^. However, once he has done so, B
may carry out the came strategy. Thus the Greeks might force Enosis
by a fait accompli, which the Turks might accept to the extent of avoid¬
ing war. But then they might try to partition the Island, uniting part
of it with Turkey, which the Greeks in turn would have to accept to
avoid war.
Category 9. Pre-emption games are those games with two Pareto-equilibria,
neither of which is the natural outcome. We find two (Matrices 33 and 34).
MATRIX 33 MATRIX 34
B1 B2 B1 B2
A1 3,3 2,4 A1 3,2 2,4
A2 4,2 1,1 A2 4,3 1,1
Matrix 33 is another of the 'infamous' games, much discussed in
the literatures it is the game of Chicken. Each player has an interest in
defecting from the outcome A.B^ before the other player. (Actually the
way the paradigm of the game is played, by youths driving cars at each
other along the centre of a highway, is the idea is to force the other
player to choose 1 by threatening A2B2, the worst outcome for both.) In
this game one player may try to pre-empt the other by choosing 2 in the
hope that the other may be deterred from choosing 2 by the threat of
A B : if both choose the second strategy, the result may be disastrous.2 2
Whatever the exact nature of the events in Cyprus at the of 1963, some
Greeks at least explain them as an attempt at pre-emption on the part of
the Turkish Cypriots. Turks on the other hand feel that the Greeks had
been trying to carry out a 'step-wise' pre-emption, gradually achieving
their ends by successive legislation and other measures, and that the
Turkish pre-emption was to 'pre-empt a pre-emption': a game of Chicken,
in fact.
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Category 10. Cycle games are the final category, those where there
are no equilibria (Matrices .35-37).
MATRIX 35 MATRIX 36 MATRIX 37
B1 B2 B1 B2 B1 B2
A^ 4-,3 1,4 4, A,1 1,4 A1 4,2 1,4
A2 3,2 2,1 A2 3'3 2,2 A2 3,3 2,1
While these games have no equilibria in the technical sense, in
each case the cycle can be stopped if player B is satisfied with prefer¬
ence 3. In Matrix 35 this would mean the Turks accepting peace, as the
most favoured outcome tor the Greeks; in Matrices 36 and 37 it means
the Turks accepting Enpsis, even though it is paradoxically not the
most favoured alternative for the Greeks.
3.3.5. Discussion.
It may seem that the apparently simple, static model with
which we started has led to a confusing richness. If all the data
had been available from both Greeks and Turks we could have constructed
a single matrix and said, This is the game being played in Cyprus, (Of
course we have said nothing of the interests of other parties, the im¬
portance of which has recently been enphasised.) But is we had been
able to construct a single matrix we should probably not have asked a
number of the important questions which arise. Thus, we have analysed
twenty-four possible games, indicating that many of them are compatible
with the real situation, This is not inconsistent. Not all members
of a population can be expected to share exactly the same value system,
to order their preferences in the same way, or to perceive the nature
of the conliict in the same way. The complexity of the conflict, and
a major reason for its apparent insolubility may lie in just such a reason.
It is rather like the kind of chess natch which is played on several
boards at once, one on top of the other. If one makes a cross-sectional
analysis, at one level, the result may be false because it fails to
take into account the other games being played. Again, one can imagine
the difficulty of analysing . a situation where the players were each
playing games with different rules. This kind of richness in the model
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would have been lost if we had had enough data to fill up a single
matrix, which might have been possible with representative sampling,
and co-operation from both parties.
The validity may be questioned on a number of grounds. The limit¬
ation to two choices is too simple, but this seems to be largely how
the participants in almost any conflict cognitively structure the situa¬
tion. At any one moment there may be many tactical choices open, but
in terms of long-tange strategy it is question of achieving a particular
end or something less than that end. A similar argument applies to
the limitation to four outcomes, which may not even seem to us to be
mutually exclusive. For example Cyprus could be partitioned, part of
it being united to Turkey and part to Greece. The Turks accept this
aa a possibility, but not the Greeks. (Nor on practical did the United
Nations Mediator in his Report to the Secretary General (S/6253, 25 March
1965). It is difficult to see the creation of a new, artificial and
higly sensitive border between Greece and Turkey as a solution to the
problem.) When one is in Cyprus it is much easier to understand why
these are seen as exclusive categories. Physically separating two
interwoven communities has enormous practical difficulties. Dividing
the administration of five or six towns, several hundred villages and
a population of some 6-700,000 between rival capitals each far from the
Island and far from each other would probably lead to chaos. In addition,
the Greeks after hundreds of years of alien rule want to rule in their
own land without feeling they are being forced into 'selling out' to
their erstwhile colonial masters. The Greeks in Cyprus are interested
in sovereignty and self-identity, and Partition or Federation are un¬
acceptable wounds to that sovereignty. (But so are the Turks interested
in their sovereignty - hence the conflict.) The model, in other words,
portrays the conflict with some richness and faithfulness (though it does
not bring in the crucial interests of Greece, Turkey, the Great Powers,
NATO and the United Nations).
The validity of the Cantril scale may be questioned, since the numbers
may well means different things to different people (as Cantril himself
points out). But this is the point of taking the relative differences
in the expectations of change from the situation now, and constructing
an ordinal set of preferences.
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One may also question the usefulness of samples of high-school students.
The investigation was designed as a pilot study, with the intention of com¬
paring equivalent samples of Greeks and Turks from the capital and a pro¬
vincial town. As mentioned earlier the Turkish results did not materialise,
but the Greek results were comparable for age, sex and educational level.
No attempt was made to draw a sample from the general population since it
was intended to compare two samples rather than to generalise to the popu¬
lation as a whole. (In particular , the intention was to compare the per¬
ceptions of the UN force, to which the two samples had differential exposure.
(See Chapter /+.)) The foregoing results suggest that the method is worthy
of further study and application.
Perhaps I could conclude this section with a remark of Cantril himself:
"I do feel ... (that) the studies were the best that could be done at the
time and under the circumstances, and I hope academic purists will bear this
in mind. I have tried throughout ... to be cautious and conservative in
interpretations." (Cantril, 1965, p.28, original emphasis.)
3.3.6. Some policy implications.
Of the twenty-four matrices obtained from the seventy-eight
possible none were no-conflict games. In all those games where there
was a strongly stable equilibrium or a strongly stable deficient equilibrium
(the Prisoner's Dilemma), the equilibrium outcome was war. In each of the
four cases with a single stable equilibrium, the outcome was Taksims these
were the games where war was the worst possibility to the Greeks and second
best to Taksim for the Turks. (Thus in these games the Turks were the
'baddies', and the Greeks the 'goodies'.)
In all the other cases the structure of the games leads to dynamic
factors which prevent stable equilibria - threat, force, pre-emption, cycling
etc. In several of these games however the cycle could be stopped if one
of the players was prepared to accept his second best outcome. In one
game this would mean the Turks accepting peace, the most favoured alterna¬
tive of the Greeks; in two games it would mean the Turks accepting Enosis,
even though this was not the most preferred outcome for the Greeks.
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Which of these games is the most dominant it is obviously not possible
to judge from the available data. Probably most readers will • like, >;
the writer, pick on several games which seem likely. One suggestion would
be to have a UN-sponsored team of social scientists to draw up proper samples,
carry out the tests, calculate the matrices, and pronounce upon the nature of
the resulting game. This would at least make clear the exact nature of
the problem (except that as mentioned earlier it is likely that several
games are going on at the same time).
In this way the role of third parties could also be made clearer. For
instance, the United Nations Force in Cyprus essentially has the job of
ruling out one of the outcomes, war. What is the efffect on the game if *
this is the only stable outcome? Does it imply that the UN Force is condemned
to remain forever maintaining an unstable situation which can nev<r find its
equilibrium because of the very presence of the UN Force? (The relative
strengths of the Greek, Turkish and UN forces suggest that \-iar is not a
strongly stable equilibrium otherwise the UN would have had greater diffi¬
culty and a considerable amount of fighting on its hands during the present
uneasy 'non-outcome'.)
While the UN has done its best to rule out one of the possible out¬
comes, it has not done anything else to affect the structure of the conflict.
A number of such attempts could be made (see Lumsden, 1966a) Some project
much'bigger' that the immediate conflict could lead to a channeling of
interest into some 'super-ordinate' goals (Sherif, 1962) which, again with
time, could lead to modified .and more psoitive perceptions of the other
community, and a subordination of the confict to new needs. Such an example
might be if Greece, Turkey and Cyprus were incorporated into the European
Economic Community - something we shall probably see in an case twenty
years from now.' Just as economic sanctions are supposed to reduce the
utility of a particular outcome, so could positive sanctions be used to
to increase the value of an outcome. A number of economic incentives come
to mind in the case of Cyprus. Recent events in Greece and in Cyprus have
1. .This suggestion.was.made to.me by Dervish Kavazagjou,, general-secretary
oi the Turkish Gypriot trade union organisation, snoruly'before He was
assassins ted,.ny Turkish extremists. It is worth noting that Cyprus is a
member of both the Council of Europe (and a signiatory of the European
Charter of Human Rights) and of the Sterling Area, so that membership of
EEC would almost certainly follow British admission. Both Greece and
Turkey are already" Associate Members o- the EEC.
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almost certainly reduce the .utility of Enosis for a large number of Greek
Cypriots. Grivas, probably with the support of the junta in Athens,
seems to have 'overplayed his hand', and has been removed from the scene.
Events seem to moving in the direction of a more independent Cyprus, though
it is too early to see signs of a detente between the Greek and Turkish
Cypriot leaders. The peace-keeping force seems to reduce to a holding
operation, damping the conflict, and enabling other important political
interests to reach ascendency. It remains an open question whether it
could do more in the direction of integrating the two communities, repairing
the damage of the hostilities, and assisting the people of Cyprus in pre¬
paring for a more optimistic future.
3.4. Conclusion.
In this section the Cantril scale has been used to give a measure
of the utilities of one of the participants in a conflict. Measures for
the other participants were not available, nor was any attempt made to
investigate the scale of values on which these judgements were made.
Two points must therefore be made claar. Firstly, game theoretic
models assume conflicts of interest over common goals within an agreed
value system. There is no reason, however, why judgements according to
difffercnt value dystems cannot be brought into the mo del at the level of
preference orders, as long as this is made explicit. Secondly, much of the
fascinating richness of the Cantril data lies precisely in tho attempt to
unravel different value systems amongst different levels of the populations
in a range of countries from India and the Dominican Republic to West Ger¬
many, Israel and the United States.
The way is opened to analysing the extent . to which conflicts between
a rich nation and a poor nation, or two social groups, are conflicts of
interest, perhaps open to bargaining and strategic analysis, and to what
exent they are conflicts of value (see Aubert, 1963). In the latter
case the value systems may be so different that each participant in a
conflict may perceive the situation in a quite different way from that
imagined by his opponent. In a world where a technologically advanced nation
can intervene in the furthest corners of the globe, this kind of conflict
presents a real threat, but one where research may make a great contribution.
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Midgaard (1965), building on the work of Schelling, has emphasised
the importance of factors 'transcending' the immediately-present game
i.i theoretical analysis. Since the whole literature on the Prisoner's
Dilemma game demonstrates the difference between theoretical analysis and
actual behaviour, it remains for experimental analysis to be made of such
transcending factors.
It is here that a major part of the Cantril technique, could be ut
to good use, which was not done in the present studies. Cantril's test
gives a coded score of a wide range of personal and national hopes and fears
(see Cantril, 1965,'Appendix A: Coding', p.329). Respondents, before
making ladder ratings, are asked to describe the anchoring points of the
scale: that is, they are asked to describe their highest hopes and their
worst fears. Their free-ranging responses are coded into 14-5 categories
(34- concerning personal aspira.tions, 33 personal fears, 4-2 national aspirations,
and 36 national fears). These categories resulted from extensive work with
some 3,000 interviews collected from as wide a range of people possiblearound
the world. Any item included by at least 5 percent of the people in any one
nation are included in the final coding schema. The final version was carried
out in the United States, West Germany, Yugoslavia, Poland, Brazil, Nigeria,
India (both before and after the Sino-Indaanborder conflict in 1962), Israel,
Israeli kibbuzim. Egypt, Japan, Cuba (15 months after the Revolution),
Dominican Republic (after the assassination of Trujillo, before the over¬
throw of Juan Bosch), Panama and the Philippines. Interviews were also
obtained with parliamentarians in the US, India, West Germany, Brazil,
Nigeria and the Philippines. Respondents were classified according to
age, sex, income, education, occupation and rural/urban habitation, many
of the indicators of social position we use in Chapter 5.
Basic analyses of this wealth of data are made in Cantril's (1965)
book, and it is clear that more could be done. Important additions could
be made by further repititions of the studies: some very interesting changes
between 1958 and 1963 are indicated by the two Indian studies, the only case
where data is available at two points in time.
Much is heard of the 'revolution of rising expectations' in the
developing countries, and the Cantril scale gives a clear measure of this.
When one relates these expectations to the actual social and political
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situation, the test would seem to be a good indicator of potential
1 trouble'. The highest expectations of change were found in the Dominican
Republic: developments since 1962 illustrate the clash of social hopes
and political reality. High hopes were also found in Cuba. It would be
very interesting to repeat the study in these two nations to compare the
evfects of their respective histories of the last five years: both may
well prove prototypes for other nations in the developing world.
The Nigerian data, collected nearly five years before the civil war
of 1967, show the fear of political instability and national disunity
amongst a large proportion of the population.
While 'war with the Arabs' was a major fear of the Israelis, 'foreign
aggression' was a major fear of the Egyptians (i960). The highest hopes
of the Israelis for their nation were 'peace with the Arabs','technological
advances', 'increase in population' and improved or decent standard of
living'. The highest hopes of the Egyptians for their nation were 'decent
standard of living', technological advances' 'national independence' and
betwer education'. War wss mentioned as a personal fear by 26 percent
of Israelis and only 4- percent of Egyptians. The evaluation of the
Arab-Israeli conflict in the value system of the two parties seems to be
quite different. This jsreadily understandable when one considers the
different historical, social, economic and political circumstances of the
two, but the difference does not seem to have much influence on the political
judgements of outside observers.
In other words, just as the utilities of our experimental subjects
turned out to be different from those expected, so may the utilities of
parties to a conflict be different from those imagined by each other, and
by those passing judgement on them. There is, for instance, no sign here
of the Egyptians having as their major hope the extinction of Israel. The
repeated Israeli tactic of savage pre-emptive strikes and reprisals is
likely to increase the Arab desire to remove Israel from their path to
a decent staandard of living and national independence, and thus act
as a 'self-fulfiling prophecy'. (The Cantril data for Egypt was heavily
biased in favour of those from the cities and with education, and so,
though an attempt was made at appropriate weighting, cannot be regarded
as fully comparable with the Israeli data. In neither case are we able to
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assess the values of the leadership, which may of course be different
from those of the common people.))
The work of Cantril and his associates may be regarded as an impressive
and, from the methodlogical point of view, optimistic addition to the work
of cross-cultural understanding. But much remains to be done to improve
the research methods available. For instance, 29 percent of Israelis and
27 percent of Egyptians gave 'inadequate standard of living' as a fear;
but in Israel Cantril gives the figure of $ 735 per capita income, and
for Egypt $ 150. The category 'inadequate standard of living' is thus
likely to mean quite different things. Similarly, 'health for self' is
a major personal concern in both countries; but in Israel there is an
average life expectancy of about 72 years, whereas the Egyptian can only
expect to live about 51 years. The fear of illness in a developed coun¬
try may be unrealistic (lox'/ probability) and little need be done about it.
The fear of illness in a under-developed country may be highly realistic,
but little can be done about it. In either case there may be little
motivation to do anything about health problems. At an intermediate
level of development knowledge of how to imrrove the situation may be
available, but not the means - a hignly motivating situation.
Thus in a structural analysis we need to be able to relate the
idealised hopes and fears of the individual to the concrete social, econ¬
omic and political reality in which he finds himself. For a dynamic analy¬
sis we need to know the cognitive processes by which the individual or
society sets about moving the concrete situation away from the worst fears
in the direction of the highest hopes. Only then can we understand the behav¬
iour. The attempt to attain new goals brings the individual and society into
co-operation andoonfliet 'wit bother stnaLarly or differently motivated individuals,
groups or nations. Thus social relations are essentially strategic. The
role that the perceptions that the actors have of each other plays in their
strategic thinking is discussed in the next chapter.
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4. PiSRCHPTlON OF THE ACTOHS IK STRATEGIC THINKING.
4.1. 'The perception of persons as a strategic variable.
In strategic thinking the major variables are the choices and
outcomes open to the actors - the situational variables that we referred to
in the last chapter - and the actors themselves. Just as the player's perception
of the structure of the situation is important in determining his choice, so is
his perception of the players.
Game theory assumes that there are no differences between the players since
they all operate according to the same ideal criterion of rationality. The
experimental record, as we have indicated, shows that there are considerable
differences in behaviour in the same strategic situation - that is, there must
be psychological differences in the players. Some of these differences we shall
take up in the next two chapters.
If there are differences between the players it is likely they will develop
different perceptions of each other. These perceptions will in turn affect
behaviour. A's behaviour will not only be influenced by his evaluation of
the available outcomes, but also by what he thinks B will do; what he thinks
B will do* will depend on his assessment of B's capabilities, based on past ex¬
perience, and the consequent positive or negative affect that he attaches to B.
Just as A's behaviour will in part depend on his perception of B, so will
B.'s behaviour depend in part on his perception of A - and A may use this fact
as a strategic variable. If A can create in B a particular impression of him¬
self, this may help to determine B's behaviour, to A's advantage. We try to
do this when we are interviewed for a job. A major part of the 'game* of
politics seems to be to give an impr^sion of strength and determination,
and there is a consequent fear of appeasement. (Appeasement might be defined
as allowing an opponent to see you as you are and not as you would like him to
think.) The 'credibility' of a nuclear 'deterrent' depends not only on the
technical capability of the weapons systems, but on giving the other side a
sufficiently strong indication that one is prepared to use these weapons. Nuclear
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strategy long ago became not oiiy a question of military 'hardware', but also
one of psychological 'soft-ware'. This even resulted in rival strategies -
the 'counter-city strategy', representing a psychological (and political)
threat, versus the 'counter-force strategy', representing a military threat
to the opponent's ability to attack or retaliate.
In any strategic situation, whether a job interview or power politics, it
is possible to create a 'wrong' impression. Perceptions are open to distortion
by a number of factors, particularly in international relations (e.g. Bronfen-
brenner, 1961; White, 1966). Insofar as experimental games are models of
strategic situations, we should be able to use them to study systematically
the genesis of person-perception (where there is no prior information) and
the effects on behaviour (where there is a given prior perception of the
opponent).
A word may be added about the use of the term 'perception'. Some psycholo¬
gists prefer to reserve the word for sensory perception - the image created by
direct sensory input. The way the term is used here it may sound to others
more like an 'attitude' or a 'belief'. What expression to use for 'person
perception' has been discussed for a long time, without any seeming consensus
(e.g. Tagiuri, 1958). Without wishing to invest too much in the issue, the
present use may be justified briefly as follows.
Perception psychologists have put increasing emphasis on judgemental processes
in primary perception, for example using decision-theoretic concepts such as
probability and utility to determine whether a signal is detected or not (e.g.
Licklider, 1959). We are here trying to apply the same concepts (in both cases
drawn from outside psychology) in the same way. We are suggesting that persons,
like material objects and natural events, are a source of uncertainty in the
environment, and what is important is how we seek to reduce this uncertaintyt
Sensory information is apart of the process, learning is another. The way we
categorise the information about the situation we have here referred to as
the 'perception' of the situation, and the way the information about the other
persons is categorised is referred to as the perception of the players. When
these perceptions are related to others in the individual's experience (e.g.
other people, other places, other times, other situations) we may perhaps refer
to the individual's image of the world, or his 'life-space'.
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Just as (in Chapter l) we conceived of information as having probability
(H) and significance (s) components, so we conceive of the perception of
persons in a strategic situation as having both cognitive and evaluative
elements. This is similar to the distinction Fishbein (Fishbein & Raven, 1962;
Flshbein, 1963) makes between belief and attitude. In his sense we are saying
that actors develop and make use of both beliefs and attitudes about the other
actors in the strategic situation. However, I prefer to use the terms beliefs
and attitudes to refer to issues. I believe such a distinction could clarify
much of the confusion in the literature on attitudes and public opinion.
iVe may take as an example a middle-class American citizen who favours
the integration of whites and negroes. Integration is an issue, and the
citizen has certain beliefs about what will happen in the event of integration,
and he has a positive attitude towards it. But he may still perceive negroes
as being dirty, lazy and unreliable. He may have a favourable attitude towards
integration because he believes that negroes will become less dirty, lazy and
unreliable if they are integrated; or he may believe that integration is the
only way to avoid trouble in the northern cities of the United States; or he
may have defined himself as a liberal and therefore have a positive attitude
towards integration because it is a liberal issue. In each of these cases,
no action may be necessarily required of the citizen, and integration may have
no effect on his life.
Conversely, an attitude to an issue may affect the perception of persons
identified with that issue. The good-looking, smartly dressed, and alert-
looking soldier may be perceived as being cold, inhuman, aggressive and
brutal by the Vietnam demonstrator, just as the discretely-dressed professor
may be perceived as being long-haired, scruffy, unpatriotic, troublesome and
dangerous by the policeman who arrests him on the same demonstration. Neither
is likely to gain the support of the other for the issue, given such perceptions.
Negative perceptions tend to lead to negative actions, though the proponents of
non-violence have tried to point out that this need not be the case - sanctions
caninfluence the other's behaviour by being positive as well as negative (e.g.
Galtung, 1965). Clearly the need for cognitive 'balance', consistency or
congruency (Heider, 1958; Festinger, 1957; Osgood, Suci, Tannenbaum, 1957)
exerts a strong pressure, particularly when investment in the issue (Jahoda,
1959) is high.
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An attitude or belief may be used to refer to a social group where that group
is a symbol or object of a social issue. Attitudes and beliefs are shared between
persons, they are cultural items which permit little testing against reality by
direct interaction with the referents of the attitudes and beliefs. Here we
are using the term perception to refer to the results of personal experience rather
than acceptance of cultural items. To employ a game theory analogy, attitudes and
beliefs determine who we play the game with, rather than how we perceive the person
with whom we are playing the game. (On the Civil Rights issue in the United
States there are indications that some groups do not want to change the rui.es of
the game (society), but simply allow the Negroes to play (e.g. the National
Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), the White House)j
others who want to change the rules (e.g. the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating
Committee (SNCC), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)} and others who believe
that the Whites and Negroes should play their own separate games (e.g. the Black
Muslims). Who determines the rules of the game, and who plays, are major aspects
of social reality which are totally ignored by game theory. The theory nevertheless
allows us to see clearly these different aspects of the social situation.)
Attitudes or beliefs drawn from the culture in which we live may largely
determine the perceptions of and behaviour towards persons who serve as referents
to those attitudes and beliefs with whom we subsequently come in contact. A negative
attitude may lead us to hostile behaviour which produces hostile behaviour in the
other person, giving a 'reality-tested' foundation to the negative perception. A
false belief, even with good-will, may result in offensive behaviour or questions,
a snub from the other person, and a bad image' v. . of him. Education in human
relations, 'turning the other cheek', etc.,are various approaches to preventing
this kind of viscious cycle of feedback between perception and action.
There seems to be general agreement in the literature that the perception of
persons is not absolute but relative, so as to be in some way congruent (Osgood &
Tannenbaum, 1955) with the needs, attitudes and traits of the individual. Thus
Lerner & Becker (1962) showed that high school students chose partners who they
perceived as being similar to themselves, in a game where both could win, and dis¬
similar in game where one player won at the expense of the other. Secord & Back-
man (1964) showed that not only similarity in attitudes in attitudes and traitd
but also similarity in perceived needs was associated with friendship.
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Perceived similarity or dissimilarity is a function in large part of
the self perception. Altrocchi (l96l) found that the assumed dissimilarity
between self and others of 'repressors' ('those who tend to use avoidance,
denial and repression of potential threat and conflict as a primary mode of
adaptation') and 'sensitizers' (those who tend to be alerted to potential
threat and conflict, to respond more readily with manifest threat and anxiety,
and to use intellectual and obsessive defences') was more a function of
differences in the self-evaluation of the two groups (sensitizers having
more negative self-concepts than repressors).
On the other hand, some investigators have shown that the self-evaluation
itself is a result of the comparison with others (e.g. Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
Gerard (l96l) points to two types of social comparison. In one case a person
directly compares his standing on an attribute with that of others; in the
other case, he relates his self-evaluation to how he believes others regard
him. Psychological measures of self-evaluation are thus likely to be in some
degree a function of the test situation. The real self-evaluation of a
subject is likely to be the result of a long-term development through the
life of the individual (though only part of this may be reflected in the
test situation). Wright & Tuska (l966), for example, have attempted to
study not only the nature of 'feeling feminine', but also the origin, in
terms of significant parent-child relationships.
A number of studies of the accuracy of person perception have been made
(i.e. where perceptions are regarded as more absolute, rather than relative
to the perceiver's gslf-perception). The findings of Gage & Cronbach (l955),
Crow & Hammond (1957) and Stone & Leavitt (l954) were against the idea of a
trait of sensitivity or accuracy in person perception. Cline & Richards (i960,
196l), however, report two studies showing 'modest correlations' with a general
trait of accuracy, ifiurstein (l96l), using the mean value of ratings assigned
by groups of college men as a criterion, showed significant differences in
accuracy (i.e. agreement with the criterion) between hostile and 'friendly and
'insightful' and 'non-insightful' groups. Smelser (l96l) has shown that the
degree of dominance attributed to the other player in a two-person co-opera-
game
tive/was a function of the subject's own dominance. Dominant subjects perceived
their partners as less dominant, and submissive subjects perceived their partners
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as more dominant than themselves. Bronxenbrenner, Harding & Gallway (1958)
make a distinction between sensitivity to the 'generalised other' (the group
norm) and interpersonal sensitivity, pointing out that many studies confuse
these two aspects. Particularly in the latter they found considerable
differences between men and women dependent on whether the stimulus persons
were of like or opposite sex. Men who were sensitive to other men seemed
also to be sensitive to women; women who were sensitive to differences
between other women seemed to be less sensitive to differences between
men. Kates (l959) reports differences in first impression formation
by high- and low-authoritarians.
These studies therefore add some support to the somewhat tentative
conclusions of Bruner & Thgiuri (1954) and Taft (l955) in the reviews
of the literature that the perception of people is something of a social
skill, in which some people are more proficient than others. Nevertheless
it is clear that it is important to consider various components of social
perception, as recommended• 1 by GageaadCronbach (Gage & Cronbach, 1955;
Cronbach, 1958). Bather than seeking for generalised phenomena such as
'empathy' from the global data of dyadic relationships, Cronbach urges an
analytic approach to the various strands of which social perception is
made up, using a more sophisticated statistical analysis than a simple
perceptual distance score.
In most of the studies above the reliance on more or less direct person
perception means that it is difficult to control experimentally both the
stimulus-detamined and the perceiver-determined aspects of the situation.
This is somewhat easier to accomplish in studies of indirect person-perception
(e.g. Warr & Knapper, 1966a, 1966b). In such studies measures are typically
obtained of a political figure, which are then mediated by newspaper reports
(e.g. Warr & Knapper, on.cit.) or television programmes (Nordenstrerg& Wiio, 1967)
etc. 'The perceptions of the stimulus persons are then re-measured. In this
way Warr & Knapper conclude that "although subjects with different expectancies
perceive the same behaviour in different ways, the influence of expectancy is
not so great that it overides the information presented in an intervening
communication" (l966b, p.252). This conclusion is supported by a study of
McGrath & McGrath (1962) who contrasted an 'image' theory of political perception
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with a perceptual balance theory. Their results, from groups of partisan
subjects, indicated that perceptions of political figures were stimulus-
determined rather than perceiver-detennined for a large number of attri¬
butes, giving much support to the 'image' theory. There were however
some perceiver-determined attributes, particularly on the potency dimension.
'These few examples from the literature are taken to illustrate
that the field of person perception is still rather diffuse. While
both perceiver and perceived are major determinants, little account
seems to have been taken of the nature of the interaction between them,
of the 'game' they are playing, or the role relationships, the degree of
investment in the interaction, if any, and the past information or experience.
'There seems to be a gap between field studies of attitudes and public opinion
on the one hand and experimental studies of behaviour on the other. Progress
in science depends both on conceptualising the relationship of variables, and
measuring these variables and their relationships. It is my belief that the
concepts and methods now available, such as we have employed here, will enable
progress in this area. The instrument used here to measure the perception
of persons is the Semantic Differential (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957),
and it is this which is discussed next.
4.2. The Semantic Differential (SD) as a measure of person perception.
The complexity of person perception has led to the advocacy of
a number of measurement techniques. Beach & Wertheimer (l96l) recommend
recording the free responses of the subject and then applying systematic
content analysis, rather than predetermined scales. Doob (l962, 1964), in
his studies of nationalism in South Tyrol, used a number of techniques -
confronting the respondent with a set of statements on cards to which they
should comment; a sentence completion test; and essays written by element¬
ary school pupils. The topics covered (which were much wider than the per¬
ceptions of the ethnic groups involved) were selected on the basis of con¬
siderable prior interviewing, newspaper reading and intensive discussions
with a small number of intellectual leaders (methods usei here in the field
study in Cyprus).
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BannLster and Fransella (l966) have used a form of person perception,
employing the grid test, to study schizophrenic thought disorder. The
patients are asked to rank (twice) eight photographs (four of men, four
of women) on six constructs: kind, stupid, selfish, sincere, mean and
honest. The constructs are selected by the investigators, and so do not
necessarily reflect dimensions important to the subjects. Other investi¬
gators have used the Adjective Check List (Leary, 1957).
'The problem in each case is to find indicators of the attributes which
people perceive in others. Such attributes are likely to vary from person
to person, and culture to culture; consequently so will the efficiency of
the indicators in detecting the underlying dimensions. Probably the best
general method in research is therefore to start with a 'free response'
method, derive the most important dimensions, use these in the next stage
of the research process, and refine them on the basis of the further results.
That is, an 'Inductive-Hypothetico-deduPtive spiral' (Cattell, 1966) seems
the most appropriate way of conceiving of the problem. If one is interested
in measuring perceptions in a variety of social situations and cultures,
then it is difficult to rely on a free response method, since the categories
employed in the subsequent content analysis will probably vary. Similarly
there are problems beyond those of simple translation in using an adjective
check list, or an arbitrarily-selected set of constructs. In each case one
must first resolve the question of the comparability of meaning systems.
For these reasons the Semantic Differential has here been employed.
Not only does the SD provide measures of a rather sensitive kind, but it
represents the most thorough attempt to determine the global dimensions of
semantic space. It offers the possibility of a sophisticated psychological
instrument which can be objectively applied in any culture, in a variety of
situations, with a minimum reliance on the arbitrary choices of the in¬
vestigator. (Not all studies employing the SD have lived up to these
claims, including that reported here.)
The Semantic Differential became widely known with the publication of
The Measurement of Meaning (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957). By now it
can claim to be one of the most widely researched tools available to the
psychologist. While one of the original studies used the SD to measure
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the perceptions of political figures, the method is intended to measure the
dimensions of general semantic meaning. The SD consists essentially of a
set of scales of the type:
good : : : : : bad
warm : : : : : : : : cold
Usually these scales are seven-point, as shown, and may be coded 1 to 7, or
+3 to -3. Respondents are asked to rate on these scales a set of concents
(e.g. mother, hand, thief, egg, horse, punishment, sun, knowledge). The
results are then subjected to factor analysis, to give the underlying dimen¬
sions: that is the scales are found to group themselves together, in a limited
number of groups, where such a group of scales has a high inter-correlation,
or 'loading' on a factor. An impressive number of studies have indicated
three basic dimensions of meaning: Evaluation (good-bad), Potency (strong-
weak) and Activity (active-passive). These three dimensions have been the
basis of many subsequent applications of the Semantic Differential.
Ifeclay and Ware (l96l) reviewed the literature on the cross-cultural
results, showing the same or similar factors in Japanese, Korean, and a
number of American Indian cultures. Triandis and Osgood (1958) have shown
similar factors in Greek culture (our justification for using the SD in
Cyprus). Burke and Dennis (l96l) found three factors, accounting for 86$
of the variance, in a study of changes in perception of self and others in
a human relations training programme . Many studies have therefore taken
these factors for granted and have not carried out a factor analysis, but
have rather selected a few scales regarded as being heavily loaded on these
three dimensions.
The importance if the Semantic Differential has been greatly increased
by the subsequent researches of Osgood and his associates (see Miron & Os¬
good, 1966). In an attempt to make a systematic investigation of the
generality of these dimensions some twenty languages, representative of
all the major language groupings were selected In each language qualifiers,
eventually to be used as scales were chosen, entirely intra-culturally. to
avoidbiases from a predetermined set. (This is in contrast to the studies
mentioned above, where the scales chosen were based on the original American
studies.) The 60-70 most frequently used, diverse and independent qualifiers
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were presented to each of ten judges proficeient in the language who were
asked to say the dnto.ny&. (For the selection criteria, see Miron & Osgood,
op. cit.) The 50 most clear-cut pairs were then expanded into seven-
point scales like those above.
By similar procedures of selection 100 readily-translatable concepts
were chosen, each to be rated on each of the 50 scales in each of the 20
language ccruausities (using male high-school students as subjects). a
'pan-cultural' factor analysis, with varimax rotation, gave strong support
to three-dimension structure.
While this is the situation for 'general' meaning (i.e. where the concepts
are single, unrelated nound, drawn from a Thesaurus), evidence for an inter¬
action between scales and concepts cones out when special sets of concepts
are used. Thus in Suci"s study of political concepts (Osgood, Suci &
Tannenbauin, 1957) only two factors appeared (Benevolence and Dynamism).
A study by Osgood, Ware and Morris (l96l) of Morris's 15 'Ways of living'
showed the usual three dimensions collapsing into a single Successfulness
dimension. Kixon and Osgood (1966) now suggest that the Activity dimension
coalesces with the Potency dimension whenever 'activity' is not well repre¬
sented in the set of concepts.
On the other hand doubt as to the generality of the three-factor struc¬
ture has been cast by Kashigawa (1965), who applied a geometric vector
orthogonal solution instead of a varimax rotation to some Japanese data of
Sagara. In this study the Evaluative factor seemed to split into a Moral
Correctness and a Sensory Pleasure factor. Ware (see Miron & Osgood, op.
cit) had 40 personality concepts judged by 20 mature male and female subjects
and found eight factors after varimax rotation.
One of the problems with the Semantic Differential was that it required
a three-dimensional factor analysis (scales x concepts' x subjects) and this
was not technically possible until recently. The data block was therefore
reduced in one way or other to two dimensions, usually by 'stringing out'
the subjects'x scales. With a three-dimensional analysis it should subsequently
be possible to study more effectively the groupings of concepts, and even
the groupings of subjects (which so far have usually been homogenous
groups such as high-school males). It is obvious from the results above
that where we wish to use the SD for special purposes, as in studies of
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person perception or political concepts, special analyses must be carried
out.
Kashigawa's study showed that different methods of factor analysis
and rotation should also be born in mind. By Cattell's (1966) standards
three factors is very few, and it is surprising that only these factors
should have resulted from so many studies, where only an orthogonal
varimax rotation is typically used, (in the present studies, a varimax
rotation resulted in seven factors in both the field and the experimental
data.) If more complex factor structures are indicated in future research
in 'special' situations, oblique rotation nay be important in reducing the
factors to maximum simple structure.
If people have a more (or less) differentiated semantic space depending
on the nature of the concepts rated, it is conceivable that there are differ¬
ences between cultures and individuals after all. In evaluating stimulus
persons, values, or political concepts different dimensions may be utilised
in different cultures, which may not be obvious from a factor analysis of
100 general concepts. It may be more than a coincidence that the ratings
of Morris's 13 Ways (reflecting various values) factored essentially to
Successfulness in the United States sample, whereas Kashigawa and. Sagara
find that Moral Goodness and Sensory Pleasure are important factors in
Japan. (Successful-unsuccessful was employed as a scale in the present
study, but there turned out to be no direct translation in Norwegian, a
fact which may seem incredible to an Anglo-Saxon.) As yet there appear
to be no good cross-cultural studies of the dimensions of meaning of
specific sets of concepts such as persons.
Clearly cognitive similarity or dissimilarity, as reflected by dimen¬
sions of meaning (and perhaps by cognitive processes - see later) are im¬
portant for connunication between language and culture communities and
their representatives. Rommetveit (1955) argued that aaquaintance with
the other person's dimensions was necessary to permit communication.
Triandis (i960) gives support for the importance of cognitive similarity
in communication in dyads. ffiushakoji (l967) however had Americans and
Japanese as negotiators in a simple international simulation and showed
that the Americans were more issue-oriented, specific and universalistic
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whereas the Japanese had a more enpathic, diffuse and particularistic
style. Where the two interacted there was a ouch longer 'learning'
period, and much more uncertainty and unpredictability in the pattern
of responses. One could imagine that, even if they shared the sane
dioensions for evaluating people, the participants' perceptions of each
other would probably be different, if not mirror-images. If they had
different dimensions, the differences in perception night be totally in-
conprehensible to each other, making communication impossible. The
results of Osgood's 'pan-cultural' studies are optimistic from the point
of view of international communication at the level of the most general
meanings, but the interaction of scales and concepts means that much
more work remains to be done when the meanings of specific sets of concepts,
such as perceptions of people, values and political concepts, are the focal
point of communication between nations and cultures. The full Semantic
Differential technique presents the possibilityofcarrying out such systematic
studies.
4.3. An experimental study of person -perception in strategic thinking.
In the present dissertation the Semantic Differential was used
to study the perceptions that the actors developed of each other and them¬
selves after playing a series of 100-trial games, and that the participants
in a real-life 'game' (the Cyprus conflict) had of the other participants.
The studies reported by Miron and Osgood (1966), showing the potentialities
of the SD as discussed above, have been published only after the present
studies were carried out and initial analyses completed (Lumsden, 1966a,
1966b). These initial analyses were based on what might be called a
'first generation' use of the SD. The three dimensions, Evaluative, Potency
and Ac.tiviity, were taken as given, and scales were selected, on the basis
of the American studies, thought to be both loaded on these dimensions, and
relevant to description of persons. (The three dimensions are reported in
Swedish and Greek languages communities. No studies had been 'ddfife in''Norway
or 'Turkey. In the event only results from the Greek community in
Cyprus were obtained.) .
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A 'second generation' application of the SD, as might now he con¬
sidered by the author, would imply the prior selection of a much more
representative set of scales, sets of concents representative of the kind
to be rated (in this case persons and ethnic groups), a factor analysis
of the results to discover the major dimensions actually employed when
rating such concepts in the language/culture under investigation and the
loadings of the scales selected. Only then would the scales be used to
measure the ratings of particular stimulus persons by a particular sample.
The importance of this more advanced approach is shown by the factor
analyses of the two sets of data which are included here. In both cases
seven factors were indicated, but the two sets of factors are very different,
and bear little resemblence to the famous three found in studies of general
semantic meaning. The results from the experimental study will be presented
first.
4.3.1. 'The Semantic Differential ratings in four experimental games.
In the experimental situation the subjects were placed in separate
rooms, with rro knowledge of who the other player was. The intention was to
measure, by means of the Semantic Differential, the development of the per¬
ceptions that the players had of each other as a function of their pattern
of choices over the run of the game, ho form of communication was. allowed
other than the results of each trial. Results are analysed therefore in terms
of the patterns of co-operative and competitive responses of the partner re¬
lative to those of the player.
16 scales of the SD were chosen from Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (l957),
the first 8 loaded on the Evaluative dimension, the next 4 on the Potency
dimension, and the last 4 on the Activity dimension. (The same scales were
used in the Cyprus field study.) There is little opportunity for 'activity
in the experimental situation, and it was intended that" - the Activity
and Potency dimensions be combined for comparison into a Dynamism factor,
as found in the Suci study of political concepts, and discussed by Miron
and Osgood (op.cit.)
'The scales were translated into Norwegian by a number of native speakers.
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Some difficulty was found in translating 'successful', and the author now
realises that the word chosen (heldig) means more 'lucky' or 'fortunate':
it does not have the achievement conotation of the English word 'successful'.
Instructions for the SD for given to the subjects before the games
began, and having read them they had to rate 'myself'. Subsequently, at
the end of each game of 100 trials they had to rate 'the other player'
and 'myself'. The scales, their loadings on the three factors (from
Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957) and the means and standard deviations
from the experimental sample on the first self rating are presented in
Table 4.1.
TAuhE 4.1. Means and standard deviations of the
SI) seal as for the initial Self rating.




Evaluative 1.00 3.27 1.08
2. A1 trui stic-egoi sti c ti .31 4.43 1.43
3. So ciable-unsociable t! .42 2.83 1.66
4. Kind-cruel tt .52 2.83 0.99
5. Honest-dishonest i» .50 2.13 0.97
6. Successful-unsuccessful ii .51 2.93 1.28
7. Intelligent-unintelligent ti .40 2.70 1.06
8. Congenial-quariel some it .49 3.06 1.17
9. Strong-weak Potency .40 3.13 1.28
10. Severe-1emient tt .43 3.77 1.61
11. Brave-cowardly f! .34 3.13 1.22
12. Masculine-femini ne tt .47 3.47 1.83
13. Active-passive Activity .98 3.10 1.75
14. Excitable - calm tt .26 4.23 1.91
15. Intentional-unintentional tt .23 3.30 1.58
16. Difficul t-easy it .25 4.97 1.61
1. from Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957.
2. Scores are from 1 to 7.
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A subsequent factor analysis (principal axes, with varimax rotation)
of the self—rating only shows little sign of these three factors (Table
4.2.). Instead there is a strong first factor (jl ,l7° )combining some of
each of the Evaluative, Potency and Activity factors into what might be
called a Dynamism factor (good, sociable, lucky, sympathetic, strong,
brave, severe, and active). There are four other factors (Kaiser test)
with much smaller loadings accounting for 37.0$ of the variance. The
second is a 'ifestyness' factor (bad, cruel, quarrelsome, egoistic);
the third is 'Easygoing-ness' (lenient, calm, easy); the fourth is
'Capability' (good, intelligent, severe, deliberate); and the fifth is
perhaps 'Chivalry' (honest, strong and masculine).
TABLE 4.2. Factor analysis of initial 'self' rating




1. good-bad .43 -.44 -.17 .42 .30
2. altruistic-egoistic -.02 -.84 -.07 .06 -.04
3. sociable-unsociable .89 -.25 .13 .05 .03
4. kind-cruel .11 -.67 -.11 .25 .31
5. honest-dishonest .11 -.31 -.31 .06 .64
6. successful-unsuccessful .70 .14 -.26 .34 .32
7. intelligent-runintelligent. 33 -.25 -.13 .74 .08
8. congenial-quarrelsome .52 -.66 .08 .05 -.04
9. strong-weak .62 .03 -.23 .27 .46
10. severe-1enient .46 .10 -.38 .52 .21
11. brave-cowardly .72 -.26 .00 .24 .20
12. masculine-feminine .20 .04 .15 .19 .80
13. ac tive-passive .95 -.07 -.11 .03 .08
14. exci t'abl e-calm .34 -.01 -.85 .00 -.12
f—J v_n • deliberate-unintentional -.GL -.10 .16 .93 .05
16. difficult-easy -.38 -.21 -.75 .00 .31
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lA/hen all the ratings of self and other are combined in a factor analysis
the factor structure looks very different (Table 4.3.)• The large firs't
factor dissappears and seven smaller factors result, taking out only 59.9$
of the variance (kaiser and Scree tests of the number of factors (see
Cattell, 1966); the scree test might suggest one more factor, but certainly
no fewer). (The scores are first standardised to mean 4.0, sigma 1.0)
TkhLE 4.5. Factor analysis (varimax totation) of
9 'self' and 'other' ratings.
Scale 1 2 3
Factor
4 5 6 7
1. good-bad .15 .68 -.14 .11 .04 .19 .05
2. altruistic-egoistic -.27 -.40 -.23 •27 —30 .17 .06
3. sociable-unsociable .02 -.06 -.01 -.14 -.03 -.04 -.85
4. kind-cruel -.01 .02 .03 .03 .75 .02 -.01
5. honest-dishonest .20 .11 .19 -.12 -.12 -.56 -.17
6. successful-unsuccessful -.75 -.05 -.10 -.19 .06 -.20 .18
7. intel1igent-uninteUigaifc -.08 .14 .30 -.71 .06 .00 -.10
8. congenial-quarrelsome .11 .10 .15 -.16 -.05 .70 -.05
9. strong-weak .36 -.14 .06 -.30 .04 .28 .49
10. severe-lenient -.06 O«1 .71 .19 -.17 -.07 .32
11. brave-cowardly .03 .10 .30 .70 .34 -.12 -.07
12. masculine-feminine -*05 -.11 -.15 .03 .65 .00 .05
13. active-passive -.06 .18 -.76 .21 .01 -.11 .17
14. excitable-calm -.17 -.12 -.05 -.44 .07 -.44 -.14
15. deliberate-unintentional-.78 .01 .10 -.00 .02 .16 -.22
16. difficult-easy -.13 .72 -.06 -.06 -.16 -.07 -.02
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE 11.40 21.91 30.68 39.00 46.57 53.56 59.90
The first factor might be called 'Misfortune' (unintentional, unsuccessful
(unlucky), strong); the second 'Determination' (difficult, good, egoistic);
the third 'Stoicism' (passive, severe, intelligent, brave); the fourth
'Innocent Heroism' (unintelligent, brave, calm, weak); the fifth 'Self-
confidence' (kind (the Norwegian word snill is somewhat broader in usage, al¬
most 'nice'), masculine, brave, egoistic); the sixth 'Good-naturedAmorality'
(congenial, dishonest, calm, strong); and the seventh 'Toughness' (unsociable,
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strong, severe).
These dimensions would seem to be appropriate to the circumstances,
and much more subtle than those of Evaluation, Potency and Activity. The
interesting question arises as to whether these new dimensions are specific
to the situation, or to the type of subjects (Norwegian psychology students);
but this remains a topic for further research. We might ask whether people
employ different dimensions when judging themselves than when judging others;
whether these seven dimensions are used in general by Norwegians when ev¬
aluating people; and whether other people use the same dimensions in the
same situation, and in different situations. Such perspectives are an im¬
portant product of the current research, but clearly they imply a very
different approach in the next piece of research.
4.3.2. The relations between the Semantic,Differential ratings
and the response patterns.
The major interest in this study was to examine the relation
between the patterns of responses of the players and their perceptions
of each other. The measures of perception were taken at the end of each
100-trial game, so that the causal direction is from behaviour to perception.
There is at least as much interest in the reverse direction, the effect of
the perception on behaviour, but no attempt was made to study that here. We
assume that there is a continual interaction between action and perception,
and the present research must be regarded as only a preliminary attempt to
study the nature of this interaction.
Table 4.4 shows the results of an analysis of variance (l6 scales
x 4 games x 30 subjects x 2 sets of ratings). A significant source of
variance due to the subjects disappears when the scores are standardised
as presented in Table 4.4. The main source of variance is clearly the
scales, rather than the subjects or the games. There is also significant
variance due to the interaction of scales and games, scales and subjects,
games and subjects, scales, games and subjects, subjects and ratings,
scales, subjects and ratings, and games, subjects and ratings.
That is, when a rating is made on a given scale on a given occasion,
it is firstly important which scale is chosen. But then it is not so much
>
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a question of which subject is making the rating, or after which game, but
which subject on which gamd. This is appropriate for the use to which
we are putting the SD ratings, since we are interested in the relations
between the ratings and the pattern of choices - which of course is a
function of which subject is playing which game.
Table 4.5 shows the correlations between the the subjects' own
proportion of. co-operative choices (Os)^ the opponent'(s co-operation.
(Co), the difference between the two (Cd)., and the SD ratings for
self and other.
TABLE ly. 5. Correlations between subjects' own
choices (Cs), the opponent's choices
(Co), the difference (Cs-Co=Cd). and
the Semantic Differential ratings.
Self Other
Scale ratings ratings
Cs Co Cd Cs Co Cd
good-bad -.01 -.08 -.02 -.02 .07 -.09
altruistic-egoistic -.21 .04 .57 -.12 -.09 .14
sociable-unsociable -.08 -.01 .01 .00 .55 .09
kind-cruel .03 -.00 -.03 -.01 -.16 -.13
hone.st-dishonest .08 -.04 -.01 .63 -.07 .09
successful-unsuccessful .44 i • o vO .01 -.20 i • o TV) .59
intelligent-unintelligent .11 .61 .15 -.01 .17 .07
congenial-quarrelsome .15 .02 -.02 -.07 .03 i • o -k-
strong-weak -.08 .05 .02 .05 -.05 -.10
severe-lenient -.17 .07 -.11 .05 .72 oo•1
brave-cowardly i • o -.20 -.10 .66 -.13 .07
masculine-feminine .60 -.17 .13 -.12 -.05 .86
active-passive .01 .10 -.03 -.15 .01 -.09
excitable-calm .03 .56 .13 .01 .03 -.06
deliberate-unintentional -.13 .02 .65 -.10 .06 .08
difficult-easy .11 -.08 .03 -.10 .01 -.07
Significant at the .05 level where r is larger than 0.381
" " " .01 " " " " " " 0.4,63
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Table 4.5 shows that six of the scales (good-bad, kind-cruel,
congenial-quarrelsome, strong-weak, active-passive, difficult-easy)
do not have significant correlations with any of the measures of co¬
operation. This includes the 'key' scales for the Evaluative,
Potency and Activity factors. Ten of the scales have significant
correlations. Two scales seem to correlate significantly with each
measure of co-operation, one such pair (successful-unsuccessful, and
masculine-feminine) occuring twice, The results may be summarised as
follows;
- where the subject's level of co-operation was high he characterised
himself as successful and masculine and the other as honest and brave;
- where the opponent's co-operation was high, the subject characterised
himself as intelligent and excitable, and the other as sociable and
severe;
- where the subject was more co-operative than the other he character¬
ised himself as altruistic and deliberate and the other as successful
and masculine.
The correlations could also be explained in the opposite direction;
- where the subject's level of co-operation was low he characterised
himself as unsuccessful and feminine and the other as dishonest and
cowardly;
- where the opponent's co-operation was low, the subject character¬
ised himself as unintelligent and calm, and the other as -unsociable
and lenient;
- where the subject was less co-operative than the other he charac¬
terised himself as egoistic and unintentional and the other as un¬
successful and feminine.
In order to investigate these relationships further, an additional
factor analysis was performed. The sixteen self ratings, the sixteen
other ratings on the Semantic Differential, and the three measures of
co-operation, were treated as thirty-five separate variables (the maxi¬
mum accepted by the program available at present). The thirty-five
variables reduced to 8 factors. Of these only three .included the
measures of co-operation, and are exactly the same as the second,
third and fourth explanations above. The remaining factors showed relations
between the self ratings and the other ratings which had no relation
to the levels of co-operation (Table 4.6).
Thus factor I is where the subject is more co-operative than the
opponent and rates himself as altruistic and deliberate, and the other
as masculine and successful. In these situations the more co-operative
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TABLE 4.6. Rotated factor matrix of self and
other ratings with indices of own
co-operation. other's co-operation




4 5 6 7 8
Self ratings
good-bad .00 .12 -.02 -.06 .04 .07 .71 .33
altruistic-egoistic .80 .08 .01 .15 -.12 .07 .02 -.10
sociable-unsociable .11 .02 -.05 .04 .07 .62 -.03 -.33
kind-cruel . . . -.05 -.00 -.03 -.02 .82 -.01 -.12 .18
honest-dishone st .06 .81 -.10 -.16 .00 -.02 -.01 -.09
successful-unsuccessful -.09 -.27 -.03 -.55 .04 -.03 -.01 -.36
intelligent-unintelligent.10 -.14 .82 -.14 .01 .07 -.01 .09
congenial-quarrelsome -.01 .07 -.03 -.09 .01 -.12 .78 .14
strong-weax -.03 .03 .03 .05 .79 .10 -.05 -.08
severe-lenient -.05 -.04 .08 .16 .02 .83 .00 .02
brave-cowardly -.04 .81 -.23 .05 .06 -.06 .15 .02
mas culine-ferainine .03 .01 -.08 -.81 -.11 .01 -.04 .09
active-passive -.06 .01 .17 .04 .04 .03 .82 .02
excitable-calm .05 .01 .84 -.01 .01 -.05 .04 .03
deliberate-^unintentional .81 .04 .06 .04 .05 .01 -.09 -.08
difficult-easy -.04 -.01 -.07 -.16 .79 -.01 .18 .10
Other ratings
good-bad .06 .84 .09 .01 -.02 -.06 .02 -.18
altruistic-egoistic .11 -.07 -.02 .11 .81 -.02 .11 -.06
sociable-unsociable .05 .03 .81 .02 -.10 .09 .15 .38
kind-cruel -.07 -.08 -.10 -.07 .01 .80 .05 .05
honest-dishonest .01 .04 .03 -.83 .02 -.02 -.10 .03
successful-unsuccessful .81 -.02 -.01 .09 .10 .02 .05 .19
intelligent-unintelligent.09 -.04 .07 .07 .08 .23 .67 -.40
congenial-quarrelsome .03 .79 .05 -.03 .03 -.08 .06 .21
strong-weak -.05 -.02 -.02 -.09 .04 .79 .02 -.10
severe-lenient -.07 .00 .87 .04 -.03 -.08 -.01 -.15
brave-cowardly -.02 .11 -.02 -.79 .02 .05 .03 .11
masculine-feminine .93 -.04 -.04 .01 .01 .02 -.00 .02
active-passive -.01 .84 .07 .13 -.04 .05 -.06 .11
excitable-calm -.01 -.03 —. 04 .12 -.07 .02 .77 -.28
deliberate-unintentional .08 .07 .01 .08 .81 .03 -.03 -.16
difficult-easy .02 -.04 .07 .05 -.03 .85 -.02 .30
Subject's co-operation - J12 -.05 .05 -.86 -.03 -.07 .07 -.10
Partner 's co-operation -.03 .00 .83 .13 .00 -.03 .01 -.19
Difference .87 -.08 .08 -.16 .06 -.10 -.01 -.01
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE 11.4 22.2 32.5 42.5 51.7 60.0 67.8 71.1
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(altruistic) player loses to the (successful) less co-operative player,
factor III is where the opponent is high on co-operative, choices and is
rated as sociable and severe (strict) by the player, who sees himself as
intelligent and excitable. The fourth factor is where the low-co-opera-
tion player sees himself as unsuccessful and feminine, and the opponent
as dishonest and cowardly. In this situation, either the partner is
also low on co-operation, in which case both will be unsuccessful, or
the opponent is more co-operative and sees himself (Factor i) not as
dishonest and cowardly, but as altruistic and deliberate, and the player
as successful and masculine. The low co-operation subjects characterise
both themselves and the other player in negative terms, whereas the high
co-operation subjects employed essentially positive terms.
The Prisoner's Dilemma and similar games seen, therefore, to pro¬
duce a psychological conflict. The players who see thonselves as un¬
successful and feminine (who may of course be women - see Chapter 5)»
may attempt to be more successful by competing. If they compete against
another competitive player, a viscious circle may arise, in which neither
can be successful, and negative perceptions of each other arise — which
may reduce the possibility of achieving a co-operative solution. On
the other hand, the competitive player may be opposed to one who attempts
to co-operate, in this situation taking the role of 'sucker' or 'chicken*.
In this 'double bind' situation, the opponent can never be seen in a
positive light, whatever his behaviour. This seems to oocur in a
number of other human relationships •
The other factors, which do not relate to the co-operation
indices, are briefly:
II. Self: honest, brave; other: good, sympathetic and active;
V. Self: kind, strong and difficult; other: altruistic, deliberate;
VI. Self: sociable, severe; other: kind, strong, difficult;
VII. Self: good, sympathetic, active; other: intelligent,excitable;
VIII. (smaller loadings) Self: good, unsociable, unsuccessful;
other: sociable, unintelligent and difficult.
The first four factors take out 10-11 per cent of the variance each,
whereas the last four account for progressively less. The apparent
similarity of several of the factors ma y be a function of the method
we have used (stringing out the four sets of ratings). A larger
sample, or an oblique rotation, may well have produced more simple
struclure,.
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Some findings reminiscent of these effects are reported by-
Swingle (1966). In a different type of two-person game he found
that an an un-co-operative partner resulted in a reduction of the
subject's level of co-operative responding when the partner was
either liked or unknown, but the initial level was maintained when
the partner was known and disliked. There was a significant diff¬
erence between two Semantic Differentials after a 'harm' (low
co-operation by partner) phase for the 'dislike' group, where
negative ratings were made of the partner, although the subject did
not change his behaviours that is, retaliation was negatively re¬
lated to negative attitude change.
An experiment might be designed where the SD ratings were made
more frequently, and the behaviour of the 'partner' (actually a
collaborator of the experimenter) was systematically varied. The
effects would presumeably be related to the personalities of the
subjects, and such an experiment would present an opportunity to
investigate the correlates of personality. _ .Which kinds of subject
react to the given situation by retaliative behaviour, and which by
negative perceptions of the opponent? Are these reactions predictable
from other psychological tests? If so, how are such people distri¬
buted in the general population?
The perception that A develops of B on the basis of B's behaviour
seems only in part to be a function of B's behaviour. The perception
also seems to depend on the reaction of A, which may be determined
by internal constraints as well as external ones due to the nature of
the situation. These relationships require further investigation with
a more adequate multivariate design than that achieved here.
A.A. Perceptions of people in conflict; a field study.
The intention of using an instrument such as the Semantic
Differential was that it could be applied in social situations in
different cultures, yet have a rationale based on laboratory experi¬
mentation. This represents something of an ideal which is some way
from being achieved, but in the field study of Cyprus an attempt
was made to use the same set of Semantic Differential scales which
were used in the laboratory to investigate the perceptions that the
major groups involved in the Cyprus conflict had of each other. Of
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particular interest was the United Nations 'peace force' in Cyprus. In
theory (but not entirely in practice) this night be inggine'd to be a new
group in such a situation, so that there was no previous experience
on which to base perceptions and expectations. If a measure such as
the Semantic Differential could be used in such a conflict it could
conceiveably act as a 'thermometer', which could be 'dipped' into
the local population at regular intervals to give a continuous measure
of how the force was being perceived. If there is something in the
perceptual distance theory, for instance, one would imagine that the
UN force should be rated in a neutral position between the conflicting
parties, by both parties. Regular measures might show whether the
force was being 8sen as moving more to 'our' side or more to 'their'
side. It might be hoped to make the same measures of the perceptions
that the UN soldiers have of the local jppulation, to see whether they
had a more favourable impression of one side or the other. Just as
m rne exiperiment differences in behaviour may effect the perceptions
created, so it may be imagined that different 'strategies' of peace¬
keeping, as well as the general behaviour of the troops, effect the
perceptions created. These perceptions might be of crucial
importance to the success or failure of the peace-keeping mission.
This at least was the reasoning behind the present study.
4..4..1. Procedure.
The same sixteen scales of the Semantic Differential that
were used in the experimental study (section 4.3), using Norwegian
students as subjects, were used as a measure of the perceptions that
two groups of Greek Cypriot high school students (section 3.3.3) had
of themselves and five other groups directly or indirectly involved in
the Cyprus conflict: the Turkish Cypriots, Scandinavians (Swedes,
Danes and Finns are in the UN force), the United Nations Force in
Cyprus (UNFICYP), and the Americans. These groups were presented to
the subjects one at a time, without them knowing which was coming next.
There own group was presented last. The tests were introduced with
1. Tne author is xnvolved in a large scale study of Norwegians who
have participated in UN forces in Gaza and Congo. A very much cur¬
tailed form of the Semantic Differential is being used in the hope
of measuring such perceptions. There continue to be considerable
political objections to it, a major reason for the modifications, which
have involved removing the negative poles of the scales, and ending up
with a positive adjective check-list. It is hoped to compare the full
SD with the modified version in a separate study.
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standard instructions.
For practical reasons the pairs of words making up the SD scales
were written on the blackboard by the teacher, the words having been
previously translated into Greek. The fact that the scales were
chosen to be on various dimensions was explained to the translators
to assist in determining shades of meaning. The subjects made their
judgements on sheets of paper containing sixteen scales of the types
"1
I • • o • *
I L . * - 9 ° -* ' •
The number at each end of the scale referred to the word pair which
was written on the blackboard.
As mentioned previously, even after initial permission was re¬
ceived from the Turkish Cypriot authorities, it did not prove possi¬
ble to get the tests carried out.
4-.4.2. Results.
Results were obtained from a sample of thirty-four
high-school students in Limassol and forty-four in Nicosia. The
scores were first standardised and then factor analysed (principal
axes, with varimax rotation). This analysis produces seven factors,
taking out 56 per cent of the variance (Table 4.7).
These factors might be called Gallantry (strong, lenient, good),
Passive Masculinity (masculine, passive, kind), Dishonesty (dishonest,
brave), 'Good-for-nothing' Sociatslity (sociable, bad, passive), Self-
assurance (congenial, calm, acgive, egoistic), Luck (successful, un¬
intelligent, excitable, unintentional), and Capriciousness (difficult,
unintentional, egoistic, excitable).
These factors, in spite of their differences, have some similari¬
ties to the Norwegian factors. It is not possible to determine from
this study whether the differences are simply a function of the
different sets of concepts rated, or whether there are stable under¬
lying cultural differences. This could be the subject of a fasci¬
nating further study.
Of interest here are the differences in the perceptions of the
various groups involved. To do this the mean ratings on each
scale are multiplied by the factor loadings for each factor and
summed. The results for each group are presented in Table 4.8
separately for each sample.
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TAI3LE 4.7. Rotated factor matrix of 16
Semantic Differential ratings
of British. Scandinavians.
Americans. TIN Force in Cyprus.
Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots. by two samples of
Greek Cypriot high-school students
Scale
Factor
■1 2 3 4
good-bad .49 - .18 1 • 0k- -.39 .04 .21 .11
altruistic-egoistic .15 .15 .19 -.11 -.31 .18 1 • O
sociable-unsociable .00 - .11 .02 .81 .14 .08 .01
kind-cruel .02 .50 .09 -.21 .13 -.11 .30
honest-dishonest .11 - .13 -.70 .18 -.18 -.09 -.18
successful-unsuccessful .04 - .07 .17 -.03 -.07 .76 -.14
intelligent-unintellignet- .12 - .06 .27 -.10 -.27 -.52 -.06
congenial-quarrelsome .10 .10 -.04 .10 .73 .17 .11
strong-weak .73 - .00 -.25 -.00 -.08 .03 .11
severe-weak .64 - .12 -.25 -.10 -.03 .15 .07
brave-cowardly .10 - .20 .67 .29 -.17 -.07 -.05
masculine-feminine .03 .73 -.08 -.07 .13 .06 -.11
active-passive .19 - .57 -.01 -.37 .33 .04 .01
excitable-calm .15 -,.05 -.25 .00 -.59 .41 .32
deliberate-unintentional .03 1.11 -.03 -.01 .00 -.32 -.56
difficult-easy .05 ' i.01 .12 -.06 -.07 -.16 .66
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE 9 .7 18,.7 26.7 34.3 41.9 49.3 55.9
Figure 4.1 shows the ratings for each group diagramatically.
It is clear that there is very close agreement between the Limassol
and Nicosia samples, though there are some differences. The differen¬
ces do not seem to be in any way systematic, either as to degree of ex¬
tremity of the judgements in general, or as the ratings of particu¬
lar groups.
The assessments of the various groups might be summarised
as follows?
- British? quite gallant, dishonest, self-assured, quite lucky,
and capricious;
- Scanfllanvians? dishonest, unsociable and unlucky;
















2 3 A 5 6 7
Limassol sample
1. British 13.00" toto•o 45.23 16.97 56.72 13.48 67.95
2. Scandanavian s -8.71 -9.67 38.78 -93.37 -15.40 -46.79 14.38
3. UN Force -57.24 16.29 21.00 33.56 -51.43 -10.60 -64.59
4. Americans 13.84 -8.33 5.98 55.05 7.05 23.64 67.00
5. Cbeek Qypriots 0.67 4.00 -20.18 -108.85 -9.15 0.32 48.07
6. Tzrkish Qrpriots-45.63 26.16 -22.97 8.76 -0.40 4.48 -90.79
Nicosia sample
1. British 17.29 -23.57 33.71 17.42 45.99 19.24 67.92
2. Scandinavians 2.86 -7.29 31.43 -90.94 -18.88 -37.08 31.02
3. UN Force -38.26 8.59 18.91 37.23 -49.73 -9.20 -85.20
4. Americans 20.19 -11.67 -7.20 54.A1 21.19 22.26 54.73
5. Creek Cypriots 7.17 -11.18 -28.66 -92.20 -20.13 18.80 38.91
6. Tbrkish Qrpriois-32,34 6.58 -12.49 10.83 -5.49 -5.20 -84.64
1». The figures in the table represent the deviations of the mean
ratings for each group on each scale from the standardised mean
&.00) multiplied by the factor loading of that scale on the factor,
multiplied by 100, and summed over the 16 scales.
- Americans; gallant, quite masculine, sociable, quite self-assured
quite lucky, and very capricious;
- Greek Cypriots; honest, unsociable, lacking in self-assurance,
quite lucky, and rather capricious;
- Turkish Cypriots; ungallant, passively masculine, rather honest,
and uncapricious.
4-.4-.3. Discussion. . *
The high degree of similarity between the two sets of
ratings may be taken as a measure of the reliability of the method.
The Limassol sample received the tests from their teacher in the
presence of the author* The Nicosia sample' carfidd-out the tests
several weeks later, under the supervision of a Greek Cypriot
educational psychologist, in the absence of the author, who thus
had no control over the administration of the tests. That is, the
tests were administered to different samples, by different people,
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at different times, and yet produce essentially similar results.
Clear distinctions are made between the various groups rated
on the different factors. Sometimes a group may be seen as simi¬
lar to the reference group, at other times very different. For
example, the Scandinavians are seen as rather similar to the Greek
Cypriots on IV and V, but very different on factors III and VI.
Table 4.9 expresses the scores as differences on each factor (d
scores) and sums the differences into a 'general difference' (D)
score.
TABLE 4.9. Difference scores for each group
by each sample on each factor.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 D
Limassol sample
British 12.33 14.88 65.41 125.82 65.90 13.16 19.88 317.38
Scandinavians 9.38 13.67 58.96 15.48 6.25 47.07 33.69 184.50
UN Force 57.91 12.29 41.82 142.41 42.28 10.92 112.66 419.65
Americans 13.17 12.33 26.16 163.90 16.20 23.32 18.93 274.01
Turkish Cypriots 46.30 22.16 2.79 117.61 8.75 4.16 138.86 340.63
Nicosia sample
British 10.12 12.39 62.37 109.62 66.12 0.44 29.01 290.07
Scandinavians 4.31 3.89 60.09 1.26 1.25 55.88 7.89
UN Force 45.43 2.59 45.57 129.43 29.60 28.00 124.11 406.73
Americans 13.02 22.85 121.46 146.61 41.32 3.46 15.82 264.54
Turkish Cypriots 39.51 4.60 16.17 103.03 14.64 24.00 123.55 325.50
Because of the conflict situation in Cyprus the most important
relation is that between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish
Cypriots are the group which the Greek Cypriots might be expected to
have the most experience of, but Table 4.9 shows that, not surprisingly,
the Turks are perceptually very distant from the Greeks. However, this
is mainly due to Factors IV and VII (Sociability and Capriciousness),
and to a lesser extent Factor I (Gallantry). The Greeks see themselves
as very low on the Sooisbility factor, and the Turks as low on the Capric¬
ious and Gallantry factors. The Limassol sample see the Turks as close
to the Greeks on Factor III (Honesty) and Factor VI (Luck). Here there
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are divergences with the Nicosia sample, which rather sees the Turkish
Cypriots as close on Factor II (Passive Masculinity).
The terms used to try to describe the factors are not very satis¬
factory. 'Passive masculinity' and 'sociability' seem to be import¬
ant factors which are not adequately tapped .by the adjective sdales
chosen. The latter especially seems to have negative connotations
not necessarily implied by the term 'sociability'. When the two
factors are put together the result might be the type of man who
sits in the coffee-shop all day long chatting, drinking and gambling,
rather than doing a good day's work. While the Turks are rated higher
on the first factor, and the UN Force higher on the second factor,
this image seems to characterise both. This seems to be a not un¬
common way for an achievement-oriented group to describe a lower
status, economically worse off, minority group in the same society.
The perception, in other words, may be as much a function of the
general 'topdog-underdog' relationship as due to the overt fighting
and political differences. In socio-economic terms the selected
samples chosen may represent the potentially most distant from the
Turkish Cypriots. (Though until the 1963 fighting there had been
some Turkish Cypriots attending the Nicosia school. They would,
however, be 'elite' Turks, so that general perceptions of the Turks
might not be influenced and these would be reinforced by the group
consensus resulting from the open conflict and split between the
communities.)
Because of the increasing commitment to the concept of
United Nations peace-keeping forces by the Scandinavian governments,
Canada, Netherlands, Britain, and some other countries, the role of
the UN Force in Cyprus is of particular interest. It is the only
remaining such force and in operational terms the most successful.
Yet there is no sign of it achieving'a situation in which it can leave
again.
The most obvious finding of all here is that the UN Force is
perceptually very distant from the Greek Cypriots - more so than the
Turkish Cypriots, much more so than the British and Scandinavians
who make up most of the force. The UN Force is seen as particularly
distant on Factors I, IV and VII (Gallantry, Sociability - which we
suggest has ovatones of 'bad morale, and Capriciousness - on which
the Force is very low). The UN Force is also seen as rather high
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on the Dishonesty factor, though not so high as the British and
Scandinavians.
As discussed elsewhere (Lumsden, 1965) one of the major
activities that the local population observe of the UN Force is
indeed when they spend time drinking beer or coffee outside the
coffee-shops. Whereas in Limassol there was little UN activity
(because there was little fighting between the two communities),
in Nicosia the UN soldiers on duty may be seen lounging in windows
of the houses along the 'Green Line' and other points of tension.
Of course there is little else for them to do just there, but in
the centre of the city they are much more visible than when they
are actively involved in stopping and preventing potentially
serious incidents in other parts of the Island.
It must also be pointed out (as pointed out to me by the late
Commander of the UN Force, General Thimaya, some months after the
data was collected) that prior to the data collection the UN Force
had been subject to unbased accusations in some of the Greek press,
resulting from a series of bomb attacks in Nicosia. The President
(in his religious capacity) later discovered (by confession) the
source of the attacks, but nothing was done to repair the image of
the UN Force.
It is not possible, therefore, to establish the cause of the
negative perceptions of the UN. They certainly existed at that
point in time, both as illustrated in the data presented here, and
coming out in interviews. Both sides, seemed to want the Force to
remain, and even to do more - but mainly more to help their cause.
The Greeks, in the data here, rate the UN Force as close to the
Turkish Cypriots on a number of the factors. Some evidence suggests
that the UN soldiers have on occasion stepped over the boundary line
of neutrality into the Turkish camp - which raises the question of
the perceptions that the UN soldiers have of the local population
and the origin of these perceptions. This is the subject of an
ongoing investigation and cannot be taken up here.
The Scandinavians are perceived as being closer than the
British. This may be because they have less information about
Scandinavians than British, and so judgements are more neutral.
Both groups are distant, however. For practical considerations
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ratings were not obtained of the.Swedes, Danes and Finns separately
(the Scandinavians participating in the UN Force) and other contin¬
gents, the Irish and the Canadians. A number of interviews sug¬
gested that the Irish were the most popular contingent, followed
by the Canadians and Finns, then the Swedes, Danes and British.
Such an order of preference follows the order of socio-economic
distance on seven indicators, presented elsewhere (Lumsden, 1966).
This suggests the hypothesis, which deserves further investigation,
that neace-keening forces should be less above, rather than more
above the 'kept at peace1 in socio-economic status. Clearly,
there are also important political considerations, which are
not discussed here. But these are not unrelated to the socio¬
economic ones. UN contingents may also be distinguished on the
grounds of 'professionalism'; the British, Irish and Canadians
are regular army units, the Scandinavians short-term service
volunteers taking a change from civilian life - with attractive
pay as a means of recruitment.
In brief, there are a number of explanations for these
perceptions which are important for United Nations peace-keeping,
but need not be discussed further here.
The attempt has been made to show that, insofar as the per¬
ceptions that the actors in a strategic situation have of each
other are an inportant variable determining the nature of the
interaction, the Semantic Differential, both in experimental
and field studies, promises a sophisticated means of measuring
those perceptions. It is a means, moreover, that can be methodi¬
cally adapted to use in different language and culture communities.
However, it is clearly not adequate to accept the assumption of three
simple dimensions where a specific set of concepts, such as ethnic
groups, is to be rated. This implies that the set of scales must be
properly selected in the given culture, in order to be representative
of the underlying factors, and not just 'imported' as was done here.
'The study presented here was intended as a pilot study, and as such
seems to have done its job. It is still hoped to overcome the diffi¬
culties in the way of a more adequate main study.
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5. SOCIAL POSITION IN STRATEGIC THINKING
5.1. Introduction.
The review of the literature in the first chapter showed that
'internationalists' in the Prisoner's Dilemma and related games give more
co-operative responses than 'isolationists' (Lutzker, 1960; McClintock, 1963)}
men more than women (Rapoport & Chamnah, 1965); students from a large
university less than students from a small college (Oskamp & Perlman, 1965,
1966); younger children behave differently from older children, Negro
children differently from white children, lower socio-economic status children
from higher socio-economic status^children (Sampson & Kardush, 1965);
and socially rigid people are less co-operative than socially open people
(Dencik & Wiberg, 1966).
With these findings in mind we went on to point out that even greater
socioeconomic differences are characteristic of the international system,
something of great significance for much political and military strategic
thinking. Two psychological measuring instruments, well-tried in a wide
range of cultures, were adapted to provide a means of measuring how the
actors in a strategic situation perceive the structure of the situation
and how they perceive each other, in the belief that these two kinds of
perception are two of the major variables in the strategic situation.
Though the experiments above did not control the perceptions of the
situation and the players, the simple experimental games employed cannot
be expected to result in wide perceptual differences. It seems clear
therefore that there are differences in strategic thinking, as reflected
in behaviour, related to the social background of the players. It is this
phenomenon which will be explored in greater detail in this chapter.
The social differences mentioned above are many of the indices of
what socidLqg_iabs(e.g. Galtung, 1964b) have called social position. Galtung
models society as a series of concentric circles, having a centre and a
periphery. The centre of society is characterised by such things as living
in a city; living in the central area of a country; being between the ages of
of 30aid60; having more than primary education (in Norway, from the age of
7 to 14); having an occupation in the secondary or tertiary economic sectors
(manufacturing and services, as opposed to primary production); having a
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skilled or professional occupation (sometimes described as 'white collar'
as opposed to 'blue collar'); being a man. The periphery implies a lack of
these attributes. An operational justification for regarding these as in¬
dicators of social status has been given in a number of studies (e.g. Galtung,
196<ib). For example, more women said they would prefer to be a man if they
had the choice than men said they would prefer to be a woman; more people
living in the country said they would prefer to live in the town than people
living in the town said they would prefer to live in the country; etc. The
items may beconstruted as an additive index, each with tne values 1 or 0,
giving a range of 0 to 8.
This index has been shown to have systematic relationships to a range
of attitudes not only in Norway, but also in France and Poland in a comparative
study using national samples (Halle, 1966), and in a number of other countries
(e.g. Schwartzman & Araujo, 1966, in Latin America). Galtung suggests that the
consistencies in the data are such as to suggest generalised cognitive differences
between the centre and the periphery. The centre is characterised by gradual¬
ism, pragmatism and partial acceptance or rejection of the status quo; the
periphery shows a high degree of absolutism, moralism and total acceptance or
rejection.
On the basis of these and the previous findings it seems reasonable to
expect a relationship between the social position index and behaviour in
experimental games of the Prisoner's Dilemma type. A systematic investigation
of this hypothesis is not possible here, though the influence of social position
on the (limited) group of experimental subjects is examined. Before a system¬
atic study is attempted it is felt that greater conceptual clarity should be
achieved about the nature of the proposed 'generalised cognitive differences',
particularly the relation between the way people express an attitude and their
behaviour. This point is discussed at the end of the chapter.
1
5.2. An experimental study.
1. This section is a revised version of a paper presented at the Annual
Conference of the British Psychological Society, Belfast, 6-10 April, 1967,
and published asPRIO publication No. 1-6 from the International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo, in the Journal of Peace Research. 1967, pp.289-303.
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Of the thirty subjects who took part in the experiment
twenty-seven completed the questionnaire used in the Three-nation
study mentioned above. This gave measures of social position as
well as of attitudes and knowledge of international affairs. Some
of the items give indications of extremity of viewpoint and can be
compared directly with the results from a national sample of the
general population. Measures on the Self-anchoring Striving Scale
also give a measure of extremity of viewpoint. The relationship be¬
tween social position and the ladder-ratings is discussed in section
5.2.2, and between social position, attitudes and knowledge of
international affairs in section 5.2.3. Section 5.2.4-. relates
social position to behaviour in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Section 5.2.5. relates the ladder-ratings to the level of co¬
operation in the PD game; part 5.2.6 relates the attitude and
knowledge scales to the level of co-operation.
Thereafter the findings are discussed in relation to a number of
theoretical considerations, and a distinction is proposed between cog¬
nitive...style and cognitive_mode. The former refers to thought pro¬
cesses causing attitudes to be expressed in different ways, which
complicates the methodology of attitude scaling in heterogenous groups.
The latter refers to the different kinds of logic employed by differ¬
ent individuals or groups in a given behavioural situation. The dis¬
tinction is employed here to show that the findings in the present ex¬
periment may bear a less contradictory relationship to other findings
than at first appears.
5.2.1. Social position characteristics of the sample.
The social position index is generally made up of some
eight items: age, sex, inc.ome, occupation (sector of economy),
occupation (skilled-unskilled), education, ecology (urban-rural),
ecology (central-peripheral). These factors were determined in the
questionnaire for the present sample. It is obvious however that
students have a limited range of social position, so that discrimin¬
ation on that basis is limited. For this reason, the father's pos¬
ition was taken on indicators of occupation, ecology and education.
Information was not available on income. Table 5.1 shows the dis¬
tributions of the sample according to both their own social position
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and that of the father, compared with the distribution for the
national smmple. Sex is the only factor which discrimirefces the
students (line 1 of table 5.1) so line 2 adds to the sex and age
of the student the position of the father on the other indicators.
It can be seen from Table 5.1 that not only are the students
restricted in range cn their own social position, but that they also
ccme from a somewhat narrow section of the population.
TABLE 5.1. Distribution of the experimental subjects on
(1) their own social position. (2) their sex
and age, plus the father's occupation, education
and ecology, and (3) the distribution of a nat¬
ional sample (in per cent).
Social position 0-1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (8) SUM (N)
1. Students( - income) 0 0 0 37 63 0 0 100% (30)




ecology 0 0 15 33 45 7 0 100% (27)
3. National sample
(Norway, Nov.-Dec.,
1964) 3 8 18 22 22 14 9 4 100% (100C
We may now compare the students' own social position with that of
the father to see whether the differences are reflected in their
attitudes and behaviour. Are their attitudes and behaviour as homo¬
genous as their social position, or are there differences related to
their social backgrounds? Where does the social position of the father
make itself felt - and where not?
5.2.2. Social position and Self-Anchoring Striving Scale results.
The Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (see Chapter 3) designed
by Cantril (1965) and his associates gives a measure of the hopes and
fears for the future as a function of the individual's present and
past situation. Respondents are asked to describe their highest
personal and national hopes and fears, and then to imagine these as
the end-points of a 0-10 ladder-scale. They then record where on
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the ladder they are now, where they were five years ago, and where
they expect to be in five year's time. The ladder-ratings for the
experimental subjects are presented in Table 5.2.
TABLE 5.2. Ladder-ratings of 29 Norwegian psychology
students according to sex.
, ,, , . Men Women Means
Ladder-rating (N=18) (N=11) (N=29)
Personal ratings:
1. Position 5 years ago
2. Position now
3. Position in 5 years
4. Change in last 5 years
5. Change in next 5 years
National ratings;
6. Position 5 years ago
7. Position now
8. Position in 5 years
9. Change in last 5 years









G. 44 0.91 0.62
0.61 0.82 0.98
Comparisons for men and women show that women have lower ratings
for both themselves and the nation five years ago but have a greater
degree of expected improvement in both cases, more particularly on
their personal ratings. This might reflect greater relative actual
improvement attained and expectedj greater need for achievement,
satisfied by reaching university (women are greatly in the minority
at the University of 0slo)j or simply a less cautious approach to
making such judgements. Some of these points will be taken up later.
However, even if the assumptions of significance tests were satis¬
fied, the differences between men and women are not significant
1
statistically.
In interpreting the data it must be borne in mind that only two
subjects were rated at social position 6, and one of these had atypi¬
cal responses, thus making the average for the 6's most unreliable.
There were only four respondents at level 4, but their responses were
1. See Cantril (1965), p.360. The data here are not from a large
enough sample to use the tables provided by Cantril, even if they
satisfied the other criteria. Differences of 1.0 to 1.5 are in
general significant for samples ae small as 50.
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much more consistent with each other* Ratings by social position are
shown in Table 5.3.
We shall not discuss the two 6's much except to say that they
are obviously not only high on the scale, but rare - only two out
out of thirty. Unlike all the other groups they do not seem to
indicate much improvement in the last five years - one even rated
himself worse off now. However, their personal and national ratings
are high and remain high. This we might expect from people high on
the status ladder, people who might be described, following Gantril
(op.cit. p.308) as in 'phase 5' - ' general satisfaction with a
way of life achieved which promised continued development'.
The 3's have low ratings for five years ago, both for themselves
and for the nation. Relative to their scale of values they now see
themselves as much better off, an improvement which they see as
continuing into the future both for themselves and for their nation.
Their experience and expectation of change seem to be greater than
for any other group. This is shown clearly in Figure 5.1.
TABLE 5.3. Ladder-ratings of the experimental





(N=3) (N=9) (N=12) (N=2) (N=27)
Personal ratings;
1. R>sition 5 years ago 4.25 6.12 5.33 7.50 5.84
2. Position now 7.25 7.56 7.73 7.00 7.55
3. Position in 5 years 8.75 8.45 8.66 8.50 8.65
4. Change in last 5 years3.00 1.38 2.42 -0.50 1.71
5. Change in next 5 years ■1.50 0.89 0.92 1.50 1.10
National ratings;
1. Position 5 years ago 5.50 6.45 6.43 6.50 6.14
2. Position now 6.75 6.89 7.51 7.00 6.83
3. Position in 5 years 8.00 7.34 7.57 7.50 7.65
4. Change in last 5 years1.25 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.69
5. Change in next 5 years1.25 0.45 0.75 0.50 0.82







5P 5 (N —12)
SP 6 <N~2)






On the personal ratings there are gamma correlations of -0.55
and -0.63 on the past and future ratings of change with social pos¬
ition, i.e. the higher the higher social position, the less likely
the subjects are to see themselves as better off. On the past and
future national ratings of change, the correlations with social
position drop to - 0.25 and -0.16 respectively.
Figure 5.1 suggests that the 4-'s have smaller expectations of
change than might be expected compared with those at other social
positons. The 4's are more optimistic regarding themselves than
the 5's, but less optimistic regarding change in the nation. This does
not show on the graphs because, while the more of the 4's expect
to be better off than the 5's, they make more moderate judgements
about how much better off they expect to be.
On the personal ratings (Figure 5.1) there is a wide divergence
on the past ratings and a striking convergence on the future ratings.
It may be that education, by leading to a common status, is also a
great leveller of expectations.
5.2.3. Social position, knowledge and attitudes to foreign affairs.
Ten items of the questionnaire were taken as indicators of
'internationalism', and fifteen as indicators of knowledge of foreign
affairs."^ Table 5.4 gives the mean scores on these scales against
social position. There is a slight linear decrease with increasing
social position on internationalism, but no obvious trend on knowledge.
In each case the difference in the means is very small. The factors
themselves covary (contingency coefficient, C = 0.33; Chi-square =
3.25, which gives p just greater than 0.05).
1. The 'internationalism'scale was simply several of the questions
taken from the Three-nation public opinion study. No claim is made
for it other than the apparent face validity. It is not standardised
in any way, so that comparisons with Lutzker (i960) and McGlintock
et. al. (1963) may be invalid. The questions were; Be so kind as
to tell me which of the two news items you would like to know more
of in this list of imaginary items (New disarmament proposal at
Geneva; rising price of bread in Norway; the independence of a new
African state; local elections in Norway; a new development of the
situation in Vietnam; Norwegian football championships: two items
to be chosen). How often would you say that you: talked about the
international situation with someone? Listened to the foreign news
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TABLE 5.4. Mean goqres on internationalism and knowledge
of international affairs against social position.
Social position
3 4 5 6
(N=4) (N=9) (N=12) (N=2)
Internationalism 7.50 7.45 6.84 6.50
Knowledge 12.25 12.50 12.00 13.50
on the radio of television? Read the foreign news in a newspaper?
How long would you say you spent reading the newspaper yesterday?
In lands the world over official government expenditure is discussed;
what do you think about our Government's position in the following
fieldss do you think they should spend more, about the same, or less?
(Military defence} development aid to lands in Africa, Asia and Latin
America). Would you recommend that a part of the Norwegian armed forces
be incorporated into a permanent force under the control of the UN?
How do you think most of the money to the developing countries should
be given, if we should give it? (Direct from rich lands to poor lands}
from the rich lands to an international organisation and,afterwards let
it decide how it should be used in the developing countries} both ways).
The 'knowledge' scale was also made up of several items from the
questionnaire: In which of the following towns does the UN have its
headquarters? (Geneva, New York, Washington, Vienna, elsewhere). In
the summer of 1963 a treaty was signed in Moscow between the USA and
the Soviet Union. What did the treaty deal with? (A joint programme
of space research} a ban on certain nuclear tests; a solution of the
Cuba problem), In the following list of lands, could you say which are
members of NATO, which of the Warsaw Pact, and which do not belong to
either? (Austria, Bulgaria, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France,
Spain, Finland, Turkey), Who is the Chancellor, or Prime Minister, of
West Germany? (Ltibke, Adenauer, Ulbricht, Erhard). Here is a list of
Albican leaders and African lands. Can you say who belongs to which?
(Nasser, Ben Bella, Tshombe, Haile Selassie; Egypt, Congo, Ethiopia),
For the very interesting comparisons on these and other items
between representative national samples from Norway, France and Poland,
see Halle, op.cit. A report of the study also appears in Unesco
Courier. August-September, 1967, pp. 5-9, where the results of a
number of the questions are reproduced.
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TAEjJil 5,5, Distribution o.:' men and women on inter¬
nationalism and knowledge of foreign affair?.
_
International! sm Knowledge
High Low High Low
Men 9 8 13 4
Women 4 6 2 7
gamma = 0.25 gamma = 0.83
chi-square = 0.4-3 chi-square = 7.4
p > 0.50 p < 0*01
Table 5.5 shows the distributions of men and women on the two
scales, split above and below the mode. It can be seen that in
this sample there is no relationship between the sex of the respondent
and 'internationalism', though there is a clear relationship between
sex and knowledge of international affairs. McClintock and Turner
(1962) note a similar finding in a study of 661 students from ten
southern California institutions of higher learning.
These scales do little to discriminate between the students on
the basis of social position, a conclusion which is substantiated by
inspection of the individual items. The student sample was homogenous
in its views, and Table 5.6 shows that in comparison with the general
population it was also somewhat more moderate and gradualistic on a
typical item.
TABLE 5.6. Student responses compared with the national
Norwegian sample (1964) on the question:
"Thinking of war, -peace and disarmament, what
do you think the world situation will be like
in five years and in twenty years?"
In 5 years In 20 years
Student National Student National
group {%) sample (%) group (%) sample (%)
War 3 3 10
More armament 22 16 7 10
About as now 48 49 3 16
Partial disarmament 15 20 60 23
Total disarmament 1 - 11
Don't know 15 10 27 29
No answer 1 - 1
SUM . 100 100 100 100
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It can be seen that there are very few extreme judgements in the
student sample, regardless of social position. The 'don't knows' which
would be expected to increase with decreasing social position do not in
fact do so in the student sample. Inspection of the data shows no re¬
lation between social position and expectations of more or less dis¬
armament .
We may distinguish two major influences on the students the home
and social background (meausred here in terms of the father's ecolo¬
gical, educational and occupational position), and the educational
and social processes leading to his being a student. The latter
seem to be the predominant influence on his verbally expressed atti¬
tudes.
5.2.4. Social position and level of co-operation in a Prisoner's
Dilemma game.
As described in earlier chapters, the experimental subjects
played a series of experimental games, one of which was the Prisoner's
Dilemma. The payoffs ( in Norwegian /re) were as follows;
Player B
C D
5, 5 -10, 10
10, -10 -5, -5
Because sex is the main discriminating factor in the social
position index when applied to the present sample it is again treated
separately. Table 5.7 shows a clear relationship between the level
of co-operation and the sex of the subject (as shown by Rapoport &
Chamnah, 1965, Dencik & Wiberg, 1966,and others). Table Table 5.8
removes sex from the index and takes only the indicators of the
father's social position, showing a weak but positive relationship
between level of co-operation and social position (gamma = 0.28).
The results show that not only are there wide differences in
the level of co-operation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, but that
these differences relate to the sex and social background of the
subject. The international attitudes of the same sample were found




TABLE 5.7. Level of co-operation and sex of subjects
Level of co-operation Women Men SUM
Low •• on 6 3 9
Medium 3 6 9
High 1 8 9
SUM 10 "17 27
gamma =0.71
TABLE 5.8. Level of co-operation against social position
as determined by education, occcupation and
ecology of father only.
Social position
Level of cc-operation 345 SUM
Low 4 3 2 9
Medium 5229
High 16 2 9
SUM 10 Tl 6 27~
gamma = 0.28
Since the women did not know they were playing other women, there
may have seemed to them a higher probability that they were playing
against a man, as there were more male students in the class. Women,
even in contemporary society, still tend to be treated as underdogs,
and they are correspondingly sensitive on the point in many cases.
They may be more determined therefore than the men to show that they
cannot be beaten into submission' by a few losses (CD and DD), but
once they have established the point (DC) they are prepared to co¬
operate (see Chapter 2).
Such an effect was noted by Borah (1963). He used a version of
the Deutsch and Krauss (1960) trucking game and played low status
subjects against high status subjects, showing that the former were
more determined not to submit. On the other hand, Rapoport and
Chamnah (1965) found that mixed-sex pairs were intermediate in co-op¬
eration between the more co-operative all-male pairs and the less co¬
operative all-female pairs. Kanouse and West (1967) informed their
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subjects neither
/of the 'sex5 of the partner on a random basis and found that/sex of
subject nor sex of partner had a significant effect on choice.
However, this experiment was (i) a one-trial experiment, and (ii)
involved imaginary rather than real money payoffs. It is not
clear from the published results whether 'sex of partner' implied
'same sex' versus 'other sex', or was rather the four groups male
with male partner, male with female, female with male and female with
female. Bixensuine, Chambers and Wilson (1964.) using an asymmetric
game, where the payoffs were different for the two players, thus
giving more 'status' or 'power' to one of the players, found clear
sex differences, with the females reacting strongly against the lower
status position.
There are thus two aspects; a difference in status may reduce
attempts at co-operationj whether the difference in status of the
sexes is sufficient amongst students to explain the differences in
the PD game is not certain. The effects of differences in status
are important because of the possible consequences for 'top-dog -
under-dog' conflicts in the international system.
Vinacke (1959) and Uesugi(l963) in a situation involving bargain-
within a triad found that females were more likely to resort to rules
and agreements that made competition unnecessary, to bargain relative¬
ly little in the more competitive types of relationships and to with¬
draw themselves from the negotiations, permitting the other two to
form a coalition without interference. In either case we do not see
much sign of strategy-oriented thinking in women compared with men.
It is interesting to note that Singer (1964.) found a correlation be¬
tween grade scores and a measure of 'Machiavellianism1 in men and
'attractiveness' in women. Obviously, in experimental situations
where no communication is allowed (visual or other), Machiavellianism
is at an advantage, attractiveness (or any other factor depending on
personal contact) is not.
To summarises we have yet to determine precisely (i) the con¬
sequences for strategic behaviour of unequal status in a given strate¬
gic situation, and (ii) the consequences for strategic behaviour of
long-term socialisation in social positions of different social status.
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5.2 Laader-rabings and level cj co-operation.
When the self-anchoring scale results are tabulated against
the level of co-operation in the Prisoner's Dilemma there are no clear
relationships except in the case of the ratings for the position of
the nation in five years' time. As shown in Table 5.9 there was a
strong tendency for those of the subjects who expected the nation to
stay the same or get worse to be high on co-operation, these who ex¬
pected the nation to be better to be low on co-operation.
TABLE 5.9. Expectation for the nation in five years'
time against level of co-operation.
Level of co-operation















TOTAL 11 18 29
gamma = -0.63; tau = -0.22.
If these results are then split according to sex we find that
this relationship holds true for women much more than for men (Table
5.10).
TABLE 5.10 Expectation for the nation in five years
against level of co-operation by sex of
subject.
The nation in 5 years;





Low 1 2 0 6
Medium 3 A 1 2
High A A 2 0






It can be seen that the group which has high expectations for
the nation and low co-operation is almost exlcusively women (six
out of eight). Of the women who thought that the nation would be the
same or worse, none are in the low co-operation group-, whereas none
of the women in the low co-operation group thought that the nation
would be the same or worse. This group of women might be referred
to as the 'low C, high ratings for ration' group, and in Table 5.11
they are split according to social position, showing a clear relationship.
TABLE 5.11. Social position of women in the low C.
high ratings for nation group.
Social position
3 A 5 SUM
Low Co-operatior,
high ratings 3 2 1 6
High Co-operation,
Low ratings 1 1 2 A
gamma = 0.52; tau = 0.20
The low C group of women may now be compared with the high C
group on the question of the conditional probabilities of choosing
C after each of the four possible outcomes in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
These have been shown to vary with sex (Rapoport & Chamnah, 1965),
and it can be seen from Table 5.12 that they may vary within sexes.
TABLE 5.12. Conditional probabilities of C following
each of the outcomes for two groups ofwomen.
C/CC C/CD C/DC C/DD MEAN C
Low Co-operation,
high ratings 27.6 16.0 28.3 31.6 28.3
High Co-operation
low ratings 82.0 58.0 A2.2 36.6 57.A
First, Table 5.12 makes clear that the difference in level of
co-operation is greats 28.3 per cent compared with 57.A per cent.
Secondly, the response to DD outcomes is very similar - but for the
low C group this gives the highest probability of choosing C on the
next trial. The low C group are least likely to choose C following
a CD outcome (i.e. one where they lose and the other player wins),
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whe.reas the high C group are least likely to respond with C following
a DC outcome (i.e where they have won and the other player has lost).
The high C group's co-operation is consistently higher, but is par¬
ticularly high after a CC outcome, whereas for the low C group
the chance of following a CG outcome with C is almost the lowest.
It seems clear that what is reflected here is not simply a diff¬
erence in the overall level of co-operation but in addition a quite
different way of reacting to the situation. While responses to the
tests, such as judgements on the self-anchoring scale, may be at
least partially due to differences in cognitive style - a tendency
to make more or less absolute verbal judgements - the behaviour here
seems to show that there may also be differences in cognitive mode;
that is, differences in the logical basis of the strategic thought
involved, resulting in quite different kinds of response.
5.2.6. Internationalism, knowledge and level of co-one ration
We shall compare the level of co-operation with the scores
on the internationalism and knowledge indices; the usual hypothesis,
following Lutzker (1960) would be that high scores on internationalism
and knowledge of international affairs were good predictors of co-op¬
erative behaviour in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
In Table 5.13 the indices of internationalism and knowledge are
each rated 0 or 1 according to whether the respondent was below or
above the mode. We see that while none of the low scorers on both





















internationalism and knowledge are in the high co-operation group.,
the great majority (six out of eight) fall into the medium co-operu-
uica gtftiidp, not the low group as would be expected from the Lutzker
hypothesis. On the other hand the largest group in the low C
category was that with high scores on internationalism and knowledge,
which was the largest proportion of the high-scoring group.
These results suggest that there is not a linear relationship
between co-operation in the PD game and attitudes expressing inter¬
nationalism. The data suggest rather that those low on international¬
ism and knowledge are not the lowest on co-operative responses, and
that it is possible to be high on internationalism and knowledge and
to choose a strategy of competition in the game.
Of the six low C women with high expectations for the nation,
referred to earlier, two were in the 0-0 group and two in the 1-1
group on internationalism and knowledge. Of four medium and high
C women, three were low on internationalism, and one was high on inter¬
nationalism but low on knowledge. Again we see no direct relation¬
ship between internationalism and level of co-operation, though there
were clear signs of a negative relationship between expectations for
the nation and C response rate.
5.2.7. Discussions Social position, cognitive style
and cognitive mode.
It should be made clear that absolutism/gradualism is not
the same as international!sm/isolationsims it is as possible to be
gradualistically isolationistic as it is to be absolutistically
internationalistic. Galtung's theory of public opinion formation
does not say that people at the centre of society are necessarily
more Internationalistic, but rather that they express their views
in more moderate tones if they are. In this discussion a brief
attempt will be made to point to some of the dynamic factors behind
the expression of opinions and the possible relationships to behaviour.
There are a number of plausible explanations of sociological
differences in public opinion.
1. One is the hierarchical structure of society, where the
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communication channels are controlled from the cent/re, but with many
filters which effectively remove all the 'ifs and buts' ty the tine
ideas get to the periphery. (For an account of filters in the
transmission of foreign news see Ostgaard, 1965.) The system is
largely unidirectional so that periphery ideas have difficulty gett¬
ing to the centre.
2. Another possibility lies in the differential nature of soc¬
ialisation patters in different strata of society. These may operate
at several levels: at one level is the enormous weight of influence
that 'liberalism', "rationalism', and 'academicism', etc., exert on
each child that struggles through the education system in the pro¬
duction of future pillars of society. The further the individual
goes, the more extreme reactions and expressions are socialised out
by the prevailing mores of the educated sub-culture. It is not
necessarily that the people at the centre do not have strong opinions:
it is that they live in a sub-culture which makes it taboo to express
opinions strongly, at least to the public opinion pollster. In other
lacuna of society, if one has a strong opinion one is at liberty to
express it. It is this difference which has here been referred to
cognitive style.
However, as far as opinion on foreign affairs goes, such a theory
leaves out the question of the opinion-holder's sphere of activity the
life situation in which he acts. It has been a major lesson of con¬
temporary psychology (especially from the work of Piaget) that cog¬
nitive development depends largely on the actions of the individual.
Human beings act on the basis of a cognitive framework which they
build up as a result of extensive interaction with the world around
them. There is little opportunity, or necessity, to test against
reality ideas from spheres of existence remote from the individual.
Hence such ideas may be extreme and simple, and may fluctuate from
one end of a scale to the other. Only by increasing use of them as
guides to behaviour will greater logical differentiation occur and
stability achieved somewhere in the middle of the extreme points.
The African tribesman may make 'stupid' or Illogical' reponses to
an intelligence test, but when the (white) psychologist is placed in
the African bush, he is likely to make what appear to the tribesman
as stupid and illogical' responses.
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The structure of the international system is such that relation¬
ships between nations are essentially between the centres of natrons.
The periphery does not act in the international system, and it is not
suprising if their opinions are untested against reality and modified
accordingly. What we do not know is whether the periphery or the
centre are more absolutistic when dealing with basic elements in the
1
life-sphere of the periphery.
3. Then there is the possibility that due to socialisation, or
other determinants of personality, there are people with different
kinds of logical basis to their thinking in situations requiring
social and political interaction. They use different 'programs'
rather than different values for the parameters within the program.
Thus, the simplest strategic situation involves two people, each with
two choices which combine to give four possible outcomes. It requires
two bits of information to determine which choice to make. If the
number of choices or players increases, there is a rapid increase in
the information processing capacity required in order to act. Only
one extra player, or one extra choice each may produce a situation
complex enough to approach the limits of a siigle human information
processing channel if there is a pressure of time. To deal with a
more complex situation it must be cognitively restructured by cutting
down on one or more of the variables, or by formulating the problem
in a hierarchical, step-by-step way. This kind of process is well
known, particularly under conditions of stress, which reduces the
capacity for complex information processing. Miller (1963) suggests
seven major coping mechanisms, of which filtering and ommission seem
to be the most utilised under conditions of medium stress. The
ability to cope with a problem by polarising the alternatives within
a single dimension is usually called absolutism. The ability to
cope by recasting the problem into a second order problem is usually
called gradualismo
1. Kerlinger (1967, footnote, p. 119) suggests that the periphery
has 'fewer referents that are criterial', referring to the finding
of Cambell, et al. (1960) that the 'average person' has a poverty of
attitudes. This seems to be another way of saying what we mean here.
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Such structural factors may lead on to a dynamic approach to
strategic thinking. Those who cannot restructure the situation
are likely to react according to the immediate effects of their
actions (see Cooper, 1965, 1966). Others may cope with the
complexity of the situation by inventing tacit moral laws which
have the effect of ruling out certain choices and reducing the need
for further thought. Others may be able to restructure the situa¬
tion in such a way as to be able to think effectively about it and mani¬
pulate it to their advantage. These may be referred to as cognitive
modes in strategic thinking.
A simple theory would be that people towards the periphery of
society were more absolutistic, more isolationistic (because they
were further from international behaviour), and less co-operative in
the Prisoner's Dilemma (because they had less socialisation in co¬
operative behaviour). If the serialisation functions of education
were a major factor, we should expect only small differences in co¬
operative behaviour in our sample, probably unrelated to social posi¬
tion. If the nature of the home background were important, we should
expect differences due to the father's social position. If the experi¬
ences in the lif© of the individual were important we should expect
differences related to social position which do not affect all mem¬
bers of that social stratum, but apply only to those who have got out
of that layer to where they are now (such as students from lower soc¬
ial positions).
The significance of the latter point for the present research is
to be found on the first part of this chapter, where it became clear
how limited were the chances of people from the periphery reaching the
university and thus being included in the sample. (Lindbekk, 1967,
shows this clearly in his study of research recruitment.) One might
therefore expect any differences in the beteiv iour of those lower on
the SP index to be related not to their social position per se. but
to the requirements of overcoming the barriers to university entrance.
This may be expected to apply particularly; to women.
We noted that on the ladder ratings there were small but statisti¬
cally insignificant differences between men and women. However we
saw that the curve of expectations from past to future was much steep¬
er for those with lower scores on social position, though there was
a general convergence on ratings for the future. The judgements
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cannot be said to absolutistic on the part of any sub-group. It Is
probably realistic for those at SP 3 to record a somewhat greater
improvement in their situation in the previous five years, though
this may not be so much a material improvement as reaching a status
which matches their achievement expectations. More of the 4's than
the 5's expected to be better off in the future, but they made more
moderate judgements of how muchbetter off they expected to be. The
expectations for the nation seemed to follow the personal expecta-
yions most closely in the case of the 3's. Table 5.7 shows that
women had more extreme judgements than men in eight out of twelve
comparisons, and that judgements were more moderate the higher up
the social position scale, the difference being most marked for
women.
Internationalism and knowledge of international affairs did
not seem to relate to the father's social position, as shown in
Table 5.6. There was a small linear decrease in the international¬
ism score with social position and no relation on the knowledge score.
On the other hand, while there was no relation between sex and inter¬
nationalism, there was a significant relationship between sex and
knowledge, with the men scoring higher than the women. The one
student with any extreme judgement on the question about the world
situation in five and twenty years' time was at SP 3. Otherwise
there were no extreme judgements, compared with 4 per cent of the
national sample regarding the world situation in five years' time,
and 21 per cent in twenty years' time. This suggests that the
socialisation factor against extreme judgements is operating in the
student sample.
There was a relationship between social position and the level
of co-operation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, but this was largely
due to the sex factor. The indicators of the father's social posit¬
ion contributed to the correlation (gamma = 0.26 for occupation of
father, 0.33 for ecology of father, with sex removed; sex of
student plus education of father gave gamma = 0.55; full SP
index as used here gave gamma = 0.71 with level of co-operation).
Given that the subjects had all undergone an extensive and similar
education process this is perhaps a remarkable result.
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There was also a relationship between the level of co-operation
and the ladder-ratings for the nation in five years' time (gamma =
-0.63)o This was also largely due to the differences between the
-|
ratings of men and women (gamma - -0.2 for men, -1.0 for women ).
There was a correlation of 0.52 fcr women who were high on co-op¬
eration and low on national ratings and social position. It may
be hypothesised that, in order to be university students, women who
are low on dimensions of social rank must have high achiarement moti¬
vation and that this is reflected in low co-opu-ation (high competi¬
tiveness) in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. When this group of women
vas separated from the rest it was shown that it was not just a simple
question of level of co-operativeness, but rather that the whole mode
of behaviour was different (Table 5.14-).
There was no simple relation between the level of co-operation
and the internationalism and knowledge scales.
All this suggests that the acculturation process undergone by
students does affect their verbally-expressed attitudes. But while
the acculturation process acts to create homogenity at the level of
cognitive style it does not lead to homogenity of cognitive mode.
Indeed, for those low on social position, only those who are especi¬
ally competitive may reach the university. This seems to be particu¬
larly the case for women,who must struggle in any essentially male
environment in a society (either in a university or in the society
at large) which does not accord them equality. Hence the reason for
including sex in the social position index. For university students
sex is the main discriminator of social position, so that it is not
suprising if this seems to be the major factor in our data. It has
not been shown that women in general are more competitive, nor that
people at SP 3 are; to do so would require that we draw the appro¬
priate samples.
5.2.8. Conclusion.
1. This extreme correlation indicates that gamma coefficients
must be treated with care, especially where there are zero values
in any of the cells. For limitations in the use of gamma and tau
see Galtung (1967).
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It may be concluded that, within the considerable limita¬
tions of the exploratory design of this experiment, we have found
some evidence of a parallel at the behavioural level of Galtung1s
findings of a relationship between social position and public opinion.
Nevetheless, the relationship between social position, verbally-ex¬
pressed attitudes and judgements, and behaviour is clearly complex.
Upward social mobility may relate to achievement motivation and competi¬
tive behaviour, but neither may relate to expressed opinions or mod¬
erate judgements. While it is not possible to generalise from this
sample to the general population, neither can centre-periphery theory
extrapolate from the general trends in public opinion to the decision¬
making elite. They, like our sample, are a highly selected group.
In order to get where they are - even those from the highest level
measureable on Galtung's social position index - high-level decision¬
makers must have qualities of achievement motivation, competitiveness,
etc., which, as in our subjects, may be reflected in their behaviour
but have no relation to their verbally-expressed opinions.
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SYNOPSIS AND PROGNOSIS: COGNITIVE MODE IN STRATEGIC THINKING
Introduction.
Consider the following statements:
"Widespread guerilla warfare and the people's anti-Japanese
movement will wear out this big Japanese force, annihilating
it in large numbers on the one hand, and on the other hand
breaking down its spirit by enhancing the home-sickness and war
weariness of the troops, as well as their anti-war sentiment."
(Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works. Vol. II, p.187.)
"He must believe in the truth and non-violence like his teacher
and thus have confidence in the inner goodness in human nature
which he expects to awaken by the honesty and love expressed by
his leadership." (Ghandi's advice to satyagrahi. From Galtung,J.
and Naess, A., Ghandis Politiske Etikk. Oslo, 1955, p.113. Author's
trans, from Norwegian.)
"In the future it may be possible to place less reliance upon
deterrence of retaliatory power... Thus, in contrast to the
1950 decade the nations which are around the Sino-Soviet peri¬
meter can possess an effective defense against full-scale con¬
ventional attack and thus confront any aggressor with the choice
between failing or himself initiating a nuclear war against the
defending country. Thus the tables may be turned in the sense
that, instead of those xrho are non-aggressive having to rely on
all-out nuclear retaliatory power for their protection, would-be
aggressors would be unable to count on a successful conventional
aggression, but must themselves weigh the consequence of invoking
nuclear war." (John Foster DulleP, 'Challenge and Response in
US Folicy Foreign Affairs. 1957.)
"... war belongs not to the province of the arts or sciences
but to that of social existence. It is a conflict of great in¬
terests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that is it
different from other conflicts. It would be better, instead of
comparing it to any art, to compare it to a trade, which is also
a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is much
more like politics, which again, for its part, may be regarded
as a kind of trade on a large scale. Furthermore - politics is
the womb in which war is developed, in it its outlines lie hid¬
den in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of living creat¬
ures in their embryos." (Von Clausewitz, On War. Infantry Journal
Press, 1950.)
"To study the strategy of conflict is to take the view that most
conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations... Thus
strategy - in the sense in which I am using it here - is not con¬
cerned with the efficient application of force but with the ex¬
ploitation of potential force." (T.C.Schelling, The Strategy of
Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. Original emphasis)
-131-
The important thing about these quotations is not only the
difference in content, but the differences in the -ways of thinking
which they reveal. The 'strategic thinking' demonstrated in each
case is of course a reflection of the very different situations in
which the writers found themselves. Nevertheless, the two Asians,
exponents of quite contrary philosophies and strategies,have an
emphasis on the "human' aspects of conflict which seems to be entirely
1
lacking in the thought of the Western writers. It is difficult to
imagine Dulles talking of the 'anti-war sentiment' of Soviet or
Chinese troops - or even of his own troops.
Each of these writers has had a tremendous influence on ways of
thinking about the political and military aspects of conflicts. Yet
it may be that their differences are not only based on alternative
viewpoints and varying assumptions, but on different cognitive pro¬
cesses of strategic thought.
The conclusion of the experimental study ■ presented earlier was
that indications of differences in the mode of strategic thinking are
present in in the behaviour of subjects in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Experimental games might therefore offer a technique for the systematic
investigation of the psychology of strategic thinking. This concluding
chapter is devoted to a preliminary attempt to construct a comprehensi¬
ble framework for the analysis of the psychology of strategic thinking.
6.2. Structure and dynamics in strategic thinking.
A strategic situation is such that the major variables
built into the structure of the situation are the actors, the choices
and the outcomes. These may be represented in the form of a payoff
matrix. The dynamics of strategic thinking arise from several sources;
(i) cognitive processes leading to a single choice in a 'one-shot'
1. Mushakoji (1967) has conducted an interesting experimental 'conflict'
involving Japanese and American students as negotiators. He found that
negotiations (in a simple international simulation) were more successful
where the Japanese were faced with interlocutors who were 'empathy
oriented, diffuse and particularistic in style', while the Americans
preferred an 'issue oriented, specific (to the problem in hand) and
universalistic'.' (applying to all other such cases) style.
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game, mainly a direct function of the payoffs, and the complexity.
(ii) Cognitive processes leading to a succession of choices in an
iterated game. In this case the player if forced to consider not
only the set of payoffs, but also what he thinks the other player(s)
will do on the next trial is he makes a given choice this trial; and
therefore what he might also do on the next trial and the one after.
Not only the evaluation of the outcomes is important here but the
players perceptions of each other. The pattern of choices may be
regarded as a form of communication, even if no other communication
is allowed, reinforcing perceptions.
(iii) If there has been prior communication (in the broad sense, and
thinking now more of social situations in general) the perceptions
that the actors have of each other become a primary variable. The
development of person perceptions, and their effect on interaction
between persons, is therefore an important aspect of the dynamics of
strategic thinking.
(iv) If there is continuous communication during the 'game' (which
then becomes a 'negotiable', or 'bargaining game' in the technical
usage) then the content of the communication leads to the dynamic
problem of its reception and interpretation by the actors. The set
of categories with which each actor aonstructs his 'image' of the
world, and the affective meaning which he attributes to them, are
important in determining how he selects, codes and interprets information
transmitted by another actor, and also information he transmits to
another actor (who may not interpret it in the way intended by the
transmittor). In real strategic situations the structure of the
'game' may change from choice to choice, so that communication be¬
comes a means of giving a structure to the game at each point in
time.
Some of these factors have received a considerable amount of
research attention, others have not. It is of particular interest
to the psychologist to discover what are the cognitive processes at
each level, and secondly, to examine what are the differences
in the processes employed by different people at different times
and circumstances. Making a choice in a strategic situation involves
a complex piece of 'psycho-logic', and it is not unlikely that there
are several possible 'solutions' to a given problem. What are the
possible solutions (psychological, not mathematical), and which
people employ them on which occasions?
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Let us take the problem of the complexity of strategic situations.
As Rapoport (1967b) has pointed out, a two person, two-choice non¬
zero-sum game (giving a A-cell matrix, each containing a payoff to
each player) results in 576 permutations of the orders of preference
of the players, equivalent to 78 non-equivalent games. If the number
of players is increased by one, and the number of choices available
to each of the three players is increased by one, making three, the
number of permutations is nearly two thousand million (U.S. billion).
In order to act in such situations, human beings must reduce the
complexity, and they may do this in a number of ways.
Simplification of the outcomes. The complexity may be reduced
considerably by assuming that the preference order of the opponent is
either exactly the same, or exactly the opposite. Determining one's
own order of preferences will then immediately give the other actor's
(that is, subjectively? such an assumption of the other's values
may bear little relation to his actual values). Some outcomes may
be simply ignored (for example, that an enemy can want peace, or that
one's strategy can lead to self-annihilation by nuclear war). The
mirror-image effect on the one hand, and denial on the other, are
well-known psychological phenomena, though it remains to demonstrate
them experimentally in strategic situations.
Limiting the number of choices. In a given situation, the range
of actions is limited by considerations of relevance. Nevertheless,
it is not uncommon that fewer alternatives are considered than are
actually possible. Possible choices, for either player, may be
ignored almost arbitrarily, or because of conscious assumptions.
In experiiental games the number of choices is frequently two or
three. In real life, the number of choices is typically much
larger, but the number is psychologically limited to two or three
('escalation' or 'de-escalation', a channel tunnel or a bridge).
Limiting the number of actors. In the theory of games n-person
games can be reduced to 2-person games by the formation of coalitions.
There is evidence from a number of social situations that interactions
between three or more parties are unstable, and strong attempts are
made to reduce the number to two ('He who is not for us is against
us'). This is particularly a problem for arbitrators, peace-keeping
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forces and multi-party political systems. Attracting 'neutrals'
to one's own side, or regarding them as opponents,reduces the
need for complex thought as to how to deal with them. 'Tolerance
of ambiguity' is an important psychological concept here, some
individuals, particularly when they are extremely anxious,are in¬
tolerant of ambiguity and resort to psychological means to reduce
it (see o.g._Stagner, 1961). Bruner and Tajfel (1961) talk of
'narrow and broad categoriser§' in situations of cognitive risk and
environmental change; "The narrow categoriser appears to prefer the
risk of reacting and possibly being wrong. The broad categoriser
prefers the risk of not reacting to change and possibly being wrong"
(p.241, original emphasis). (Chapman, 1961, found that schizophrenics
tended to increase their errors of over-exclusion when conceptual
categories were broadened.) In a strategic situation where we must
not only categorise the choices and outcomes, but also the other
players, the dynamics of the inclusion of particular others into
categories 'friend' or 'foe' is important in determining which choices
will be made - and hence which outcomes will result.
A structural theory of strategic thinking might be developed from
further experimental studies of how the factors choices for self, choices
for other, set of outcomes, and set of players are cognitively simplified
in strategic thinking in complex situations.
Such processes may be themselves a source of conflict, since they may
enable each player to arrive at a different simplified matrix from that
imagined by his opponent. Intelligence, creativity and the amount of
stress experienced by the actors are likely to be important factors in
determining the matrices and the consequent choices.
It might be imagined that the'normal' person may resort to any or all
1. Neuringer (1964) concludes after an experimental investigation
that authoritarianism,lidgity and anxiety are intimately related.
"When the authoritarian person is under stress, his usual rigid out¬
look becomes a caricature of itself . . . The heightened rigidity
helps him cling more tenaciously to known anchor points that serve
him as a basis for some kind of action and/or decision-making. In
a sense the excessive rigidity helps maintain a semblance of cognitive
organisation during the stress period."
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of the means of simplification, but that some people resort to one more
than the others; or alternatively that some people resort to one less
than the others. In this case one could concieve of a score for an in¬
dividual on each of the three dimensions, people (players), choices
and outcomes. figure 6.1 uses the representational device of Sheldon
to show this. Actors may be rated say 1 - 7 on each dimension, giving
a score of 4.4.4. for the mean individual on each dimension, a score of
say 1.6.6. for an individual low on one and high on the other two, or.
7.2.2. for an individual high on one and low on the other two. (The
method would require that subjects be presented with a series of complex
matrices and be required to describe their strategic considerations;
this, at least, seems a feasible suggestion, though it has not yet been
attempted.)
A dynamic theory of strategic thinking may now be introduced. It
was suggested earlier that Cooper's (1965, 1966) concepts of Effects-,
Processes-, and Causes-thinking may reflect different levels of strategic
thinking. In the first case, the actor considers only the immediate
effects of his choices, so that if he wins he might make the same choice
again, and if he loses he might change. He does not consida*the other
player, noi? does he make recursive calculations about his own possible
choices in the future. This is assumed to be the level of thought of
the rat in the T-maze, and, particularly where speed of response is
required, clearly has adaptive significance in pre-social situations.
Cooper claims that such thinking is typical of younger children.
Secondly is the case where tacit moral 'rules' are established
by one or more of the players: in the oase of the Prisoner's Dilemma,
for example, 'We should both make the co-operative choice because
that is the right thing to do'. This stage of thought implicitly
involves considering the other player, but simplifies the situation
by 'presribing' choices for each. Such behaviour is appropriate
to many social situations, and seems to develop in pre-adolescent
children.
Thirdly, the players may be able to deal with relatively complex
strategic aspects of the situation, attempting to manipulate it to
their advantage, taking into account the possible choices of the
opponents, and their own future choices under various eventualities.























Cooper's theory, based on a comparative study of British
and Japanese children (1965) and interviews with British poli¬
ticians (1966), is that these represent Piaget-type developmental
stages in cognition - but that in the adult the primary stages
may be 'recapitulated' in particular situations. For example,
some Members of Parliament might be in favour of unilateral nuclear
disarmament because of fear or disgust of the consequences of using
nuclear weaponsj others because they believe it to be morally
right to give up nuclear weapons and if 'we give them up others
will feel morally bound to do so too' (and if they don't we can
at least feel virtuous)5 and others because of strategic calcu¬
lations about effects on the 'balance of power', in order to get
into the Common Market, in order to invest the resources in more
1
constructive pro jects,cr to weaken Britain's role in NATO.
A psychodynamic theory of strategic thinking is suggested by
the work of cultural antropologists (Roberts, et al. 1963). The
work of McClelland and his colleagues (e.g. 1955) on achievement
motivation suggested a relationship between independence training
in childhood and later achievement orientation. Moss and Kagan (1961)
found significant correlations between childhood and adulthood
achievement behaviour. Maternal acceleration of the child's
developmental skills during the first three years of life predicted
adult achievement behaviour for women but not for men. (Other
work of McClelland suggests that the presence of the father may
be an important factor in diminishing the achievement behaviour
of the males (McClelland, et al. 1953.)) McClelland (1961) has
then tried to use the wide cultural differences in achievement
motivation as an explanatory principle for differences in economic
development.
The importance of Roberts' work in the present connection is
that his studies of games and folk-tales in a wide range of cultures
indicate that achievement-training is associated with games of
1. Hveem (1968) has recently completed a study of the Norwegian
'foreign policy elite' (a sample of MPs, Foreign Department,
mass media and interest organisation representatives) which gives
some indications of such cognitive processes. Of particular in¬
terest in Hveem's study is how the short the time perspective
seems to be amongst such decision-makers, and how little imagination
they have for change from well-trodden paths of thought.
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physical skill (and folk heroes who win over their enemies by
their strength and prowess in battle). A cultural emphasis on
games of chance seems to be associated with responsibility-
training in childhood (i.e. the games seem to be a kind of
compensation, where responsibility is not possible). Games of
strategy are are only associated with obedience-training. This
relationship holds both cross-culturally, and within American
culture (Sutton-Smith, et al.,1963). Previous studies of the
same group of researchers have shown that these three major div¬
isions of games have specific associations with child-rearing
practices. (Roberts et al.g1959t'. Roberts et al., 1962). But
in the 1963 article they point out that games of strategy are assoc¬
iated with high political integration and high social stratifica¬
tion. They propose a psychodynamic explanation; "Obedience
training . . . produces psychological conflicts which heighten
drive and curiosity within this area and these in turn are assuag¬
ed by play with model social systems, i.e. games of strategy. In
addition the play with the models teaches the player such appropri¬
ate skills as the discernment and foresight he will need if he is
to function later as a commander, obeyer or decision-maker." (p.189)
Referring to Piaget (1932* they add; "Perhaps it can be said that
individuals must reach certain advanced levels of social and intellect¬
ual maturation before they can appreciate the strategic mode in models",
(p.197)J
These findings suggest not only the development of several
stages of strategic thinking within individuals but within societies.
In a stratified society (particularly in a complex,modern society)
differences may be expected in various sections of the community
for two reasons; (i) the patterns of family relations may vary,
influencing development along the lines indicated above; (ii)
the social situation will be different, resulting in differences
in approach to the problems of the society. Thus Crowne (1966)
reports that subjects from entrepreneurial families were considera-
1. It is interesting to note that the Western strategists seem
to originate in 'Prussian1 or German and Russian Jewish families,
the Eastern strategists from Chinese or Vietnamese families -
in each case strongly paternalistic. (Kahn, Kissinger, Schelling,
Wohlstetter vs. Mao Tse-Tung, Lin Piao, Vo Nguyen Giap, etc.)
-138-
bly more exploitative than those from bureaucratic families.
'Entrepreneurial' females were more competitive than 'entrepren¬
eurial' males, a sex difference which did not appear among the
bureaucrats. Mischel (1961) found the ability to delay grati¬
fication related to need for achievement and social responsibility
in 11-14 year old Trinidadian children. Several writers have
pointed to social class differences in cognitive constructs
(e.g. Bernstein, 1961J Warren, 1966).
Clearly such differences are a reflection of the social situa¬
tion and the resulting concerns of the individual. At the extreme,
/^or immectiate gratification (effects-thinking, or a concern for
outcomes) may be overiding, making social behaviour impossible
(as in the hungry baby). Keys et al. (1950) reporting on the
World War II Minnesota starvation studies point out "that the individual
may withdraw into a 'life of his own, withdraws from society, with¬
draws from any significant activity unrelated to staying alive'.
Zawadzki and Lazarsfeld (1935) showed how a pre-occupation with
physical survival, even in industrial areas,is a force militating
against community ties and the possibility of joint action. Davies
(1962) adda that "Far from making people into revolutionaries, en¬
during poverty makes for concern with one's solitary self or soli¬
tary family at best, and resignation or mute despair at worst . . .
A revolutionary state of mind requires the continued, even habitual
but dynamic expectation of greater opportunity to satisfy basic
needs . . . But the necessary additional ingredient is a persistent,
unrelenting threat to the satisfaction of these needs", (p.8).
Social relations, identification with the group around,
initial conceptions of moral rules (e.g. Strauss, 1954), possi¬
bilities for interpersonal attraction and affiliation (e.g. Byrne,
1961), conformity (e.g. Zajonc & Kishorwashi, 1961), exploitation,
competition and co-operation, can only arise when the individual
and society cease to be dependent on the immediate requirements
of basic needs for survival. Concepts of codes of behaviour arise,
at first related to behaviour in a given situation, later generalised
and made more abstract and extensive (Piaget, 19 32? Strauss, 1954).
Piaget suggested that there may first develop a 'morality of constraint',
which may later shift to a 'morality of co-operation'. (in the experi-
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mental games employed earlier this should create a more co-operative
response where the 'punishment' for joint non-co-operation was in¬
creased (the DD outcome), and decreased co-operation for decreased
punishment, in the case of subjects acting according to a morality of
constraint, but not in the case of subjects acting according to a mor¬
ality of co-operation, where the CC outcome remained the same, or even
if it was changed.) Sherwood (l966)reports data which seem to in¬
dicate that the morality of constraint of the young child characterises
the moral judgements and attitudes toward punishment of the authoriiari-
an adult. 'Thus there is a direct link here with the studies of the
effects of authoritarianism and social rigidity on behaviour in ex¬
perimental games mentioned earlier (Chapter l).
On the other hand, the ability to establish elementary social
relations enables a 'need for affiliation' to be expressed. Some
people may not be interested in which game they play, or who wins, but
in who they play the game with. The social phenomenon of the bridge
club is an excellent example - a game of strategy which may be played
as an exseusefor establishing social relations. In which case other
factors affecting- interpersonal attraction, such as attitude similar¬
ity, become important in maintaining the club, and may be much more
important for those high on n-affiliation (Byrne, 196l). Those
high on achievement motivation (which might be another reason for
joining a bridge club) will conform to the group norms as long as
it is necessary for achievement, but not otherwise (Zajonc & Kishor-
washi, 196l), so that a bridge club ma.de up only of high-achievers
might be less likely to continue as a stable institution. Though
as indicated earlier, games of strategy like bridge, may not be
sufficiently motivating for the high-achiever, to want to join a club;
he might join it in order to make the right social contacts to advance
his position.. Other-people play bridge or chess because they are
fascinated by the strategic thinking involved, the challenge of out¬
witting another good player, etc. Again this depends on the estab¬
lishment of elementary social relations and is not possible in ex¬
tremes of deprivation. In addition it seems to require a fairly
high degree of intellectual maturity, be associated with obedience
training in childhood, and arise in politically complex, stratified
societies.
Paced with with what have here been described as strategic situations,
it might be suggested that some people are interested in who they play
the game with (person-oriented); some people are interested in who wins
(outcome-oriented); others are interested in which strategies to choose
to out-wit the other player (strategy-oriented) , and are not especially
interested in the stakes per se. nor do they mind who they play the game
with as long at it is someone who will give them a 'good game'. Again
these may be represented as three dimensions, as in Figure 6.1,
These dimensions seem to be similar to Cooper's P-logic, E-logic
and C-logic, yet not quite. Outcome-orientation suggests Effects-
thinking; Strategy-orientation suggests Causes- thinking. Processes-
thinking implies employing tacit 'moral' laws (though I find terms causes
and processes insufficiently appropriate). If there is a close relation
between moial. laws and affiliation and identification with others, as
seems not unlikely, then person-orientation may be the same thing as
P-logic.
The large number of studies employing game-theoretic situations
have demonstrated that the assumptions of game theory enable rather
little prediction of the choices of real subjects, and that the pat¬
tern of these choices varies according to the subjects selected. It
is usual to analyse the behaviour in terms of the statistical relations
of the response patterns. These response patterns may be taken to re¬
flect the strategic thinking of the subjects, and it was argued earlier
on the basis of the present experimental results that subjects show
different modes of strategic thinking. It may now be suggested that
Outcome-mode. Person-mode and Strategy"mode are the fundamental cog¬
nitive processes involved. These modes are not imagined as mutually
exclusive but as concentrations on particular aspects of the strategic
situation. They may be regarded as learned as a result of social in¬
teractions in the previous experience of the individual, where P-mode
and S-mode are more complex than O-mode. Just as Piaget did
not suggest that the moral responsibility of the child developed
through a precise set of stages, as in intellectual development,
so it not suggested here that there is a generalised progress from
one stage to the other, with the adult employing the most advanced
mode in all situations. On the other hand, the young child is un¬
likely to able to use S-mode in any interaction.
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There is somewhat more significance to this theory than may
at first appear. The logic of the Prisoner's Dilemma is that un¬
less psychological .judgements are made about the other player
game-theoretic rationality leads to the absurd result of mutual loss
in the face of possible mutual gain. Two game theoreticians will
presumeably continue to make the D choice, on the basis of their
calculations of the dominating strategies, an example of pure
Strategy-mode. But a player who can also think in Person-mode,
and is not too subject to Outcome-mode, can begin to consider the
choices of the other player, and, for example, try to lure him into
making the C choice, only later to face the strategic defection of the
first player. Alternatively, a player can, if he adds P-mode to
S-mode, try to communicate by his pattern of responses that he
is prepared to come to a tacit agreement on the CG outcome. A
player employing the pure P-mode will note that both he and the
other player can be better off if they choose C ('morality of co¬
operation'), but not be able to think sufficiently strategically
to deal with an opponent who treats him as sucker. If he continues
to lose by playing C, the tendency to choose D, both in the hope of
winning back something, and to punish the other player ('the morality
of constraint'), will increase. For such a person, continued defection
by the other player may lead to emotional distress ('How can he do
this to me?'), mixed with conflict over whether to defect himself or
not. Punishing the other player may provide primitive satisfaction,
but it may result in guilt since it means breaking the self-established
'moral code'. The psychological conflict produced by this complex of
emotions may result in withdrawal, 'aggression'. (expressed either
in the pattern of responses, or, for example, in the perceptual
ratings (Chapter 4) of the opponent), or considerable anxiety.
The anxiety, 'blind' aggression and withdrawal, in their different
ways, will each hinder strategic thinking.
The extreme Outcome-thinker will also have problems in dealing
with a more sophisticated player. He will probably choose D, and
if he wins he'll choose it again. If he loses, he may try C, but
then may lose even more. Faced with such a 'double-bind', he will
probably choose D, the lesser of the two evils, which also gives
the possibility of winning more if the other player chooses C. If
he wins when choosing C, he may try it again, but will also notice
that he could then just as well win the larger sum by choosing D.
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Outcome-mode may be mixed with Person-iiode to produce the subject who
says about DD, 'Well, at least this is bad for him too'. With a
greater degree of P-mode a player could think, ' Since we are both
in the same boat, perhaps we could change from the DD 'boat' to the
CC 'boat''. The difficulty may be to persuade the other player to
do so. If A fails by a simple change to the C choice, he may revert
to the D choice, or resort to random choices.
Outcome-code may also be mixed with Strategy-mode. Her© the player
tries out strategies to achieve his best outcome, mixing his choices,
randomising, luring and defecting - but all without taking sufficiently
into account what the other player is trying to do. The response pat¬
terns are not seen as a means of communication. Attempts at attaining
mutual co-operation by the other player are not perceived, or are seen
as signs of weakness, or as proof that A's strategy is successful.
Finally, all three modes may be mixed. Such a player is able to
think strategically )S-mode) about how to make the best of the situa¬
tion (O-mode), given that the freedom .of action of another player
makes constraints on his own behaviour (P-mode). This, rather
than the pure S-mode, may be seen as the ideal, since it is necessi¬
tated by the existential nature of strategic social relations, as
demonstrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma (Lumsden, 1964).
Games of chance are marked by the absence of P-mode and S-mode.
In a game of chance, no-one is !responsible' for the outcome, yet it
is the outcome which is important. The relation to responsibility-
training thus suggests that this kind of game is compensation for
behaviour normally expected, or an institutionalised regression to
the stage where one did not need to be responsible because, somdbody
else was being responsible for one (e.g elder siblings, parents, etc.).
Games of -physical skill provide ways of ahcieving an outcome
by one's own efforts. In their pure form they do not involve strategic
thinking, though they often involve other players as standards of meas¬
urement. They typically have graded results (times, goals, numbers
of wins, etc.) which, more than in games of skill and strategy, en¬
able the degree of achievement to be ascertained. In the game of
chance, the interest is not so much in who wins, but in how much.
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A1though the value of the prize may be measureable, its value
reflects nothing back to the winners he was just lucky. In the
game of physical skill, the prize itself may not be very valuable.
But the honour, which is a measure of the achievement, is reflected
directly back on the winner. The interest is in who wins, but also
in who he wins against? there is no honour or achievement in beating
a bad player. In the game of skill, the other player acts more as
a stimulus than as a constraint (as may be the case in a game of
strategy). In society, the high-achiever may be restricted in his
pursuit of achievement by others; the game of skill may also be
an outlet therefore, where achievement is encouraged. Indeed, the
game may be taken so seriously as to provide a means for the •under¬
privileged to gain recognition in society (football in Brazil,
boxing and athletics for the American Negro).
It is interesting to note that considerations of strategy seem
to be coming more and more into games of skill, particularly in
the case of football. This may be a reflection of the requirements
of the game, since it involves complex interactions between the players,
in contrast to many athletic sports. But it may also be related to
changes in modern society, where the high-achiever has to think
strategically.
The pure game of strategy provides an opportunity to indulge
in pure S-mode. The games have complex rules, but within this .
framework there are none of the restrictions of everyday social
relations, no requirement for a 'morality of constraint' or a
'morality of co-operation'. Bluff and double-bluff, false trails,
etc., are all part of the game. There is no place for O-mode
and P-mode: the 'fun of the game' is to outwit another clever,
pure strategist.
All the classes of games are therefore models of competitive
situati ons, where the outcome is determined by chance, physical
prowess and strategic skill respectively. As social phenomena they
may perhaps be regarded as directly reflecting basic aspects of a
culture, or alternatively as mirror-image reflections, providing
compensatory outlets for behaviour which is not normally sanctioned.
The mirror-image hypothesis may be the better explanation. For none
of the classes of games allow opportunity for P-mode which is essential
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for social relations in anything other than a purely competitive,
Darwinian society. P-mode involves recognising the personality
of the other player, attempts to communicate, social
contact, trust and tacit agreements and the establishment of
norms of behaviour. The human dilemma is that we can never
know exactly how the other person will react, or how he will, inter¬
pret our behaviour or attempts at communication. The greater
the social and cultural distance, the greater this problem is.
For this reason pure P-mode is insufficient since the dilemma
necessitates some degree of S-mode. But neither is pure S-mode
adequate, as it requires assumptions about the nature of the other
player which may be invalid, and can only be checked by establishing
social contact and accepting the personality of the other player.
Thus attempts to regard war as a game of chance, a game of
physical or technical skill, or a game of strategy are all false.
If a situation is strategic (that is, it involves other actors,
and not only outcomes and strategies, as in games against nature),
then the nature of the other players must be taken into account.
Their actions cannot be predicted entirely from a consideration of
the outcomes and the choices except in special cases, such as zero-
sum games with known payoffs, no-conflict non-zero-sum games, etc. To
apply pure S-mode in social, political and international relations
it must be shown that the situation is either not strategic, or fits
one of these special cases.
The three modes of strategic thinking - Outcome-mode, Person-
mode and Strategy-mode - (which may be pure or mixed) may each be
appropriate to particular situations, but in most social situations
a mixture involving all three is required. These modes may result
from the attempt to cofni?ive?y/^?ructure cfthematrix describing the
strategic situation along one or other dimension. They may also result
from long-term social learning processes in the life of the individ¬
ual, and so may reflect cultural patterns.
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6.3. Approaches to the measurement of strategic thinking.
In the previous section, ideas from several areas of
research were brought together to produce the outlines of a poten¬
tial theory of strategic thinking. Having done so (the point
at which the philosopher might stop), it is incumbent upon the
empirical reseaacher to show the existence of the variables, measure
them, and demonstrate the nature of their relationships. Since this
is the last chapter of a thesis rather than the first, such a task
cannot be achieved here. Nevertheless, some possible methods
will be indicated. Some of these have already been initiated; it is
hoped that subsequently they may all be thoroughly investigated.
An analysis of the psychological basis of strategic must, by
the nature of the topic, involve complex, multivariate research. A
great many areas of psychology are involved, and their extension
to social and political aspects brings in other disciplines too.
The suggestions below may seem more than enough for a few research¬
ers to handle, yet inadequate to the task. The hope is that a start
can be made, and at least the possibility of further fuuitful work
on the subject demonstrated.
6.3.1. Experimental studies.
A number of experimental studies immediately suggest themselves.
(i) A major aspect of the theory was that subjects must reduce the
complexity of the strategic situation. A considerable amount of work
has been done on human information processing which can be brought in
here. The obvious experiment is to compare the performance of players
in games of different complexity. This can be increased by:
1. Giving the player more choices, increasing the number of
strategies available to him;
2. Increasing the opponent's possible choices, thus increasing
the number of possible outcomes for the player without increas¬
ing the number of choices available (though it does increase the
number of strategies, since these are regarded as the pattern of
choices contingent on the choices of the other player);
3. Increasing the number of players, and the possibilities
for communication.
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There are a number of technical problems which it cannot be
cxaimed have been overcome. Increasing the complexity of the game
increases the problem of a complete strategic (game-theoretic) analy¬
sis, and hence of relating the subjects's behaviour to particular
logico-strategic aspects of the situation. Secondly, choice reaction-
time is usually taken as a measure of information-processing time.
But in iterated non-zero-sum games of the Prisoner's Dilemma type the
same game is repeated many times, often inter-trial periods being
regular intervals determined by the experimenter. Information process¬
ing may continue duirng the entire iter-trial period. This might be
avoided by interchanging four or five matrices, on a random basis,
presenting them to the subjects as slide projections requiring a
reaction as soon as possible, the reaction time being from the start
of the viewing time. This is technically possible, but the effect
on behaviour in simple games needs to be examined . first.
Thirdly, is the more interesting theoretical problem as to how
to distinguish between the modes of strategic thinking, if they exist.
Table 5.12 showed that two groups of women could be distinguished on
the basis of the conditional probabilities of choosing co-operation
after each of the four possible outcomes in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
The low-C group responded most to the DD outcome, the high-C group
most to the CC outcome. The figures for the men (presented in Chapter
2) fall in between, but are more like the latter group. These patt»
erns seem to illustrate a Piaget-type 'morality of constraint' on
the one hand and a 'morality of co-operation' on the other; in our
terms, Outcome-mode and Person-mode respectively. But the S-thinker,
playing against someone who i s tryigiD co-operate, might also be low in
co-operation. Two solutions seem to be available. The first is to
compare behaviour in several games, against different players, to
see which aspects of the situation the players are consistently re¬
acting to. The other is to use intensive and systematic questioning
of the subjects as to how their decisions were made.
(ii) Standard experiments could be carried out using subjects re¬
presenting groups selected on the basis of a number of criteria. One
such group might the members of a bridge or chess club. Is it possi¬
ble to distinguish the behaviour of such a group from 'normals' in the
Prisoner's Dilemma? If so, in what way is their behaviour distinguished?
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How does their behaviour differ, for example, from that of football-
players and social workers? Other criteria for comparing selected
groups are suggested below (6.3.2, 6.3.3).
(iii) As discussed in Chapter 5, the sources of the differences
between men and women in their behaviour in the PD game are not
yet clear. We should mainly imagine that they are due to differ¬
ences in mode of strategic thinking, which is one of the things we
should hope to determine by further research. But it was also sug¬
gested earlier that the difference may be due status differences.
An experiment designed to test this hypothesis has been designed,
where men will play men, and also men who they imagine to be women,
and vice versa for women. In addition high-school students will
play university students, and perhaps university stud' nts will play
university staff. The hypothesis is that like-status pairs will
be more co-operative than unlike status pairs.
6.3.2. Psychological testing.
"When a person has a problem or worry it is best for him
not to think about it tut Id keep busy with more cheerful things."
"Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earth¬
quake or flood that will destroy the whole world."
"In times like these a person must be pretty selfish if
he considers primarily his own happiness."
"My blood boils over whenever a person stubbornly refuses
to admit he is wrong."
"There is usually only one best way to solve most problems."
"I prefer to stop and think before I act even on trifling
matters."
The first two statements above, which seem to indicate ex¬
tremes of Outcome-mode, are taken from the California F-scale, re¬
nowned as a measure of authoritarianism. The next two, which in¬
dicate a concentration on the negative side of Person-mode, are
from the Rokeach Dogmatism scale. The last iwo, which suggest
Strategy-mode, are from the Gough-Stanford rigidity scale. The
items are exceptions in that they are relatively 'pure', but many
of the others give a strong impression of trying to 'catch' mixed
modes, the first two tests concentrating (in a very negative way)
on Outcome and Person-modes, the third test (also in a negative
•In¬
direction) on Strategy-mode. A number of the items have been
chosen from each test, and some additional ones added, giving
a preliminary scale of fifty items. It is hoped to use these
as a basis for deriving a scale of Mode of Strategic Thinking
(MST). After pilot testing, modification of the items and
some pruning, they will be tried out on some broad samples and
the results submitted to factor analysis. Given that there are
signs of simple structure, correlations will then be attempted
with other measures (social position, sex, behaviour in ex¬
perimental games, etc.), and the scales below.
A second scale - the Activities Scale - lists twenty-five
common activities, and the respondent is asked to list in rank
order his top five preferences, and the top five preferences of
his countrymen. This activities can be broadly classified into
those involving physical skill or pleasure, chance, strategy,
personal contactsj and mixtures of two such aspects (e.g.
dancing).
A third scale - the Human Relations Scale - presents multiple-
choice answers to a number of questions on human and sexual relations.
A fourth scale, the Family Scale, asks for an order of preference
first on the question of who is the most important member of the
family, and then a set of alternative aims in bringing up children.
This scale emphasises achievement, responsibility and obedience train¬
ing. The Human Relations Scale presents alternative Outcome,
Person and Strategic approaches to friendship and sexual relations.
These scales are in the first stages of development only and
so will not be presented here. . Much work- is required before it
can be determined whether they have any value. The ideal, however,
is to produce a relatively simple and easily administered set of
tests which correlate highly with particular patterns of behaviour
in strategic situations• The tests can then be more readily and
widely used than can experiments as measures of strategic thinking.
6.3.3. Developmental, social and cross-cultural studies.
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One of the assumptions of the theory is that the be¬
havioural differences observed in experimental games are the
result of social learning. It might therefore be hoped that
the development of such differences could be followed through
several age-groups in several social groups. It may then be
possible to determine to what extent the differences are due
to differences in social and intellectual development, and to
what extent 'sub-cultural' factors, such as child-parent relat¬
ions, socialisation to competition and co-operation, etc. Sex
differences in behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma-type games could
also be explored in the 'Piaget-sociological' manner. Do
differences appear in only certain types of family and social
background? If so, at what age do these differences appear?
A number of studies have used children as subjects, but the
ages and social backgrounds have not been, as yet, systematically
varied. It was suggested in Chapter 5 that women students from
a lower social position who are more competitive in the PD game
may be so not because they are women, or because they are from
lower social position per se. but because they have had to be more
competitive incrder to get to the university from that lower social
position. Whether or not they are such a specially selected group
of women, or of people from lower social position, could be deter¬
mined by studies employing more representative samples of women
and social positions.
If there are social differences, there will probably also be
cultural and national differences in strategic thinking, which may
be of great significance. Cantril's studies of hopes and fears,
McClelland's studies of achievement motivation, Osgood's studies
of semantic meaning, and Mushkoji's (1967) study of differences
in bargaining procedure in a small simulation, _ all point to
the importance of cultural variaoles. If we can identify modes
of strategic thinking, then we can hope to measure their distri¬
bution in different cultures. There will, however, be considerable
methodib gical problems in transferring the measurement techniques
from one culture to another, particularly in the case of the kind
of tests described above. Experimental methods may therefore be
preferable.
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The findings in Chapter 4- suggested that possibility that
people are evaluated on different dimensions in different cul¬
tures. If this proves to be the case, then it is not unlikely
that there will be systematic relationships with the predominant
modes of strategic thinking employed in the culture. OS-cultures
(Outcome and Strategy modes) might be expected to emphasise power
dimensions in their perceptions of people; PS-cultures might em¬
phasise empathy, morality, honesty, integrity, etc.; OP-cultures
kindness, pleasantness,moral virtue, etc.
6.3.4-. Strategic studies. 1 .
Strategic studies is here used in the more usual way to
refer to studies of political and military strategic problems.
If the quotations at the beginning of the chapter are now referred
to it will be seen that the first two (Mao and Gandhi) seem to
illustrate PS (mixed Person and Strategy-modes) and P modes
respectively. The third quotation (Dulles) shows OS thinking,
and the fourth (von Clausewitz) pure S-mode. These quotations
are purely illustrative, and are in no way 'sampled' from the
writings of the authors concerned.
Nevertheless, it would be technically possible to make rep¬
resentative samples of the writings of political and military
writers, making a content analysis coded for indications of the
various modes of strategic thinking. At this stage, however, a
dictionary of words or phrases acting as tags for a computerised
content analysis might be premature. Strategic analysis requires
study of the logical connections between the 'tags', but, with
modern developments in computerised linguistic analysis, it is
quite likely that this will be possible in the near future.
The quotations above suggest that even a simple analysis, adding
up the references to the actors, outcomes and choices, would pro¬
duce some interesting and significant differences.
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6.3.5. The multivariate analysis.
In the foregoing a number of research approaches
have been outlined. Yet none of them could be fully satis¬
factory alone. None of the individual measures can be ex¬
pected to tap pure dimensions of the kind discussed, even
if they should exist as separate dimensions. For the very
nature of the strategic situation, as has been emphasised
in this disseration, is that not only goals and paths to
the goals are involved but also players. A complete em¬
phasis on only one of these factors is doomed to failure
in the majority of social situations. Therefore one can
presume that any normal person, functioning in day-to-day
social interactions, has considerable training in handling
all the aspects of the strategic situation. Nevertheless,
the suggestion is that some persons do not fully cope with
all the factors, and this affects their performance in ex¬
perimental games, on certain psychological tests (authoritari¬
anism, rigidity, Machiavelliansim, etc.), in social relations
and in strategic decision-making.
The single variable experiment of classical physics has
proved of limited utility in psychology (and even in physics).
What must concern us is the attempt to determine the multiple
conditions " for the behaviour we observe in an experiment, or
the verbal response we record on a test, questionnaire or inter¬
view. In order to simplify for ourselves the relations of con¬
ditions to behaviour we construct models and theories which we
hope have predictive value.
The subject matter of strategic thinking is essentially
multivariate, and therefore the methods of study outlined above
are seen as complementary means of investigating the possible
relationships of underlying variables. With the development
of modern techniques of factor analysis, multivariate analysis
of variance, discriminant analysis, canonical correlation, etc.,
and the computers which enable years of calculating work to be
done in minutes, it is possible to conceive of employing a var¬
iety of techniques, each of which may be expected to be partially
measuring the underlying variable. This is the only approach
possible in the study of the psychology of strategic thinking.
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6.4. Conclusion.
Interest in strategy is as old as the oldest military-
based civilisations, but the systematic study of the cognitive
processes involved is a recent development. The theory of games
of strategy and its extensions, _ and the growing body of experi-,
mental studies,combined with a number of other contemporary theories
of psychology and social behaviour, make this one of most dynamic
'forward areas' of present social science research.
The present analysis has been conducted at two levels, which
it is hoped are not too incompatible. On the one hand, it is be¬
lieved that 'strategic thinking' represents an important area of
psychology, which has not been adequately considered by psycholo¬
gists. Because of the theoretical and technical developments
I believe the area can be 'opened up' to psychologists, and in¬
tegrated with the body of psychological knowledge. At some points
it may indeed have important implications for psychological theory.
An example is that of operant conditioning and behaviour therapy.
To the animal in the Skinner box, no actor can be discovered as
causing the stimulus; the situation may be regarded as a game
against nature, as far as the animal is concerned. The well-proven
principles of reinforcement may be employed in the human situation
only to the extent that they are games against nature - such as
many kinds of skill-learning, removal of undesirable habits, etc.
Where the human being is in some kind of strategic relationship,
as with a therapist or experimenter, the nature of the 'game'
must be determined before conditioning techniques can be freely
applied. (For some examples of human 'games' see Berne, 1967.)
The other level is that of a psychologist trying to apply
psychological methods and theories to problems of interest to
researchers in a number of other disciplines. The reason for this
Is the common endeavour to throw light on problems of human conflict
by means of social science techniques. The interchange with other
disciplines is extremely stimulating, though perhaps the result
appears on occasion to be something of a kaleidoscope. Rather
than pick out one or two pieces, an attempt to construct some
kind of pattern has been made here, mainly for the author's en-
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couragement, but also in the hope of making some sense to a number
of other readers, some of them psychologists, some political scien¬
tists and some sociologists. At a time when a number of psycholo¬
gists have taken up an interest in international problems, so have
political scientists involved themselves in experimental studies of
decision-making processes and the measurement of perceptual variables
in diplomatic communications. There is a flood of recent interdisci¬
plinary books on international behaviour, and a rapid growth of re¬
search institutions. In this thesis I have therefore also tried to
mark out an area in which I might hope to accomplish further substan¬
tive research 'keeping in the swim, without getting lost in the flood'.
The area chosen is that of strategic thinking and data was obtained
from an experimental study, using Norwegian student subjects in a
series of iterated non-zero-sum games, and from a field study of the
conflict in Cyprus. A emphasis was placed on the necessity to meas¬
ure the values that the participants have for the outcomes available,
and their perceptions of each other. How we perceive a person may
be important in determining our behaviour towards him, but this has
not been considered in the theory of games, the basis of many studies
of strategic thinking. The ladder-ratings of Cantril's Self-Anchoring
Striving Scale were used as a measure of utility, and the Semantic
Differential as a measure of person perception. The results of
the latter suggest that there is a strong interaction between sub¬
jects, scales and object-persons, and further research is required
before the dimensions of Evaluation, Potency and Activity can be
freely assumed in studies of person perception.
The relation between attitudes, behaviour and social background
is of interest to many, and the experimental study here indicated a
relation between social background and behaviour but not attitudes.
The behaviour seemed to indicate differences in the mode of strategic
thinking, and tbis was distinguised from cognitive style in expressing
attitudes.
Differences in cognitive mode are potentially important and a
number of studies indicate ways in which they might develop. The
separate studies may be given some coherence by analysing them in
terms of the basic elements of the strategic situation - actors,
choices and outcomes - which may be the origin of three modes of
strategic thinking. A number of research approaches to the further
study of strategic thinking seem to be available.
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APPENDIX.
Instructions for the experiments.
"We would like you to perform some decision-making tasks.
On each occasion you are asked to choose one of only two possible
choices. You may indicate your deciaon either by not pressing;
the switch, or by pressing the switch, (in the latter case an in¬
dicator lamp will light up on your onw panel, the other subject's
panel and the experimenter's panel.)
There are two of you, A and B, and you may both choose either
to put your light off or on on each occasion. You will know whch
the other person has chosen from his indicator light, and he will
know which you have chosen. Thus on each occasion you may make
the same choice as each other, or different ones. There are there
fore four possible outcomes:
A off, B off
A off, B on
A on, B off
A on, B on,




In the diagram, A's choice is the first one in each 'window',
B's is the second. You will gain or lose a certain amount of
money according to which of the four 'windows' results from your
decisions.
There are four separate experiments: the Red, Blue, Yellow
and Green problems.
NOW TURN TO THE FIRST EXPERIMENT, OVER THE PAGE.
B's choices
Off On







If you press the switch and the other subject does not, you
will gain 10 ore and he (or she) will lose 10 ore.
If he (or she) presses the switch and you do not, he (or she)
will gain 10 ore and you will lose 10 ore.
If neither of you press the switch you will both gain 5 ore.
If both of you press the switch you will both lose 5 ore.
B's choices
Off On
5, 5 -10, 10
10, -10 -5, -5
A'S PAYOFF IS THE FIRST OF THE PAIR IN EACH SQUARE, B'S IS THE SECOND.
The problem will be repeated many times, and on each occasion
you may make which ever choice you think best. Every 10 seconds the
experimenter's light will flash and you are asked to make your decis¬
ion immediately afterwards by pressing or not pressing your switch.
The outcome is indicated by which lights are on or off 3 seconds
after the experimenter's light stops flashing.
You may keep a record of each outcome on the sheet of paper
provided, so that you can keep an account of your gains and losses
(and of the person's, if you wish, so that you know how much he (or







If you press the switch and the subject does not, you will
gain 10 ore and he will lose 10 ore.
If he presses the switch and you do not, he will gain 10 ore
and you will lose 10 ore.
If neither of you press the switch you will both gain 5 ore.
If both press the switch you will both lose 50 ore.
B'S choices
Off On
^ Off 5, 5 -10, 10
choices. On 10, -10 -50, -50
A'S PAYOFF IS THE FIRST OF THE PAIR IN EACH SQUARE.
The problem will be repeated many times, so to save time we shall
do it very very quickly. Every 10 seconds you are asked to make a




Your country is occupied by an enemy power and you are the
leaders of two ideologically different resistance groups, A and B.
While you both hope to defeat the enemy, you are also fighting to
prevent the ideological domination of the country by the other group
after the war.
You have both been arrested and are in separate cells of the
prison where you cannot communicate with each other or with anyone
else. Both of you know of the other's activities in the resistance.
The occupying power has offered you a choice - either to talk about
the other's activities - indicated by putting the switch to ON to
call the .jailer - or not to say anything - shown by leaving the
switch OFF.
1. If you give evidence and he does not, he will be shot
and his resistance group destroyed, while you will be set free,
though your movements will be watched. You will have a good chance
of joining in the continuing work of your resistance group, which
will certainly then gain power after the war.
2. If you keep quiet while he gives evidence against you, you
will be shot and your group destroyed, leaving your country open to
ideological domination after the war, and he will go free.
3o If neither of you say anything, you will both be kept in
prison under interrogation, and perhaps torture. On the other hand
you life will be saved and the resistance may be able to continue
operating against the enemy.
4. If both of you talk, you will both be sent to a prison
camp. Your lives will be saved, but both resistance groups will
be in danger.
Turn to the Ladder Rating Score Sheet. Imagine that the
top rung of the ladder 4 is the best possible situation for your
own personal life. Then:
Put an 'M' on the rung where you think 1 above should be.
Put an 'N' where you think 2 should be.
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(Resistance, contd.)
Put a 'P' where you think 3 should be.
Put a 'Q' where you think 4 should be.
Then fill in these figures in Matrix 4 on the sheet provided to
help you make your decision. The problem will be repeated many times
as if you had to make the decision for many members of the resistance
each time they came into the hands of the enemy over a period of years.
(Cuba.)
THE GREEN PROBLEM.
The world is divided into two powerful military alliances, A
and B, each equipped with nuclear weapons and delivery systems capa¬
ble of completely destroying the other many times over. You represent
the final decision-makers of each side.
Because of military and political moves made in recent weeks there
is now a state of crisis in which both sides have threatened to initi¬
ate serious military operations if the other side does not back down
when an ultimatum expires. Both sides fear that the other side will
make a nuclear attack, and the only way to avoid this may be to make
a pre-emptive attack with nuclear missiles.
At the moment that the ultimatum expires each of you has two
choices. You may either carry out your threat to initiate military
action, knowing that this will almost certainly lead to a direct con¬
flict; or you may hold back in the hope that the other side will
also hold back, so that nuclear war can be avoided and perhaps a
compromise achieved. However, beacause of the time taken to communi¬
cate between the two capitals, there is no possibility of communica¬
tion with the other side between now and when the ultimatum expires.
You must both make your decisions independently , without being able
to consult the other.
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(Cuba, contd.)
Mow turn to the ladder-rating Score Sheet, and mark on ladder
3 the values you give to the four possible outcomes of this situation.
1. If you initiate military action, as you have said you would
in the ultimatua, by putting the switch (It. and other side does not
and backs down, you will have a good chance of winning a rapid military
advantage, regaining your political prestige and silencing your critics
in time for the coming elections, and avoiding nuclear war. Put a
'G' on the rung of the ladder where you think this outcome should be.
2. If you back down, but the other side stands by their
u .timatum, they will win the political and military advantages. You
will be heavily criticised both in your own country and abroad, and
you may well lose the election as a result, putting a more extremist
government in your place. Put an 'H' on the ladder where you think
this outcome should be.
3. If neither of you press the button, so that neither
carries out his threat when the ultimaturns expire, though you will
lose face with your critics, you will both have some time to consider
a compromise, which may increase your chances of re-election, and
a nuclear war will have been avoided. Put a 'J' on the ladder where
you think this outcome should be.
4. If you both press the button to inj'i^te military action,
as you said you would, and as you are pressed to do by strong opin¬
ions at home and abroad, you may both be forced to use your nuclear
weapons and an all-out war may result. Put a 'K1 on the rung of the
ladder where you think this outcome should be.
Fill in the numbers from the ladder in the cells of the matrix
provided. The experiment will be repeated many times, every 10 sec¬
onds, so that many decisions can be made in a few minutes.
The light will flash at the moment the ultimatum expires and
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APPENDIX 2.
Experiment II: Introduction.
Variations in performance in Prisoner's Dilemma
games have been related not only to the structure of the
game (e.g. Rapoport & Chamnah, 196^)5 but to social and
personality characteristics of the players (e.g. ferhune,
1968).
Many of these findings may be conveniently summarised
by introducing the concept of modes of strategic thinking.
Support for outcome-oriented, person-oriented and strategy-
oriented modes may be found in such apparently unrelated
studies as- those of Cooper (1965? 1966) and Roberts, et al.
(1 959,1962,1963).
Outcome-oriented thinking implies an overemphasis on
tiie immediately-given gains and losses and an inability to
take account of the strategic factors in the situation.
Person-oriented thinking arises where personal and social
aspects of the situation predominate to the extent that,
while the immediate payoffs cease to be so important, the
player attempts to establish decision-rules of a normative
kind. Strategy-oriented thinking takes an 'amoral', long-run
approach, exploiting the strategic possibilities of the situ¬
ation.
In order lo examine these suggestions further a second
experiment was carried out where, in addition to the procedure
adopted in the previous experiment, subjects were (i) required
to record their prediction of the other player's choice before
each trial, and (ii) questioned immediately following the ex¬
periment about their strategic thinking.
Data on the predictions provides further information
about cognitive processes of the subjects. If a subject
predicts that ' he par:ner will choose C (co-operation)
a choice of C by the player clearly means something different
from a choice of D (defection).
The pos!-experimen:al interview gave informs tion not only
on the degree of difficulty, annoyance at losing, etc., experi
enced by the subjects, but also on whether :heir choices were
random, or determined by the immediate payoff! , at tempts a':
co-operating with or exploiting the other player, the long-run
gainsfor bolh, etc. This information, combined ut h the
pat em:, of respon. es, gives considerable suppor: 10 the
notion of different- modes of . raoegic thinking, .ad further,
that .hese modes are somewhat differently distri a ed amongst
men and women.
Experiment Ii.
In the previous study 30 psychology students at
the University of Oslo performed 100 trials of a Prisoner's
dilemma and three other games. A second experiment was
carried outline University of Bergen employing 120 women
subjects and 1h8 men in a 100-trial Prisoner's dilemma game.
The sample represents some 10 percent of the female population
and some 5 percent of the male population of the University.
Subjects were recruited by student assistants throughout the
University and thus while not entirely randomly selected they
are broadly representative of the student population not only
by sex but also by faculty and year of study. 1 Pairs of subjects
were matched by sex and social background.
3• Procedure.
Ss performed 100 trials of a Prisoner's Dilemma game with
the following matrix displayed:
B's choices
C D
A's C 6, 6 0, 10
choices D 10, 0 2,2
(This is simply a linear transformation, of the matrix (1,1),(-2,2)
(2,-2) , (-1,-1) by the formula 2(x + 2), where x is each value in
the matrix. The value of T, the 'temptation' to defect, is then
increased from 8 (2(2 +2) =8) to 10. Tnis transformation has
the effect of removing the negative values, which are a practi¬
cal problem, while retaining the structure of the game with a
slightly decreased index of co-operation (see Rapoport & Cham-
nah, 1965). For tnis game the index of co-operation,
r1 = f" _ s ~ ■) 0 - O = ^ne inciex r2 = j ~ s
-
1^—I—q = 0.6. The PD game used previously nad the
values r1 = 0.3, r2 = 0.75-
Each subject was placed in a separate room without knowing
who the other subject was. (To avoid inadvertent meetings osie
subject arrived half an hour before the other and filled out a
questionnaire; the second subject completed the same question¬
naire after the experiment.) Before each S was a panel con¬
taining a switch and three small lamps. Each S controlled one ■
of the lamps, the third lamp being flashed by E to indicate
when each choice was to be made. Instructions were given botn
in writing and verbally by E in language avoiding indicating
competition or co-operation.
Immediately before the s tart of the experiment each S
made a rating of himself on a 35-scale Semantic Differential.
At the end of the experiment Ss rated the other subject on the
same 35 scales. In tne case of the males, a second rating of
themselves was tnen made, this time specifically in relation
to the otner subject.
At the end of the experiment a 'debriefing' interview was
conducted and the sum of the payoffs was paid out (in Norwegian
ore) together with a modest participation fee. (This was nev¬
ertheless considerably larger than the 'winnings', thus reduc¬
ing real money differences between the subjects.)
h. Results of Experiment 11.
Responses on the first trial. Table ! shows the results
on the first trial for men and women. 'Whilst the men were even¬
ly divided between C and D choices, tne women chose somewhat
more Cr,which wa. not the case in the previous investigation.
Slightly under half of both groups predicted that the partner
would choose G - that is, fewer predicted that the partner
would choose C than chose C themselves. Of those who pre¬
dicted that the partner would choose C about, one-third chose
D. Of those who predicted that the partner would choose D,
about one-half 01 the women and two-thirds of tne men them¬
selves chose D.
TABLE ; . Players' choice on Trial 1 by
prediction of partner's choice.
Predicted C 1 Predicted A No prediction
, ,-jn ^ ,ax- „u.ien t en To tath Women ken Tbtal
C on Trial 1 hi »+7 88 32 2h 56 3 3 6
D on Trial 1 •1 7 23 hO 27 h6 73 0 5
.
5
To tal 58 70 i 28 59 70 1 29 3 8 11
1 . for 3s wno predicted C, ciii-square = 0.058, df = 1 ,
p ^>.80, ie. there was no difference between men and women.
2. For 3s who predicted D, cni-square = hA07, df = 1 ,
p <.05, ie. a significant difference between men and
women.
3. For the total sample, choice on Trial 1 by prediction
of partner's choice, chi-square = i6.i2A, df = 1, p<*.001,
A. i prediction of tne partner', choice was signifi¬
cantly related go the player's choice.
iv-
On the first trial, though the prediction of the part¬
ner's choice plays a significant role in determining the
player's choice, this seems to be more the case for the men
than for the women.
Responses on Trial 2. Trial 2 is of particular interest
because the outcome of Trial 1 has by then provided the nLay¬
ers with tneir first real piece of information about each
other.
Table 2 snows the frequency of the four possible
outcomes on the first trial and the relative frequency of
eacn of these being followed by a C (co-operating) response
on Trial 2.
TABLE 2. Percentage frequency of the s
outcomes (f) and the relative
frequency of each being follow¬
ed by a C choice on Triai 2 (rfC).
Qui come on Women hen Total
Trial 1 f rfC f rfC f rfC
CC b2 . 27. .57 35- . 55
CD 22 .31+ 23 . 58 22 A 7
DC 22 . 2 23 .bb 23 • 37
DD 1 *+i .35 27 • 30 21 .32
While the four possible outcomes were evenly distributed
amongst the pairs of men, the women, as a consequence of the
higher proportion of C choices on the first trial, had a rela¬
tively higher proportion of CC outcomes. The men, on the
other hand, responded more frequently with C on Trial 2 after
three of the four outcomes.
H is the hypothesis that choices on both trials are
random. The expected and the observed distributions are com¬
pared in Table 3. .
TABLE 3. Expected (TO and ob:-erved frequencies
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Whilst the null Hypothesis can be rejected at the 5 per¬
cent level for the women and tne sample as a whole,it cannot
be rejected in the case of the men taken alone.
IL was the hypothesis that the subjects, like the rat in
the X-maze would ai'ornate their choices as a way of exploring
the situation. To avoid the difficulty of zero values in some
cells the hypothesis was tested with expected frequencies of
two-thirds of the sample alternating, the rest taking the same
choice. The null hypothesis that there is no difference between
the resulting distribution and tne observed frequencies can be
rejected at the .001 level for the whole sample, and for the
men and women taken separately (Table 9 ).
TABLh L. thcpec ted(f,) ana observed frequen¬
cies (f ) under II. (alternation)
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H,., was the hypotnee is thLat t he choice on Trial 2 would
be influenced by she 'rev/ard 1 or ' punish;meno' on Tria 1 1 -
the utility maximisation ny pot nesi s. T;his im D Lis i iia t
those subjects who received a high payoff (10 or 6) on Trjal
1 would make the • ame choice on Trial 2; those who received
a low payoff (2 or 0) would make the oppo:. 1 te choice on Trias
2. The results under this hypothesis are shown, in Table 5-
for tne women, but not for the men or the sample as a whole,
the null hypothesis under ily may be rejected at the .01 level.
While ai.mo.s-- exactly the same proportion (9o.o percent
of he women and '39.2 percent of the men) of those who won
on Lne firs;, rial changed their choice on r.he second trial,
i+7.8 perceu1 of ;he women and only 35-2 percen ;>f the men
wno lor' changed <heir choices.
TaBLL oub.jec who made Lue same or
oooosite choices on Trial 2 as
ct Tunc tion of whe ther tiiey ' ujso n 1W 011
or 'lost on Trial 1.
Wonen
Pane Change Ocl i
Kerf Toial^















1 61 1 07
*5 — 6 .H-O'S • d. 1 — ; • •J .01
11'■—10011 D > .80
7J = 2.013, af - 1 , P > . 10
.• n
, i10
he final hypothesis presented previously, H- , was that
id tend to hold their choices constant,
The
ruojectn woul t t n i tn i i t t; on tne
firs t lwo trials' in order to liiaoyndn e_ ene icn'orma tip:'. 'nu
sequence of trials required to predict any regularities in
the partner's pattern of choices will be shorter if the player
holds ais own choices constant Clearly this makes his behav¬
iour easier for the opponent to predict which may be a disad¬
vantage in a strategic, mixed-motive interaction. The increas¬
ed payoff in information may be offset by tne increased risk
of exploitation by. the partner, so that 'such constancies, may
be expected to be of limited extent except where the players
deliberately use their choices to attempt to communicate with
the partner (see later). Table 6 presents the results under
EL , again adopting the 'two-third: ' principle in order, to avoid
zero entries in the matrix..
TABLE Expected(fn) and observed frequencie:
(x ) under" 11, (information maximis¬
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a i 3 ,
d{ " 3,
p <. 0 5
p >• 50
P < .05
In the case of the women and the sample as a whole the
hypothesis can be rejected at the 5 percent level. For the
men, however, there is a greater than 50 percent chance that
there is no difference between the observed and the expected
frequencies under 1L .
j
it must be concluded that there is no clear evidence for
any of one hypotheses. But there are definite indications
that, on Ine .second crial trie women are more influenced by the
immediate effects of their choices (112)1 whereas the men may
well place more emphasis on acquiring information necessary
for explicitly strategic modes of tninking (H-,) .
Res ponses over 100 trials.
TABLE 7. Response indices over 100 trials.
women Men Total
Mean % C-choices 5-1 .
C-choices predicted 5-5-.
Correct predictions 59-
Condi t i ona i pro ba 1;i 1 i ty
of C following
- CC outcome (x)
- CD outcome (y)
-DC outcome (z) .
- DD outcome (w)
-own C-cnoice(eta)







-Mean CC outcomes 20.
Mean CD+nC outcomes 5-2,





















































1. Figures in brackets are those from Experiment 1
Table 7 shows that over 100 trials the men chose slightly
more Cs than the women (1=3.55-0, p < .0005, with a one-tailed
test) ; tnat they predicted more Cs (t = 3-5-51, p <.0005) one-
tailed test); and that more of their predictions were correct
(t = 5-.277, p< .0005, one-tailed test). The result was a
nigher occurrence of CC outcomes and fewer CD/DC and DD outcomes,
significant at the . .01, ,077 nn(j . oorr levels respectively.
Figure 1 shows the progression of responses nn.-l predictions
over 10° trials by blocks of 10. Vhilc both men a.oh '.'/omen improve
their predictions, the men are more successful. Only the men
appear to increase in the proportion of co-operative choices.
MeanpercentC-choi sand correctly-predictedhoices formenandwomenp rblock of10trials.
-viii-
i'he result.0 corroborate the previous findings to a re¬
markable degree and in spite of the differences in the appear¬
ance of the game (and a slight decrease in the indices of co¬
operation) . Very few of the figures in the Table 7 vary by
more than a few percent. The z value, the conditional proba¬
bility of choosing C following a DC outcome, was .13 larger
for the men in Experiment I, the largest discrepancy. The
pre; eat much more reoresentative sample suggests that the
high z for men in Experiment l compared with women is not a
reliable finding.
Compared with Rapoport and Cnamnan's (1965) results both
Norwegian sample: are less extreme in their responses, either
to tne partner's' co-operation or to his defection. Differences
between the sexes are °lso less marked in the Norwegian samples,
however, these results are obtained from 100 trials, whereas
Rapoport and Cnamnaa ran 300 trial:, and used a variety of
games and conditions. In the present experiment there was
an increa;ing difference between men and women which may or
may not have continued had the game been extended por a further
200 trials. (3ee Figure 1.)
The men respond with C more frequently than the women
following a CO outcome (x) (t = ".767, p <<!. 01 , one-tailed
test); following their own choice of C (Rapoport's eta.)
(t = '-i. 1 97 p <_ .0007); and following the partner's choice
of C (Rare-port's xi) (t = p P. 0007).
We may now take the prod letiins into account and test the
hypothesis that the men are ' more co-operative than the women
whatever the previous outcome and whatever their prediction
(Table 0).
TABLE 0. Relative frequencies of choices
1 vod oppo i p t j py~is n910r pmdp outcc• rnp.
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1. Two-tailed tost. The figures do not always sum to 1.00 due
to miss: niz nred ic t i ons .
-ix-
Table P> shows that the men are not more co-operative
on all indices. Following the CI and DD outcomes the
majority response of both men and women, was to choose D,
even though C was predicted as often as D. Following the
DC .outcome, though more of the women predicted that the
partner would choose D on the subsequent trial, bo percent
of the women and ^7 percent of the men chose E.
Following the CC outcome hh percent, of the women and
7? percent of the men on average predicted that the partner
would choose C. Cf these proportions 71.2 percent of the
men and rrr'.)l percent of the women themselves chose C.
Thw figures strongly suggest that the outcome of the
previous trial has a much more pronounced influence on
the choice on the trial than the prediction of the-
partner's choice. The predictions seem to reflect the
learning of probabilities since they coincide well with
the behavioural results. Note that the higher probabilities
are over-estimated and the lower ones underestimated (Vail,
1?5'd; Fdwards, irrd>; Van der Meer, 19^?) (Table $0. (In
TA3LK c. Predicted and aot.iml cond it tonal
probabilities of C-responses.
Women Fen
Pred j r tion Response Prod jet ion Response
n
L/ a f t e r V-/ .6U
after CD l , r7
c after un r\LAw . ,J n
wC a f t e r r\ r>,jJlJ . 00
ny u yr• • ( • > /
-> 7 mo a P,
• • •
~>n ) i n p 7
• > f •'/ * J i
. p)i # pc . a p
this situation it should be remembered that the utilities may
well play a role in determining the subjective probabilities.
If a player chooses C following CC he may predict that the
partner will also choose C not only because it is statistically
likely, but also because the -player -hopes to gain the high
payoff for mutual co-operation and avoid the low 'sucker's1
payoff for unrociproca ted co-operation. On the other hand,if a
nlaver chooses D after a DD outcome his hopes that the other
player will change his choice, thus giving the player the
maximum payoff," "may help to reduce his subjective probability
of trie partner choosing D. Il-wever, the latnr is not the case
here since the prediction of C following DD was the lowest and
lower than the actual resnons.es. The role of selective attention
or cognitive d1sronanc» should not be overlooked but does not
offer a simple exnlrna ti^n.N
From the behavioural responses we may draw the conclusion
that the men respond mere co-operatively to C-choices, and,
perhaps as a result of the more consistent C-choices, they
jjiake more cormct predict']ons. The predictions' themselves do
-X-
ion questionnaire. As a further source of
information on the decision processes a brief interview was
conducted, immediately following the experiment. Standard
questions were employed in an attempt to cover the major
possible modes of strategic thinking. The majority of the
subjects clearly identified one or two of the alternatives
as characteristic of their own performance.
TABLE io, P o s t -re s s i o n q u e s t i o nn; ia i r e .
wuestion. ' Women Pen %2 Uj
(/o) xty
1 . Was it difficult to predict
the other person's choices?
PERT LI kill C UL T
Q UITE D1 FFI CULT
. • r r*i p "P i ' '> Q \T
^ 'J llu vJ I
V AA L LitA O 1
3.k, 7 O< • 7
36.2 23.7
56.0 5k. 7
k 1' • -J 13.7
2. Do you think the other person
found it difficult A predict your
choices?
VERY" LIFFICULT 3«k 7.7
QUITE DIFFICULT k3 .2 35-2
QUI Til illA 3 Y kd .9 kl . Q
VERY EA E Y
. 8.5 1 5•5
3. Lid you try.to make your
choices difficult to predict?
YE3 60.0 32.6
UO kO.O 67.k
k. Was it difficult to decide
which cnoice to make?
VhRY DIFFICULT 0.8 0.0
QUITE DIFFICULT 8.k 9.7
QU± T A isA0 Y 52.1 bb. y
V ER Y EA 0 Y 7) & 7 23.k
5. who had the most control
over th e situation?
PLAYER 21 .2 28.1
PAR Til ER 22.9 19.2
BOTH EQUAL 55-9 52.7
6. nid you ciioo; e randomly?
V1. ijU 22. n 5. 5.
1M 0 70.0 9k. 5





• 939 1 <.001
-xi-
fABLE 1 0 (coa .a . )
vu0s t,L oil Women i .en X ell
7. did you choose mostly accord¬
ing lo your immediate gain:?
YES 39.0 39 * /
NO' 61 .0 60.3
8. ■ did you decide on a pattern




9. did you wait to see if you
could discover your partner':
strategy before you found a
straIegy yourse1f?
YES 6-3-7 96.3
N 0 !+2.7 37«3
10. did you try to communicate
a strategy to your partner?
YES 51.3 62.1
NO 6-8.7 37.9
1 1 . Jid you try to hide a
strategy from your partner?
YES 21.0 31.7
NO 79.0 68.3
12. did you try to influence
your partner', choice by 'reward¬




1j. Which of these stra
did you use most?
RiiNDOis (6) 9.2 1 .1■^-
E.t,YSC:i,S (7) 9+.3 6-1
PA IT nRN (o) ?. 6 6. 2
1NEOiii j\ lx0it (9) 7. b 13.5
CO; .J- JNlCrt.fION' C1 0) 2b. 6 ^5. 9
r.ACnlaV DLL! (11) 11.3 -12.3
r iiiU.r J_jii f J. OiM (12) 9.'- A • I
Ot.ner 3 9+ 6.1
don't know 5A 3.9
.015 1 >.95





-.81A 1 <. C
32.901 8 <.001
Somewhat more of the women found i t difficult to predict
the other perron'? choicer, which if alro shown by the results
of the predictions (Table 7). A higher proportion of women
answered that it war 'very easy' to decide which choice to make
60.0 percent, compared with 32.6 percent of the men, raid that
they tried to make their choices difficult to predict. A
significantly higher number of women chore randomly or tried
to influence their partner's choices by reward and punishment.
a higher proportion of men tried to communicate a strategy
to trie otrier player or to nide a strategy from the other player.
Over 100 trials tiiere are opportunities- for -.any strategies.
Question 13 asked which was the most characteristic strategy.
The most used by both men and women was the co-operative strategy
of trying to communicate with the partner. Almost twice as many
men (75-9 percent) as women (28.6 percent) answered in this cate¬
gory. The women otherwise chose most often random!./ , according
to the immediate payoffs (effects), or tried to manipulate
the other player by controlling the effects of hpr choices.
The men more often than the women attempted to gain informatlon
the partner'? response pattern.
The questions were bared on the theory that the situation
enables several Icels of cognitive Comdex'tv to function.
The spriest, level r random choices, taking into account ne' the r
the payoffs, -or the - tV-r player. The iext level involves taking
account of eithe1- of the "avoir s . the fact that one's c', o i ■" e s
d'roctlv a"feet thn outcome, or the other rlaver, that is, at
least one of the variables 'n the situation. Hbgher levels of
cogni t' r,e complex : ty take account of several or all of these
levels. These * aria hies can be conce'ved of as a three dimen-
si -ial space where 't is possible fo~ any individual to be high
or lew or. a nv d i mens ' on. '
The results of the questionnaire give considerable support
to th's conception. At least °0 percent of the subjects answer¬
ed to each category, suggesting that the hypothetical dimensions
were at 1 ea s t pa.rt5 al 1 y operative'. Fwrther it i s obv ious that
men and women are somewhat differently distributed in this
three-dimensional space. The men were more 'strategic', taking
more account of the need for :*nformation in order to predict
the partner's responses, either in order to communicate the 1r
own (c o - o p e r a t i ve) strategy to h' m, nr. to hide a (competitive^
strategy from him. Insofar as the women took account of tan
partner they •more often tried to influence the part .or by admiui-
ster inr rewards -and pvni shments rather than by more long-t-rm
stra1egi.es.
The quest-" on >f motivation arises but ;s difficult to answer.
About o auarter of ti e subjects admi ted they were a. litt-l?
annoyed at the partner when t.hev lost.. Manv others cxpresre'
interest in th° "'xu "' bv want j ng to moot -the other pnrs m.
hear mc re of the purr^se or the res'"l t,s , or by savi -,g they had
en j >yed t. There were ' nd ' eat j ons that the w me i were par-
t' cvlarly d 1 s interested, which might otherwise be a i explanation
of t- e h ■ gher j nc .1 donee of random cho ce .
-x 1 i i-
Somap.tic Different 1*1 ratings. A "'f-scale semantic differ¬
ential was employed to measure the perceptions that each
player had a) of himself, and b) of the other person.
Previously sixteen scales had been used,.drawn from Osgood.
Suci and Tannenbaum (19rr'7), where eight were assumed to be
loaded on the evaluative dimension, four on the Potency
dimension and four on the Activity dimension. A factor
analysis provided no support for this assumption since it
resulted in sever, factors both in the experimental study
and in the field study in Cyprus (though the factors wore
different in each case).
Several of the studies quoted by Kiron and Osgood (1966)
indicate that there is a scale-concept, interaction, such
that where a particular class of concepts is rated a factor
structure specific to that class may emerge. If, however,
the factor structure is more complex than the commonly found
three it becomes necessary to make a more representative
sampling of the possible factors by including more adjective
scales. As a preliminary seen towards developing a set of
scales appropriate to (i) ratings of persons and social
concepts, and (iiN Norwegian language and culture, a semi-
systematic method was adopted to draw out from the culture
an. appropriate list of adjectives. Starting with the
stimulus words used by Miron. and Osgood, a set of ten
person words, (e.g. MOTHER), twelve occupation words (e.g.
TEACHER), eighteen nationalities (e.g. SWEDES) and thirty-
six general social concept words (e.g. HUNGER, DEATH, WEALTH,
THE FUTURE) were presented to fifteen .judges (employees of
the University of Bergen). The judges were asked to write
all the appropriate adjectives they could think of for each
stimulus word. The result was some 1700 adjectives which
were then examined for frequency and generalitv of usage.
19 pairs of the most-used, non-synonvmous adjectives were
added to the 16 pairs used previously.
The factor analysis of the ratings of self and other
(two ratings of self were made by the men, one before and one
after the experiment; there were thus e sets of ratings in
all, which were 'strung cut' to make a matrix 699 x 9C) is
shown in Table 11 (principal components method with Varimax
rotation). As before 7 factors emerge. The total variance .
accounted for is approximately the same as in Experiment 1
(77.62 percent now compared with 7°.9° percent previously),
though this time the first factor is stronger (00.or percent
of the total variance) and more clearly a general evaluative
factor.
A factor analysis of' the GD self ratings with 99 indi ecs
of the responses in t he experiment shows no obvjous relet, ion-
ships. A fee tor analysis of the GD ratings of the partner
shows several relationships between response indices and
1. The criterion is the Kaiser test of number of factors
where the cut-off is at' the last latent root greater than
1.°. Cat,tell (1969) believes that this gives two few factor:
where the number of variables is less than 90 and too many
where there are more' than variables (p.207).
TAdLh
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IV V VI VII
fortunate-unfortunate o.l7 .08 -.19 -.13 .56 -.10 -.29
sociable-unsociable . 60 -.08 -.04 .35 -.19 -.02 -.12
unkind-kind -.38 -.19 .14 -.53 .16 .01 -.09
honest-disnonest .67 -.02 -.04 .01 .09 -.18 .09
unintelligent-intelligent -.15 .01 .76 -.19 -.05 .09 -.05
good-bad .40 -.14 -.38 -.01 -.23 -.20 -.25
altruistic-egoistic .37 .05 -.02 -.08 -.63 .07 -.11
quarrelsome-congenial -.21 -.34 .08 -.49 .22 .22 -.02
brave-cowardly .18 -.15 -.12 -.13 -.37 -.62 -.12
weak-strong .01 .00 .30 -.05 -.05 .65 -.14
severe-lenient .19 -.08 -.06 -.56 .22 -.23 -.07
feminine-masculine .06 o•i .17 .09 .06 .06 -.76
active-passive .25 -.43 -.05 -.09 -.05 -.51 .00
easy-aifficult .62 ,0b -.04 .30 -.32 .02 -.08
excitable-calm .03 -.76 .06 -.12 .09 -.01 .06
unintentional-deliberate -.07 -.49 .50 .10 -.08 .23 -.17
dominating-mild -.15 -.41 -.01 -.56 .15 -.14 .02
warm-cold .43 -.36 -.02 .25 -.10 .14 . -.26
hard-soft -.14 -.03 .02 -.67 -.01 -.17 .16
stupid-clever - .08 -.04 .76 -.20 -.08 .27 -.01
consci enti ous-unconsc ientious .69 -.00 -.03 .10 .05 -.09 .01
aggressive-phlegmatic -.03 -.59 -.01 -.38 -.01 -.26 -.05
reasonable-unreasonable • 56 .10 -.50 -.15 -.04 -.01 -.02
mo ral-immoral . 60 .16 -.10 -.10 .07 -.11 -.19
decisive-uncertain .31 .03 -.21 -.32 .03 -.50 -.07
helpful-troublesome .70 -.12 -.10 .32 -.18 -.05 .02
naive-wise -.03 -.03 .79 -.07 .01 .14 -.03
harsh-gentle -.14 .02 .11 -.61 -.29 -.02 .26
pieasant-unpleasant .54 .09 -.09 . 24 .18 -.06 -.37
authoritarian-democratic -.26 -.00 .16 -. 66 .08 -.04 -.13
ambitious-lazy .10 -.07 -.08 -.31 .08 -.44 -.25
weak-willed-strong-willed -.03 -.iO .15 -.13 -.25 .72 -.13
reliable-unreliable .73 -.07 -.08 .14 .05 -.07 .02
unjust-just -.40 .06 .26 -.49 -.09 .13 -.27
surly-sweet -.17 -.12 .17 -.60 -.08 .25 .32
CUi'iULAi'lV£j fmitCmn'i'Aum 20. 95 32.81 40.86 45.34 49.21 52.67 55.62
-XV-
the general evaluative factor (Table 12). The factor
loadings for the Ten and the women are very similar,
though with several exceptions. Whilst women use the
scale 'feminine-masculine1 to refer to their partner,
men use the scale 'excitable-calm'. The men have
higher loadings on the scales 'honest-dishonest', 'in¬
telligent-unintelligent' , 'conscientious-unconscientious' ,
'reasonable-unreasonable' and 'ambitious-lazy' whereas
the women give higher loadings to 'kind-unkind', 'warm-
cold', 'soft-hard', 'phlegmatic-aggressive', 'gentle-
harsh', 'just-unjust', and 'sweet-surly'.
5• Summary and conclusions. \
In Experiment II 120 women and 1U-8 men performed
100 trials of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. The results were
a clear replication of most of the response indices obtained
in Experiment I. Women were shown to choose fewer C (co¬
operative) choices than men, even following their own, their
partner's or mutual co-operation on the previous trial. Pre¬
dictions of the partner's response followed the actual proba¬
bilities, though the more likely choices were over-estimated
and the least likely unuer-estimated, both by men and women.
The predictions of the partner's choice seemed to have little
influence on the players' choices which were more a function
of the previous outcome.
Analysis of behaviour on the first and second trials,
over 100 trials and the results of the post-session question¬
naire indicated sex differences in strategic thinking. The
women were more often influenced by the immediate outcomes
and more often tried tu use their control over the partner's
immediate outcome as a means of reward and punishment. The
men more often used the partner's choices as a source of in¬
formation about his strategies in order to devise appro¬
priate counter-strategies for co-operation or exploitation.
Though the partner was evaluated on the semantic differ¬
ential in terms of his relative degree of co-operation, the
ratings of 'self' bore no obvious relationship to performance
In their ratings of the partner women more often stressed in¬
tegrative attributes (just, warm, gentle) whereas men used
more 'instrumental' scales (intelligent, honest, conscientiou
ambitious) .
The results of these experiments provide a basis for the
further empirical investigation of the cognitive substrate of
strategic behaviour which has been given little attention in
the litterature.
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